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Material Abstract  
My doctoral project is a study of epistemological and ethical issues in Evidence-Based 
Medicine (EBM), a movement in medicine that emphasizes the use of randomized controlled 
trials. Much of the research on EBM suggests that, for a large part of the movement’s 
history, EBM has considered expertise, mechanisms, and values as forces contrary to its 
goals and has sought to remove them from both medical research and the clinical encounter. 
I argue, however, that expertise, mechanisms, and values have important epistemological 
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Chapter 1: Outline and Textual History of EBM  
In this chapter, I provide an outline of the work as a whole and a short analysis of 
some of the most important texts within the Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) movement. 
These texts give shape to the EBM movement, beginning with a few classic claims about the 
quality and uses of evidence, continuing through the production of a plethora of manuals to 
bring these claims into practice, enduring a period of strong critique from many fronts, and a 
recent period of reflection, renaissance, attempts to improve implementation, and conceptual 
expansion. This analysis provides the foundation for the discussion of the treatments of 
particular concepts, including expertise, mechanisms and values, in EBM in the chapters that 
follow.  
Chapter 2: Expertise   
In this chapter, I examine the three models of expertise developed by EBM over the 
course of the movement. I argue that despite interesting shifts between the models, all three 
models are unclear on the question of any evidence-internal role for expertise, and what 
evidence-external roles for expertise are to be encouraged. This lack of clarity results in 
divergent recommendations for the role of expertise in medical education. As a result, I 
argue that EBM needs to develop a clearer account of expertise in medicine.  
However, this improved account of expertise need not be created from scratch. The 
disciplines of philosophy, artificial intelligence, sociology, cognitive science and psychology 
all have accounts of expertise which could be good resources for EBM. These accounts 
include those put forward by Dreyfus, Turner, Collins and Evans, and Bishop and Trout, and 
I examine each in turn. I argue that while none of these accounts can be adopted wholesale 
by EBM without EBM taking a stand on the internal/external issue of expertise and evidence, 
the Collins and Evans account fits best with EBM.   
Chapter 3: Mechanisms   
In the third chapter, I examine the debate about mechanisms in medicine, specifically 
about the appropriateness of mechanisms as a kind of evidence for the use of a particular 
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intervention. While philosophers of science have asked what kind of evidence might be 
needed in order to say that a mechanism is in place, the question in EBM has been instead 
should mechanistic knowledge be used reliability to support claims about whether 
interventions work.  
Historically, EBM has encouraged a distrust in knowledge of mechanisms as a way of 
selecting interventions and has even claimed that the investigation of causes is not the goal 
of medicine. These theses have been argued for by the use of a set of historical case studies 
in which interventions were endorsed for use based on a rationale about how or why they 
worked without evidence about efficacy, with poor results. Such examples include 
bloodletting, anti-arrhythmic drugs, and thalidomide, among others.   
In other sciences without this history of mistrust, mechanisms and causality remain 
important and legitimate concepts. Perhaps as a result of contact with these fields, 
philosophers of science have attempted to rehabilitate mechanisms in medicine. While there 
are many philosophers who have undertaken a version of this project, the version put 
forward by Federica Russo and Jon Williamson and further clarified by Phyllis Illari, has 
gained particular traction in the field. Since the Russo-Williamson thesis already has 
significant uptake in the field, not to mention a few engaged clinician-critics, I argue that this 
conception of mechanisms should be rehabilitated for use in medicine—with one large 
modification which addresses a main concern of critics. This additional component is a 
restriction of the scope of a mechanism inspired by the work of Michael Strevens on ceteris 
paribus laws. Because a main critique of the Russo-Williamson thesis is the worry that 
mechanisms are so expansive that it is impossible to make a list of all the required parts, the  
Strevens account, which places the scope of a mechanism neatly between traditional 
“Empty” and “Boring” accounts of mechanisms, is an important component of making 
mechanisms useful for EBM.   
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Chapter 4: Values   
It is clear that medicine is saturated with values. Work by scholars like Miriam 
Solomon, Alison Wylie, Helen Longino, and Phillip Kitcher has made clear the importance of 
values in science. Medicine, insofar as it participates in some of the practices of science, is 
no different. However, the particulars of medicine (the causal complexity of epidemiological 
evidence, the wide range of factors to be taken into account in diagnosis, uncertainty about 
what counts as evidence of treatment efficacy, and concerns about which methods provide 
clinicians with the best evidence to make treatment decisions) mean that it is especially 
difficult and especially necessary to be clear about what the proper roles are for values in 
medicine.   
In this chapter, I follow the changing roles of values in EBM. Early accounts of EBM 
said very little about values. Later accounts added a role for patient values back into EBM 
clinical practice, but without much direction about what clinicians should do should patient 
values conflict with other components, such as the best evidence component. Partly 
because of the way in which this addition did not address the values of other stakeholders in 
the clinical encounter, Bill Fulford developed Values-Based Practice (VBP), which takes care 
to discuss the ways in which the values of the patient, family, clinicians, support staff, social 
workers, and others can impact clinical practice. While VBP is occasionally overly optimistic 
about sorting out conflicts between these kinds of values, it represents a great improvement 
over the treatment of values in EBM.   
So far, the discussion in EBM has centred around the values of particular individuals 
which come in contact in the clinical encounter. What about the values which are present 
within EBM itself? The EBM literature says very little explicitly about what its values are, but 
some of these can be pieced together from value-laden commentary in the literature, such 
as the GOBSAT joke, which I discuss in detail. However, this both leaves an incomplete 
picture of the values in EBM leaves open the possibility that these implicit values are not the 
values EBM would adopt upon reflection. Do we have any way to distinguish those values 
that are acceptable for use in a scientific project from those values that are unacceptable?  
12  
  
A possible solution to concerns about how to distinguish values that should be used 
in medicine from values that have no place in medicine comes from the values in science 
literature: the legitimate/illegitimate distinctions. These distinctions use different metrics, 
including epistemic content and the completeness of the non-value involved evidence (the 
“lexical-priority” metric), to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate value inclusion in 
science. I argue that this set of distinctions is not the solution to the problem of values in 
medicine, or even more broadly, in science.  
This section on illegitimate and legitimate values in medicine proceeds in three parts. 
First, I critique the legitimate/illegitimate distinctions based on the two line-drawing metrics 
suggested in the literature: epistemic content and the completeness of the non-value 
involved evidence (the “lexical-priority” metric). I argue that both these distinction-drawing 
metrics fail to be universally applicable across all sciences and fail to assist in practical 
distinction drawing. In a larger second part, I argue for transparent, local, and context-based 
value adoption in particular sciences and provide an example case for use in statins medical 
research. In a brief third part, I entertain possible counter-arguments to my account of 
transparent, local, and context-based value adoption, including worries about relativism and 
the “entrance” of politics into science. If what must be done is more than asking, “Is this 
value legitimate based on metric X?” this will require more training, more communication and 
transparency, more philosophical involvement and more forums for debate and discussion 
about adopted values both in clinical practice and in medical research.  
Values have also been used to critique a spin-off from EBM: Evidence-Based Ethics 
(EBE). While EBE is in need of critique, I am critical of a current popular method of achieving 
this, which relies on a strong demarcation between science (facts) and ethics (values) which 
is thought to fall out of the is/ought distinction in Hume.    
Finally, coming full circle on the use of values in EBM, I examine some very recent 
work on values in EBM. This recent work suggests that the prescriptions about values in  
EBM put forward in this work may reach a receptive audience.   
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Chapter 5: After EBM   
In this chapter, I consider the possibility that precision or personalized medicine may 
overtake EBM as the primary movement in medicine. I follow the shift from personalized 
medicine to precision medicine in the literature. This possibility of precision medicine has not 
yet been realized: I consider in principle and in practice reasons for this. However, if this shift 
were to take place it would have downstream effects for the epistemological and ethical 
agenda in medicine. Would such a change mean that the issues of expertise, mechanisms 
and values are no longer salient, and the philosophical recommendations suggested in 
works like this are no longer necessary? I argue that this is not the case, and that even in the 
face of such a shift of priorities, these three issues would still play a major role, though the 
kinds of philosophical recommendations to be made regarding them would differ in this new 
context.    
EBM Textual History  
  While there might be many ways to trace the influence and content of EBM over time 
(development of journals, institutions, conferences, changes to clinical practice, popular 
media acclaim), one of the easiest ways to see the changes in philosophically interesting 
content in EBM is to look at the texts produced by those within the movement and those 
criticizing the movement. In what follows, I trace the shape of the EBM movement from its 
original texts to the rise of manuals, to its critique by philosophers and others, through to the 
most recent period of renaissance, reflection and reconsideration.1 These texts provide the 
foundation and context for the more in-depth considerations of individual philosophical 
concepts in the chapters which follow.  
Original Texts   
1992: The “Debut” Article  
  In 1992, the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group published their paper  
                                               
1 This discussion of main texts in the history of EBM is not exhaustive. For a more complete overview, see Bluhm 
and Borgerson 2011 or Howick, Kennedy, and Mebius 2015.  
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“Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine” in  
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). Since then, it has been cited nearly  
4000 times and is now generally considered to be the “debut” of the EBM movement, 
although many other historical precedents have been cited.2 But what exactly was claimed in 
this seminal paper in the EBM field? Three major claims were put forward: the paper 
described the new approach, Evidence-Based Medicine, claimed that this new approach was 
a “new paradigm” in a Kuhnian sense, and claimed that an important effort of this new 
approach would be to reform medical school pedagogy.  
Description of EBM  
  The Evidence-Based Medicine working group described EBM saying, “Evidence-
based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience and 
pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the 
examination of evidence from clinical research” (EBMWG 1992, 2420). The process of EBM 
is further illustrated with a case study. When faced with the following clinical scenario, what 
should a resident do?   
A junior medical resident working in a teaching hospital admits a 43-year old 
previously well man who experienced a witnessed grand mal seizure. He had never 
had a seizure before and had not had any recent head trauma. He drank alcohol 
once or twice a week and had not had alcohol on the day of the seizure. Findings on 
the physical examination are normal. The patient is given a loading dose of phenytoin 
intravenously and the drug is continued orally. A computed tomographic head scan is 
completely normal and an electroencephalogram shows only nonspecific findings. 
The patient is very concerned about his risk of seizure recurrence. (EBMWG 1992, 
2420)  
  
In the past, the resident would ask for advice from her attending clinician, who would tell her, 
(and she would relay to the patient) that the risk of seizure recurrence was high and that the 
patient should avoid driving, take the prescribed medication, and come in for a follow up.  
In contrast with this old-fashioned solution, in the mode of EBM the resident 
recognizes that she does not know the prognosis3 of a first seizure. Then she goes to the 
                                               
2 See the later section, “A Note on Further History: Semmelweis, Snow, Lind and Fisher” in this chapter.  
3 It is interesting that this very first example of how to do EBM hinges on a question of prognosis. In the literature 
which follows this debut article, EBM focuses on decisions about intervention, largely by-passing additional questions 
about prognosis and prevention.   
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library to do a computerized search using relevant search terms and narrows the results 
based on relevance and critical appraisal. In a manner that rather dates this debut article, the 
authors note that, “the entire process (including the trip to the library and the time it took to 
make a photocopy of the article) took half an hour” (EBMWG 1992, 2420). She returns with a 
precise risk of recurrence for the patient. This example is taken to show the way in which 
practice under EBM is to be different from the status quo.   
A Note on a “New Paradigm”  
  In the movement's debut article, the EBM working group writes,   
Thomas Kuhn has described scientific paradigms as ways of looking at the 
world which define both the problems which can legitimately be addressed and the 
range of admissible evidence which may bear on their solution. When defects in an 
existing paradigm accumulate to the extent that the paradigm is no longer tenable, 
the paradigm is challenged and replaced by a new way of looking at the world. 
Medical practice is changing, and the change which involves using the medical 
literature more effectively in guiding medical practice is profound enough that it can 
appropriately be called a paradigm shift. (EBMWG 1992, 2420)  
  
It is not clear that the description of EBM that follows the above claim conforms to the 
description of a Kuhnian paradigm given by proponents of EBM. According to them a “new 
paradigm” generally entails a change in problems tackled and evidence taken to be 
admissible. Insofar as EBM did not change what counts as the important problems for 
medicine (cures for new diseases, advances in the accuracy of tests, improvements in 
palliative care), instead providing a new method for tackling those familiar problems, and did 
not change what counts as evidence, instead providing a new way for that evidence to be 
ranked in order to make decision making easier, it seems difficult to say that, even by the 
account given by supporters of EBM,  EBM counts as a “new paradigm.”  
However, the supporters of EBM continue, giving a history and a series of examples 
of the applications of their new paradigm, writing,   
The foundations of the paradigm shift lie in developments in clinical 
research over the last 30 years. In 1960, the randomized clinical trial was an 
oddity. It is now accepted that virtually no drug can enter clinical practice 
without a demonstration of its efficacy in clinical trials. Moreover, the same 
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randomized trial method increasingly is being applied to surgical therapies, 
and diagnostic tests... A number of major medical journals have adopted a 
more informative structured abstract format which incorporates issues of 
methods and design into the portion of an article the reader sees 
first...Textbooks which provide a rigorous review of available evidence, 
including a methods section describing both the methodological criteria used to 
systematically evaluate the validity of the clinical evidence and the quantitative 
techniques used for summarizing the evidence, have begun to appear. 
Practice guidelines based on rigorous methodological review of the available 
evidence are increasingly common. A final manifestation is the growing 
demand for courses and seminars which instruct physicians on how to make 
more effective use of the medical literature in their day-to-day patient care. 
(EBMWG 1992, 2421)  
This list of changes does seem to show that EBM has come to prominence. However, none 
of these changes suggest that the rise of EBM has changed the goals or main problems of 
medicine or that what counts as evidence at all has changed, since proponents of EBM 
make so clear that the old ways of judgment and experience have a place in EBM, just a 
lower place on the hierarchical pyramid.  
The question of EBM's status as a “new paradigm” is not the most important question 
for later authors in the EBM canon. This discussion explicitly in terms of “new paradigms” is 
missing from other important works in theoretical EBM literature, such as Sharon Straus et 
al.’s Evidence Based Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM and Jeremy Howick's The 
Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine (Straus et al. 2005; Howick 2011). Both of these 
works appear several years after the original article from the EBM working group appeared 
and emphasize the ways in which EBM actually fits into the traditional medical framework, 
rather than upends it. Indeed, Howick only says of the pronouncement of a “new paradigm”4 
that it was a “rhetorical tour de force” before moving on to discuss the ways that medicine 
“has always been evidence-based by definition” and argues that what EBM has done, far 
from beginning a revolution, is simply to make explicit which evidences are best and most 
applicable in a new and clear manner (Howick 2011, 4). In this way, although noting that 
others have called the movement a paradigm shift, Howick generally supports the idea that 
                                               
4 Quotes original.  
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EBM is a reform within a standard practice of medicine, not a revolution of the entire 
discipline.  
Straus et al., whose book specifically targets the busy clinician and is featured in this 
chapter’s later “Rise of the Manuals” section, makes clear that EBM is a change within a 
familiar medical landscape, rather than a radical revolution. They write, “The practice of 
evidence-based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best 
available external clinical evidence from systematic research” (Straus et al. 2005, 2).  
The emphasis given here on integration with earlier medical practice, including 
clinical judgment, rather than revolution or replacement, makes clear the authors’ lack of 
commitment to EBM as a paradigm shift in the sense that the working group had in mind in 
the debut article.  
For early supporters of EBM, even discussion of a paradigm shift actually functions 
within the current paradigm. The popularity of the Kuhnian vocabulary of paradigm shifts is 
so strong and so commonly used that discussing a new discovery, or reform, or method as 
just that is no longer enough. In order to be taken as a truly novel contribution worthy of the 
medical and scientific community's attention, the vocabulary of “paradigm shift” is used as a 
signal of a development that is worthy of attention and consideration. Use of this vocabulary 
of the paradigm shift does not seem to carry with it the implications or meaning that Kuhn 
originally had in mind.   
Implications for Medical Education  
  Right from the beginning, EBM proponents placed issues of pedagogical reform in 
medicine front and center in their movement. In this first article they write, “An important goal 
of our medical residency program is to educate physicians in the practice of evidence-based 
medicine. Strategies include a weekly formal academic half-day for residents, devoted to 
learning the necessary skills; recruitment into teaching roles of physicians who practice 
evidence-based medicine; sharing among faculty of approaches to teaching evidence-based 
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medicine; and providing faculty with feedback on their performance as role models and 
teachers of evidence-based medicine” (EBMWG 1992, 2420). Indeed, the article contains an 
explicit endorsement of the Internal Medicine Residency Program at McMasters University, 
which includes these specific components (EBMWG, 1992, 2422). From the very beginning,  
EBM was not just about a change in practice, but a change in pedagogy.   
Who Were the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group? 
The 1992 article by the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group was an important 
text for the Evidence Based Medicine movement. But who exactly was this group? In what 
follows I will describe the group as a population, trace the popularity of the 1992 article, 
discuss work done by the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group after the 1992 article, 
and provide brief career sketches of some of the group members who went on to become 
leaders in the EBM Movement. A list of the authors on the 1992 article and their academic 
credentials and affiliations is provided in Appendix III. 
The Working Group was comprised of 25 men and 6 women, for a total of 31 group 
members. While all members had at least an MD, 15 participants had both an MD and an 
MSc, 15 had only an MD. Of 31 total members, 24 had at least one McMaster affiliation. Only 
7 members had no McMaster affiliation. Many of those who reported an affiliation with 
McMaster in the 1992 article are still currently affiliated with McMaster. Other affiliations 
included the Department of Medicine, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA, Centre 
de Medicine Trezentize Cardio-Vasculaires, Paris, France, and Department of Medicine, 
University of Texas, San Antonio, USA. Only 1 group member had an affiliation outside of 
North America. Only 5 group members had an affiliation outside of Canada. Of 31 total 
members, 24 had some background in epidemiology or biostatistics, where this is defined as 
an affiliation with a biostatistics or epidemiology department (16) or authorship in at least 5 
peer-reviewed publications in academic journals in this field before the 1992 article 
(8)(Evidence Based Medicine Working Group, 1992). 
This information can help us to get a clearer picture of the group. They were mostly 
men with MDs, some background in epidemiology, and overwhelmingly affiliated with 
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McMaster University in Ontario, Canada. While it is difficult to assess the group’s intention in 
naming themselves as they did, choosing the name, “the Evidence-Based Medicine Working 
Group” without any mention of either McMaster or the geography of the group might have 
served to make the pronouncements of the group seem more international, and therefore 
perhaps universal, than might otherwise have been. The high level of engagement of the 
group with epidemiology and biostatics can perhaps explain the way in which the debut 
article of EBM emphasized that knowledge of the content and methods of epidemiology and 
biostatistics could improve medical practice. This clearer picture of the make-up of the group 
also makes the 1992 article’s explicit endorsement of the McMaster educational programing 
in this area unsurprising.  
The debut article has been cited over 4000 times according to PubMed. In 2001, 
when the New York Times listed “Evidenced-Based Medicine” as the “E” in their “The Year in 
Ideas: A-Z” round-up, author Jack Hitt explained the origin of EBM in the following way; “six 
doctors in Canada came up with the idea of skimming the most dependable studies and 
crunching the results into an accessible, reliable database (Hitt, 2001).” Although we are not 
given a citation for this claim, it seems likely that this is a reference to the McMaster based 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group. It was in this way that EBM was fully introduced 
to the American public at large. 
The Evidence Based Medicine Working Group never published another article as 
such. However, several prominent McMaster-based members of the group wrote a series of 
“Users’ Guide” articles for the Journal of the American Medical Association between 1993 
and 2000.5 These guides are listed as being written by a few primary authors with the note 
“for the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group” at the end of the author list. There is no 
indication that this means that the rest of the members of the original working group had any 
direct authorship role in the writing of these guides, but instead that the project grew out of 
work originally visualized by the working group. The Users Guides include “II: How to Use an 
                                               
5 The series has been revived outside the manual in JAMA itself in recent years. 
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Article about Therapy or Prevention A. Are the Results of the Study Valid?,” “XXV. Evidence-
Based Medicine: Principles for Applying the Users' Guides to Patient Care,” and “XX. 
Integrating Research Evidence With the Care of the Individual Patient” among others (Guyatt 
et al. 1993;Guyatt et. al. 2000; McAlister et al. 2000). Eventually, these “Users’ Guides” 
articles were complied into one of the most successful EBM manuals, Users’ Guides to the 
Medical Literature: Essentials for Evidence-Based Clinical Practice. This manual is currently 
in its 3rd edition and lists Gordon Guyatt, Drummond Rennie, Maureen O. Meade and 
Deborah J. Cook as its editors. Guyatt and Cook were part of the original Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group, while Rennie and Meade were not (Guyatt et al. 2014). 
Many members of the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group went on to 
interesting careers. For example, Patrick Brill-Edwards went on to help develop a vaccine for 
HPV (Bezruki, 2014), Virginia Moyer has led efforts to prevent over-screening for prostate 
cancer in the United States (Park 2011),  Murray Enkin led efforts to professionalize 
midwifery in Canada and internationally, and argued successfully for more partner 
involvement in delivery (Sakala and Swenson 1999), and Allan Detsky, in addition to being 
one of the foremost experts on economics and health policy in the world, also became a 
producer on Broadway, notably working on the Atlantic-Canada-set-musical, “Come From 
Away” (Stasio, 2017). However, three of the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 
became especially recognizable leaders of the EBM movement; David Sackett, Gordon 
Guyatt, and Deborah Cook. What follows is a brief biographical sketch of each. 
David Sackett 
Although he was born in the United States in Chicago, Sackett was one of the first to 
be recruited to be chair of epidemiology and biostatistics at the brand new medical school at 
McMaster University in 1967 (the first students arrived in 1969). This was after completing 
his medical education at the University of Illinois in 1962, and his epidemiological education 
at Harvard University in 1967 (Watts 2015). At McMaster Sackett was known for his 
insistence that biostatistics and epidemiology be integrated with other kinds of medical 
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coursework, rather than taught separately. In 1985 he began to write Clinical Epidemiology: a 
Basic Science for Clinical Medicine, which contained much of the methodological 
background for what would become Evidence-Based Medicine (Sackett, Haynes and Tugwell 
1985).  
In 1994, following the success of the 1992 EBM debut article, Sackett left McMaster 
to run the Centre for Evidence Based Medicine at Oxford. At Oxford, he was known for 
referencing RCTs and metanalyses as well as calculating number needed to treat/harm at 
the bedside during student rotations (Smith 2015).  In 1996, Sackett was first author on an 
article further defending and explaining EBM and created the most commonly-used definition 
of EBM, “Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients (Sackett, 2016).” This 
article has been cited over fifteen thousand times according to PubMed. Believing that 
experts tend to be a liability rather than a boon to the subjects they champion after around 
ten years, he gave a last talk on EBM in 1999 (Watts 2015). 
But Sackett is perhaps most well known for a spirit of consistency. For example, in 
response to his own studies which suggested that older physicians were less likely to be 
informed about new findings in their field the further out they were from their residency, he 
repeated his own residency voluntarily, twenty years after he completed this part of medical 
education for the first time (Smith 2015). Sackett died in 2015, at the age of eighty.  
Gordon Guyatt 
Guyatt was born in Hamilton Ontario, also home to McMaster University, 1953. He 
received his MD from McMaster in 1977 (Canadian Medical Hall of Fame 2016). Guyatt was 
first author on the 1992 debut article (EBMWG, 1992). Guyatt is usually considered the 
source of the name “Evidence-Based Medicine” after an earlier attempt, “Scientific Medicine,” 
was met with indignation by clinicians who already considered themselves to be doing 
science-based work (Smith and Rennie 2014). 
Guyatt was a leader in creating Grading of Recommendations Assessment, 
Development and Evaluation (GRADE). Published in 2008, this system for assessing the 
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strength of the evidence on a particular topic, treatment, or study, in a more sophisticated 
way than the original EBM Pyramid Model, has been adopted as a standard assessment by 
many in the field, such as the Cochrane Collaboration (GRADE Working group 2008). 
Guyatt was an author on 34 of the Users’ Guides articles, and one of the editors of 
the resulting manual. Indeed, he has remained active in the group, writing on contemporary 
topics like the use of EBM in accessing efficacy of surgical procedures (Evaniew et al. 2016) 
and the use of adjusted analysis in studies on harm (Agoritsas et al. 2017) with a new 
generation of EBM researchers. Guyatt is currently Distinguished Professor of Clinical 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics at McMaster University. In 2016 he was inducted into the 
Canadian Medical Hall of Fame (Canadian Medical Hall of Fame 2016). 
Deborah Cook 
Part of younger generation of EBM researchers with Guyatt, Cook received her MD 
and MSc from McMaster in 1985. When she was part of the authorship of the 1992 debut 
article, she was fresh from a Critical Care Fellowship at Stanford University (The George 
Institute for Global Health 2018).  
She was an author on 19 of the “Users’ Guide” EBM article in JAMA and was one of 
the editors of the Users’ Guide EBM manual (Guyatt et al. 2014). She has spent most of her 
career in the critical care setting. A major focus of her work was championing EBM principles 
into the critical care setting (Cook 1998, Cook and Levy 1998). 
She continued to insist, along with Guyatt and several other familiar faces, on the 
importance of critical appraisal methodological skills for all practitioners, even when EBM 
began to move towards a more forgiving, less independent model of pre-assessing the 
literature for physicians (Guyatt et al. 2000). 
In 2014, she was named to the Order of Canada for her work on improving critical 
care procedure and creating a network for critical care research (Nolan 2014). Cook’s recent 
work has included trials for different treatments for septic shock in the ICU (Mehta et al. 
2013) and a cohort study comparing survival of aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians in 
the 2009-2010 H1N1 flu outbreak (Jung et al. 2017), among many other projects. Cook is 
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currently practices intensive care medicine at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Hamilton Ontario and 
is the academic chair of Critical Care Medicine at St Joseph’s and McMaster (The George 
Institute for Global Health 2018).  
1996: An Effort at Clarification  
  In 1996, Sackett et al. attempted a clarification of EBM in response to a few very 
early critiques in their article, “Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t.” It is in 
this article that the most commonly cited definition of EBM appears: “Evidence based 
medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine 
means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical 
evidence from systematic research” (Sackett et al. 1996, 71).   
This definition, in addition to emphasizing the place of the evidence base as seen in 
the earlier 1992 description, also includes clinical expertise as an element. Clinical expertise 
is defined in this article as, “the proficiency and judgment that individual clinicians acquire 
through clinical experience and clinical practice. Increased expertise is reflected in many 
ways, but especially in more effective and efficient diagnosis and in the more thoughtful 
identification and compassionate use of individual patients’ predicaments, rights and 
preferences in making clinical decisions about their care” (Sackett et al. 1996, 71). Concepts 
of expertise are discussed in detail in this work in Chapter 2, but their inclusion in this short 
article is a reason for its continued importance in the history of EBM.  
2002: A More Holistic EBM   
  EBM pivoted to a more expansive and holistic self-conception in the 2002 article by  
Haynes et al., “Clinical expertise in the era of evidence-based medicine and patient choice.”6 
The authors here claim that they are putting forth a “more advanced model for evidence-
                                               
6 Because this pivot was at least in some way a response to ten years of strong critique from many different 
disciplines, this article could also be classified as belonging in the “Adoption and Renaissance” portion of this 
chapter. However, because of its high citation count, close ties in argumentation to the 1996 Sackett et al. 
article and the 15-year gap between this article and many in the “Adoption and Renaissance” section, I have 
retained this article as part of the “original set” of EBM texts.  
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based decisions,” although they do continue to reference the Sackett et al. 1996 explanation, 
“the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values,” as the 
definition of EBM (Haynes et al. 2002, 36).  In addition, this text moves the role of expertise 
to an amalgamating function, emphasizes that taking patient preferences into account may 
mean disregarding clinician preferences, and introduces a new component, “the clinical state 
and circumstances” which highlights that social, political, economic and geographical forces 
can intervene to mean that true standardization of practice will not be possible. For example, 
“people who find themselves in remote areas when beset by crushing retrosternal chest pain 
may have to settle for aspirin, whereas those living close to a tertiary care medical center will 
probably have many more options—if they recognize the symptoms and act promptly!” 
(Haynes et al. 2002, 37) Together these changes mean that EBM as depicted by Haynes et 
al. is a broader undertaking than that depicted in earlier articles, which focused on methods 
for clinicians to access research in response to bedside questions about diagnosis, 
prognosis and intervention.        
This article is also framed with a clinical case study─ this time concerning a man with 
hypertension and a gastrointestinal bleed who fears stroke because of a family history. In 
this case, based on the EBM approved evidence, appropriate interventions include warfarin, 
with a higher risk reduction, although this intervention comes with weekly blood checks, or 
aspirin, with a lower risk reduction, but no time-consuming blood checks. In addition to this 
evidence, the article suggests the patient’s preferences and circumstances will need to be 
taken into account in order to choose between the evidentially indicated treatments and that,  
“clinical expertise is needed for follow up and monitoring” (Haynes et al. 2002, 38).   
While this article does point to a strong expansion of the goals of EBM, its authors are 
aware that it is not all inclusive, and still, remains so idealistic as to be normative, not 
descriptive. They write, “Our model does not depict all of the elements involved. For 
example, we have not included the important roles that society and healthcare organizations 
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play in providing and limiting resources for health services…It is also impossible to 
implement the model as prescribed…Thus our model is conceptual rather than practical and 
remains under development…” (Haynes 2002, 38).  
A Note on Further History: Semmelweis, Snow, Lind and Fisher  
It is worth noting that in many of these texts and the manuals discussed in the 
following section, a set of consistent historical examples are discussed as the “roots” of 
EBM. These examples centre on several different historical figures, but most often feature 
the stories of Semmelweis,7 Lind, Snow, and Fisher. Ignaz Semmelweis, by comparing the 
results in two largely similar hospital wings between 1844-1848 in a kind of proto-trial, found 
that when all personnel were required to wash their hands with chlorinated lime, “childbed” or 
“puerperal” fever rates were reduced in hospital maternity wards (Tulodziecki 2013). Nearly 
100 years before, James Lind found that a diet that included citrus fruits was much more 
effective than the current standard practices for treating and preventing scurvy in British 
sailors, again using a kind of proto-trial after completing a review of the current practices in 
the field, sometimes thought to be an early systematic review (Lind 1753). The Cochrane 
collaboration library is named the James Lind Library in honour of this figure. As one 
contender for the honour of “father of epidemiology,” the work of John Snow is also often 
cited as an important precursor to EBM. Snow worked to understand the origin, spread, and 
containment of cholera (Snow 1855; Fine et al. 2013). Given the importance of statistical 
methods to EBM, the inclusion of Fisher as one of these historical role models is not 
surprising; his work in 20th century statistics has a dizzying array of practical applications 
(Efron 1998).  
                                               
7 The Semmelweis story is especially important to EBM as a kind of cautionary tale. There is still some debate 
regarding the reason his suggested reforms where not taken up, possibly saving many lives (Scholl 2013; 
Tulodziecki 2013; Persson 2009; Gillies 2005). One of these proposed reasons is because of his failure to 
correctly articulate an appropriate mechanism by which his proposed intervention worked. From the point of view 
of EBM proponents, such a mechanism was superfluous-demonstrating that an intervention led to good outcomes 
is all that is required for implementation on the EBM view. This view will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
For now, the story of Semmelweis’s demise and inability to effect change serve, not just as a way of anchoring 
EBM in history, but also as a warning of giving too much weight to explanatory mechanisms.  
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The scientific contributions of these historical figures were diverse. However, in the 
role they play in EBM origin myths, they are roughly equivalent in that they relate the 
newness and the statistical sophistication of EBM in general and Randomized Controlled 
Trials (RCTs) specifically with earlier, historical, common sense practices (Sackett et al. 
1996; Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2017). They serve to suggest that although some of the 
statistical tools used in EBM might seem new and unnatural to the clinicians who are now 
being asked to use them, they naturally flow from any attempts to answer the questions 
about effective interventions that patients and clinicians care about.  
These early EBM texts and the historical case studies mentioned within them 
continue to be an important force in defining the movement as a coherent unit. They 
articulated the set of problems that EBM sought to fix and defined the movement, if in ways 
which were not exactly consistent between texts. They emphasized EBM’s break with the 
medical status quo of the past and that their movement would require a revolution in medical 
pedagogy. How exactly this could be achieved was to be more clearly articulated in a 
different kind of EBM literature; the EBM clinical manual.  
Rise of the Manuals   
  After these classic texts provided the framework for the EBM movement, its practice 
was cashed out in a series of “how-to” manuals (Greenhalgh 2010; Guyatt et al. 2014; 
McKibbon et al. 1999; Moore and McQuay 2006; Straus et al. 2005). These manuals were 
generally addressed to practicing clinicians, and were formatted to be slim books, well suited 
to fit in the front pocket of a lab coat. While there were some EBM manuals directed at 
individual specialties (for example: Craig et al 2012; Hansen and Roach 2010), most 
manuals steered clear of particular content, instead focusing on methods of obtaining and 
applying evidence in any specialty.  
A Manual Example: Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature  
The Users’ Guide to the Medical Literature: Essentials of Evidence-Based Clinical 
Practice by Gordon Guyatt, Drummond Rennie, Maureen Meade and Deborah Cook is one 
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of the most popular of these manuals. They explain the need for an evidence-based method 
as follows:  
What is the nature of the evidence in EBM? We suggest a broad definition:  
any empirical observation constitutes potential evidence, whether systematically 
collected or not. Thus, the unsystematic observations of the individual clinicians 
constitute one source of evidence; physiologic experiments constitute another 
source. Unsystematic observations can lead to profound insights and wise clinicians 
develop a healthy respect for the insights of their senior colleagues in issues of 
clinical observation, diagnosis, and relations with patients and colleagues. At the 
same time, our personal clinical observations are often limited by small sample size 
and by deficiencies in human processes of making inferences. Predictions about an 
intervention’s effects on patient-important outcomes based on physiologic 
experiments usually are right but occasionally are disastrously wrong…Given the 
limitations of unsystematic clinical observations and physiologic rationale, EBM 
suggests a number of hierarchies of evidence, one of which relates to issues of 
prevention and treatment. (Guyatt et al. 2014, 6-7)  
  
These manuals also clarified the components of the EBM Hierarchy of Evidence in ways 
that the classic texts did not. For example, the Guyatt et al. manual includes a “Hierarchy of  
Strength of Evidence for Prevention and Treatment Decisions,” which lists the kinds of 
evidence in descending order of strength as follows:  
• N-of-1 randomized trial  
• Systematic reviews of randomized trials  
• Single randomized trial  
• Systematic review of observational studies addressing patient-important outcomes  
• Single observational study addressing patient-important outcomes  
• Physiologic studies (studies of blood pressure, cardiac output, exercise capacity, 
bone density, and so forth)  
• Unsystematic clinical observations (Guyatt et al. 2014, 7)  
•  
The aims of these manuals were bold and revolutionary. They explicitly sought to 
transform day-to-day clinical practice. For example, authors of the above manual write,   
This book, now in its second edition, is designed to change all that. It’s designed 
to make the clinician fluent in the language of the medical literature in all its forms. To 
free the clinician from practicing medicine by rote, by guesswork, and by their variably 
integrated experience. To put a stop to clinicians being ambushed by drug company 
representatives or their patients, telling them of new therapies the clinicians are unable to 
evaluate. To end their dependence on out-of-date authority. To enable the practitioner to 
work from the patient and use the literature as a tool to solve the patient’s problems. To 
provide the clinician access to what is relevant and the ability to assess its validity and 
whether it applies to a specific patient. In other words, to put the clinician in charge of the 
single most powerful resource in medicine. (Guyatt et al. 2014, xiii)  
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It is not clear that these ambitious goals were achieved. Indeed, some of the practical 
advice presented to these clinicians in these manuals was problematic. Some of the most 
concerning passages in this manual have to do with study applicability. According to Guyatt 
et al., it is best to assume that a study does apply to a particular patient, unless the clinician 
can think of a reason that it shouldn’t; that is generalizability is assumed, perhaps because of 
randomization,8 and situations where studies do not generalize are the exceptions. They 
write,  
What if that individual does not meet a study’s eligibility criteria? The study result 
probably applies even if, for example, he or she was 2 years too old for the study, had 
more severe disease, had previously been treated with a competing therapy, or had a 
comorbid condition. A better approach than rigidly applying the study inclusion and 
exclusion criteria is to ask whether there is some compelling reason why the results do 
not apply to the patient. You usually will not find a compelling reason, and most often you 
can generalize the results to your patient with confidence. (Guyatt et al. 2014, 103)  
This assumption has been criticised by Jonathan Fuller, who argues that instead of 
assuming a study applies to your patient and checking for reasons it might not, clinicians 
should in each case look to find reasons to think that the study does apply (Fuller 
forthcoming).   
Critical Appraisal by Clinicians  
  These manuals often differ on the topic of critical appraisal. Critical appraisal is a 
systematic process for the quality assessment of evidence. Because of improvements in 
information technology since the publication of the classic EBM texts, this appraisal is now 
assumed to be done in real time at the bedside. Most early manuals had high hopes for the 
feasibility of this practice to be adopted by clinicians “at the coalface.” These manuals 
include in-depth instructions for the evaluation. They see individual critical appraisal as an 
important component of their goals, writing, for example, that step 3 of the EBM process 
involved, “critically appraising that evidence for its validity (closeness to the truth), impact  
(size of the effect) and applicability (usefulness in our clinical practice)” (Straus et al. 2005,  
                                               
8 This issue of the assumed relationship between randomization and generalizability will be further discussed in the 
section “Critical Response: Philosophers, Clinicians and Others” in this chapter.  
29  
  
3).9 For example, in order to evaluate the results of individual studies about therapies, 
Evidence-Based Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM suggests that clinicians be able 
to answer the following questions about the intervention:  
1. Was the assignment of patients to treatment randomized?  
2. Was the randomization concealed?  
3. Were the groups similar at the start of the trial?  
4. Was the follow up of patients sufficiently long and complete?  
5. Were all the patients analyzed in the groups to which they were randomized?  
 
Some finer points:  
6. Were patients, clinicians, and study personnel kept blind to treatment?  
7. Were groups treated equally, apart from experimental therapy? (2005, 117)  
  
After this determination of the “validity” of the trial, the manual suggests that the clinician 
calculate the Relative Risk Reduction (RRR), the Absolute Risk Reduction (ARR) and the 
Number Needed to Treat (NNT) in order to answer the questions, “What is the magnitude of 
the treatment effect?” and “How precise is the estimate of the treatment effect?” (Straus et 
al. 2005, 125). A final set of appraisal questions are designed to facilitate the application of 
this kind of population generated evidence to a patient (Straus et al. 2005, 132). All this 
information is reproduced not only in the manual, but on a set of brightly coloured laminated 
index cards which come with the manual, for ease of use.  
Move Toward Pre-Evaluated Evidence  
  Perhaps because, “fewer [clinicians] claimed to understand (and to be able to 
explain) the ‘appraising’ tools of Number Needed to Treat (NNT) (35%) and confidence 
intervals (20%)” (Straus et al. 2005, 6), the emphasis on critical appraisal as the indication of  
EBM in practice waned in these manuals. In its stead, “pre-evaluated evidence sources” and 
guidelines rose in prominence. These replacements, while intended to lower the previously 
high bar of critical appraisal for clinicians, were nevertheless not universally appreciated.  
Trisha Greenhalgh writes,  
                                               
9 However, because this is a later edition of the Sackett/Straus, they stipulate that, “For conditions we encounter 
less often…we conserve our time by seeking out critical appraisals already performed by others who describe 
explicit criteria for deciding what evidence they selected and how they decided it was valid. We leave out the 
time-consuming step 3 (critically appraising) and carry out just step 2 (searching) but restrict the latter to sources 




Never was the chasm between front-line clinicians and back-room 
policymakers wider than in their respective attitudes to clinical guidelines. Policy 
makers…tend to love guidelines. Front-line clinicians…often have a strong aversion 
to guidelines…Clinician resistance to guidelines has a number of explanations. 
These include: clinical freedom, debates among experts about the quality of the 
evidence, lack of appreciation of the evidence by practitioners, defensive medicine, 
strategic and cost constraints, specific practical constraints, failure of patients to 
accept procedures, competing influences of other non-medical factors, and the lack 
of appropriate, patient-specific feedback on performance. (Greenhalgh 2010, 132)  
  
 These kinds of guidelines were meant to free individual clinicians from the burden of 
replicating for themselves a critical appraisal process on the results of relevant studies. 
While it is true that there is less emphasis on individual critical appraisal in the EBM 
contemporary literature, a new problem has arisen: the proliferation of difficult to apply and 
sometimes contradictory guidelines that were meant to take the place of critical appraisal.   
EBM manuals which suggest that pre-evaluated evidence can replace individual 
critical appraisal in some cases suggest several possible source journals for this information, 
including, “the ACP Journal Club, Evidence Based Medicine, Evidence Based Mental Health,  
Evidence Based Nursing, Evidence Based Health Care Policy and Practice, Evidence Based 
Cardiovascular Medicine, and a number of others. Synoptic journals do what traditional 
journals wish they could do in selecting the best studies, finding the best articles from all 
relevant journals and summarizing them in one place” (Straus et al. 2005, 45).10 The shift 
from individually accomplished critical appraisal to advocating for clinician trust of identified 
journals which promised good evidence was a major change for EBM.  
Critical Response: Philosophers, Clinicians and Others  
The response to these classic texts and manuals from clinicians and philosophers 
was varied and critical. While there is a very large body of critical literature on EBM, this 
literature can be broadly sorted into categories based on the kinds of claims made. The most 
                                               
10 Given that this manual also includes the helpful advice, “If you still have the no luck…then you can try Google 
(http://www.google.com). It is incredibly fast and you can retrieve a product monograph…Google is the fastest 
way to get to almost any service on the internet…” (Straus et al. 2005, 40), it is worth considering if this list is 
similarly dated.   
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often made critical claims are, “Randomization doesn’t do what EBM claims it does,” 
“Mechanisms are crucial in medicine,” and “Medicine requires an expanded role for clinical 
expertise.” I will consider some of the literature in support of each of these claims in turn.    
Randomization doesn’t do what EBM thinks it does  
While being attentive to the ways in which the classic texts do make mention “in the 
fine print” of the usefulness of non-randomized evidence, John Worrall, in his article, “What 
Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine?” interrogates the reasons EBM gives for 
randomization; why is it that we need randomization at all? He investigates four main 
reasons. First, because frequentist statistical significance testing only works if the 
populations are randomized to the comparison arms. Second, because randomization 
controls for all factors, known and unknown. Third, because randomization helps to prevent 
selection bias- that is, where the agent doing the selecting places promising looking 
individuals in the intervention arm for various reasons. Fourth, because empirical work has 
shown that non-randomized studies over-estimate the size of treatment effects.  
The first reason, says Worrall, only makes sense if you think that frequentist 
statistical significance testing is something we should be doing; and plenty of Bayesians and 
others don’t. The second is trivially untrue-even correctly done randomization can result in 
skewed arms in relation to some factor or another. But what about a modification of this 
claim? Worrall suggests, “Randomization controls for all factors, known and unknown, at 
least in ‘some probabilistic sense’”(Worrall 2002, S322) This might be true, but only if the 
experiment were to be run many times. RCTs tend not to be, or this repetition is considered 
waste. The third reason is an interesting example of the way in which blinding and 
randomization are tightly related. Worrall concedes that avoiding selection bias is a useful 
reason to do randomization but notes that the real work here is done by blinding or masking, 
and randomization is simply one way to achieve this. The forth reason only makes sense if 
you are already assuming that the RCT comparator in each case shows the true effect size; 
it is the other side of coin of the worry that RCTs so often under-estimate effect sizes. 
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Additionally, newer empirical work of the kind cited for this claim has come to quite different 
conclusions.  
In sum, according to Worrall, randomization only does one of the four things it is 
proposed to do.11 There are many other arguments in this vein in the critical literature 
(Borgerson 2009; La Caze 2009; Senn 2012; Teira and Reiss 2013) but Worrall’s article has 
received significant uptake.  
There are additional knock-on effects that EBM sometimes claims for randomization. 
These are often claims about the ease of generalizability of RCTs. As discussed in the 
earlier “Rise of the Manuals” sections, EBM manuals often claimed that one of the reasons 
for the importance of randomization is that it allows for the application of trial results to 
patients who were not in the trial, unless the clinician could think of some reason these 
results do not apply. This is presumably meant to be supported by the claim that 
randomization “controls for all confounders, known and unknown,” as discussed in the 
Worrall article.12 This claim of generalizability has met with strong critique (see Deaton and 
Cartwright 2016 for an example, though the focus here is on economic applications).  
Mechanisms are crucial in medicine  
  An additional kind of criticism levelled at EBM by philosophers was that EBM 
proponents failed to appreciate the ways in which mechanisms are crucial in medicine 
(Clarke et al. 2014; Anderson 2012; Bluhm 2013; Howick et al. 2013, Illari 2011). This 
literature is discussed at length in Chapter 3, so I will not dwell on it here, but just note it as 
an important group of criticisms.    
                                               
11 In a later article, Worrall argues that in addition to these ways in which randomization falls short of its priviledged 
status, additional roles for randomization as causally important suggested by philosophers are also not fulfilled 
(Worrall, 2007).  
12 Interestingly, RCTs are also critiqued as particularly difficult to generalize in the pragmatic trial literature (see 
MacRae 1989, McMahon 2002, and Roland and Togerson 1998 for example). I am planning future work on this issue, 
but do not focus on it here.  
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Medicine requires an expanded role for clinical expertise  
An additional critical claim often made by philosophers and others is that medicine 
requires a larger role for clinical expertise than that allowed for in the various forms of EBM 
(Tonelli 1998; Tonelli 2009; Feinstein and Horwitz 1997; Naylor 1997). While it is true that 
the classical texts often mention clinical expertise or clinical judgement as an important 
component of EBM, the details of this role are often left unclear (Greenhalgh 1999). Again, 
this literature is discussed at length in Chapter 2.  
Adaptation and Renaissance  
  In the last few years, proponents of EBM have engaged in a significant amount of 
reflection, debate and dialogue about new directions in the EBM movement. While this 
discussion has resulted in a considerable variety of textual outputs, four texts stand out as 
indicating new directions for EBM; “Evidence-based medicine: A movement in crisis?” by  
Trisha Greenhalgh, Jeremy Howick, Neal Maskrey and the Evidence Based Medicine  
Renaissance Group, “Progress in evidence-based medicine: a quarter century on” by 
Benjamin Djulbegovic and Gordon H. Guyatt, Trisha Greenhalgh’s new book “How to  
Implement Evidence-Based Medicine,” and “Evidence based medicine manifesto for better 
healthcare” by Carl Heneghan, Kamal R. Mahtani, Ben Goldacre, Fiona Godlee, Helen  
Macdonald and Duncan Jarvies.  
Renaissance/Crisis?  
  According to the authors of “Evidence-based medicine: A movement in crisis?” a 
series of developments have corrupted EBM since its beginnings. These include the 
influence of vested interests, such as pharmaceutical companies, in determining what counts 
as good evidence and good outcomes in medicine, the incredible volume of evidence that 
has been created, especially an excess of guidelines created for clinical practice, the over-
powering of trials so that even very small effect sizes are statistically significant (if not 
clinically significant), the proliferation of templates and point of care prompts which 
encourage mechanical rather than thoughtful engagement (which looks suspiciously like the 
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“cookbook” charge levelled by many critics) and a refusal to consider the practical problems 
of an explosion of multimorbidity in a system which does not and cannot provide evidence 
pertaining to patients with multimorbidity (Greenhalgh et al. 2014, 2).   
  In response to these problems, the authors write that,   
[R]eal evidence-based medicine has the care of individual patients as its top 
priority, asking, ‘what is the best course of action for this patient, in these 
circumstances at this point in their illness or condition?’ It consciously and reflexively 
refuses to let process (doing tests, prescribing medicine) dominate outcomes (the 
agreed goal of management in an individual case.) It engages with an ethical and 
existential agenda (how should we live? When should we accept death?) and with 
that goal in mind, carefully distinguishes between whether to investigate, treat or 
screen and how to do so. (Greenhalgh et al. 2014, 3)  
  
  This description of EBM has a few features in common with earlier descriptions of the 
movement. The first part, with its references to attempting to individualize care based on 
patient preferences and clinical circumstances, echoes concerns first put forward in the 
Sackett et al. 1996 article and the Haynes et al. 2002 article. The emphasis on refusing to let 
processes trump outcomes serves a similar purpose as the Sackett et al. 1996 denial that 
EBM could ever be “cookbook medicine.” However, the last portion about an engagement 
with an “ethical and existential agenda” has not been emphasized previously in EBM 
literature. This is perhaps a result of the inclusion of various philosophers in the Evidence 
Based Medicine Renaissance Working Group. Additionally, many of the components of the 
plan to implement “real” EBM, while not ruled out or considered inappropriate, were not at all 
the focus of the movement in earlier iterations. These include encouraging patients to 
advocate for better evidence and personalization, pedagogy to hone expert judgment and 
shared decision making, resistance to evidence created by vested interests (and helping 
policy makers to resist this as well), and supporting research into the experience of illness 
(research philosophers might call phenomenology of illness). This expansion does not enjoy 
universal support; some responses to this article doubled-down on the traditional clinical 
research components of EBM as most important to its future (Tovey et al. 2014; Oliver 
2014).    
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  A particularly interesting feature of this paper is the authors’ insistence on framing 
what is the most expansive EBM project of all, including many aspects of medicine not 
originally included as targets of reform by EBM, as a return to EBM’s original values. The 
EBM depicted in this article is unrecognizable when compared with the goals of the Evidence 
Based Medicine Working Group, and yet is not described as novel. Instead, the article 
contains several references to a, “Return to real evidence-based medicine” (Greenhalgh et 
al. 2014, 3) and argues for “a return to the movement’s founding principles— to individualize 
evidence and share decisions through meaningful conversations in the context of a 
humanistic and professional clinician-patient relationship” (Greenhalgh et al. 2014, 5). While 
this could cynically be described as a rhetorical device designed to appeal to a discipline that 
is tired of heralding new movements, it is possible that at least some early EBM practitioners 
had read into the original movement calls for such vast changes, though to an outside 
observer they are difficult to see in the 1992 and 1996 articles (see Fuller et al. 2014 for one 
take on this). Regardless of the idealism or cynicism of such a framing, it can do much to 
obscure the ways in which criticism and dialogue with critics both inside and outside 
medicine forced EBM to adapt and change over time. While only a few years old this article 
has already been cited several hundred times,13 and looks likely to become a classic in the 
EBM literature.14  
New Greenhalgh book  
  Given how often the literature on EBM categorizes itself as ideal or prescriptive  
(Haynes et al. 2002), for example, passing off the messy problems of implementation, Trisha  
                                               
13 It is important to note that a good portion of these citations are by critics- I am not making the mistake that 
many citations indicates universal agreement, only a high amount of engagement.  
14 For this work, the author’s adoption of the Dreyfus account of expertise is of particular interest. They write, “The 
Dreyfus brothers have described levels of learning, beginning with the novice who learns the basic rules and 
applies them mechanically with no attention to context. The next two stages involve increasing depth of 
knowledge and sensitive to contest when applying rules. In the fourth and fifth stages, rule following gives way to 
expert judgments, characterised by rapid intuitive reasoning informed by imagination, common sense and 
judiciously selected research evidence and other rules” (Greenhalgh et al. 2014, 3). While this is not the most 
careful description of the Dreyfus account of expertise, its inclusion is worth noting given that I argue in chapter 2 
that the Dreyfus model of expertise is incompatible with EBM, regardless of its enthusiastic uptake in nursing. I 
stand behind that argument, given the strong differences, noted here and by many others, between EBM as 
traditionally depicted and the EBM in the Greenhalgh et al. 2014 article.  
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Greenhalgh’s new book, Implementing Evidence Based Healthcare is a welcome addition to 
the literature on EBM. The book explicitly builds on the vision of Evidence Based Health 
Care (EBHC), the term preferred due to the diversity of practitioners involved, set out in the 
previously discussed “Renaissance” article (Greenhalgh 2017, 2). As a result, the scope of 
the book is ambitious, sweeping from problematizing theories of evidence, to examining 
patterns of human behaviour and rationality that bound and sometimes block implementation 
of new epistemic practices, to challenging technological determinism, to the often-ignored 
realities of policy creation (Greenhalgh 2017, 6). If it is ever the case that EBM suffers for 
being too broad rather than too narrow, it is in the iteration put forward by this work. This 
movement toward broadening EBM may be encouraging to philosophers and clinicians in 
that it means the integration of many of their critiques and the inclusion of many more types 
of evidence. However, this broadening also brings with it the worry that this new EBM is so 
inclusive that no particular message can be heard; that the new movement is to be so broad 
as to be vacuous.   
A Traditional Account of Progress  
  “Progress in evidence-based medicine: a quarter century on” by Benjamin 
Djulbegovic and Gordon Guyatt, represents a newly philosophically-oriented restatement of 
more traditional EBM goals. The authors, themselves lifelong proponents of EBM, count 
among the movement’s achievements its pivot from consideration of evidence quality alone, 
to other components of the clinical encounter including patient preferences (while remaining 
rather weak in explaining the role of clinical expertise), as well as the development of more 
sophisticated hierarchies of evidence like GRADE, and the development of systems to 
produce clinical guidelines (Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2017, 1). This is in contrast to the work 
of Greenhalgh et al., in which the proliferation of guidelines derived from EBM was a flaw 
rather than a feature of the movement.   
  The authors concede that attempts to insist that each clinician learn and practice 
critical appraisal have largely failed, as I suggested earlier in this chapter in the section, “The  
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Rise of the Manuals,” writing, “a decade of efforts to teach EBM to medical trainees had 
revealed that few clinicians would ever have the skills—and those with the skills would 
seldom have time—to conduct sophisticated assessment of the evidentiary basis for their 
practice” (Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2017, 4).  
This paper is the clearest case of a work solidly within the EBM literature proper 
which explicitly frames what is new and worthwhile about EBM as a set of epistemic claims; 
other work does this implicitly. The authors write that EBM is at its core, a set of two 
epistemic claims, first, “that not all evidence is created equal, and that the practice of 
medicine should be based on the best available evidence,” and second, “that the pursuit of 
truth is best accomplished by evaluating the totality of the evidence, and not selecting 
evidence that favors a particular claim” (Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2017, 2). The acceptance of 
a role for philosophical explanation and critique in EBM made clear in this article by such 
strong proponents of the movement suggests that future philosophical suggestions, such as 
the content of this work, may fall on interested ears; this certainly has not always been the 
case.  
EBM Manifesto  
  A final text which importantly represents new directions in EBM is the so-called “EBM  
Manifesto.” This manifesto consists of a set of identified problems in current EBM and a set 
of goals, identified by the authors and others participating in the Oxford Centre for Evidence  
Based Medicine’s yearly “Evidence Live” conference.   
These problems include the extent to which trial results are not published (this is 
especially the case for “unsuccessful” trials), the exorbitant cost of trial research and the 
amount of financial waste, the lack of harm reporting, the use of non-evaluated decision aids, 
and the extent of pharmaceutical conflict of interest. These goals include an expanded role 
for patients and clinicians in research, the traditional call for more systematic use of existing 
evidence in practice, a reduction in unethical research practices, transparent drug and 
device regulation, improved clinical guidelines, and pedagogical improvements for the next 
generation of EBM leaders (Heneghan et al. 2017, 2).   
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While these seem to be a strong articulation of at least some of the current problems 
related to EBM as well as an admirable set of goals for the movement going forward, the key 
step of how exactly to move from these problems to these goals seems to be missing. For 
this reason, the manifesto remains an aspirational document rather than a concrete plan for 
change.  
 What makes this effort at recalibrating the movement unique is the extent to which 
the authors have called for participation from clinicians, philosophers and the wider public, 
not only by drafting the Manifesto through input at their academic conference but by inviting 
a broader audience to comment and critique it online. The Manifesto and the ongoing 
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Chapter 2: Expertise  
Introduction  
Since EBM’s debut article (EBMWG 1992), the movement has struggled to articulate 
the relationship between expertise and evidence. In this chapter, I mean by expertise 
knowledge gained by subjects in the course of clinical interactions, in contrast with 
knowledge gained from sources such as journal articles reporting on the findings of RCTs, 
meta-analyses and systematic reviews or explicit medical education. As such, references to 
‘experience,’ ‘expert opinion’, ‘clinical skills,’ and ‘judgment’ are all relevant to the discussion 
of expertise, though they emphasize different aspects of this method of knowing. In spite of 
the historical development of three different models of expertise integration in EBM, little has 
been done to flesh out exactly what is involved in each model of expertise, leading to 
confusion. Clarity about the role of expertise in EBM is essential for the practical application 
of EBM principles to the clinical context, but is also important for practitioners in other fields, 
such as educators and social workers, looking to develop their own evidence-based practice. 
Clarity about the role of expertise in EBM is also important for theorists of expertise in a 
variety of fields, such as sociology, education, and science and technology studies (STS). 
Without this clarity, these theorists can only receive muddled feedback about which concepts 
and frameworks assist practitioners. Given the way in which the nursing literature has 
discussed and debated the Dreyfus account of expertise as a description of their own 
practice, this account might be seen as the logical first choice to fill this theoretical gap in 
EBM (see Benner, 1984, 2004, 2009; Rashotte and Thomas, 2004; Koch, 1995; McHugh, 
2010; Pena, 2010 for a brief history of the debate surrounding Dreyfus on expertise in 
nursing).   
In this chapter, I argue that there have been three different models of the integration 
of expertise with other components of the clinical encounter in EBM, and all three models 
have difficulties. The account of expertise in EBM is still impoverished in ways that make 
practical implementation of EBM goals and methods difficult. I will show this through a 
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discussion of the various models and an analysis of the weaknesses and inconsistencies of 
these models. I then suggest that other disciplines provide a wealth of potential conceptions 
of expertise that might augment the problematic EBM models. I argue, that the Dreyfusian 
account is unsuitable for use in the EBM movement, regardless of its uptake in nursing.  
There are, however several other candidates including the accounts of Turner, Bishop and 
Trout, and Collins and Evans which I consider in detail in turn. I judge the Collins and Evans 
account to be best suited to the current needs of EBM and suggest several ways in which its 
use can improve EBM practice. In the final section, I argue that until EBM makes some basic 
clarifications about the role of expertise in its programme, none of the resources from other 
disciplines on the subject of expertise, not even Collins and Evans, can be successfully 
taken up. In order to remedy this situation, I suggest several desiderata for the creation of a 
useful conception of expertise for EBM.  
Overview of EBM Treatment of Expertise  
  
   EBM began as an explicit attempt to remove or de-emphasize the role of intuition 
and clinical expertise in medicine, replacing them with rules, decision matrices, and best 
practices derived (in the best-case scenario) from randomized controlled trials (RCTs). RCTs 
differ from other kinds of studies because they involve the random allocation of participants 
to intervention groups and may involve various masking/blinding practices. These studies, 
and sometimes meta-analyses or systematic reviews, are considered the gold standard of 
evidence in EBM. A meta-analysis is a statistical technique that combines the populations of 
smaller studies to form a larger sample, in hopes of improving statistical power before 
analyzing the treatment for effectiveness (Lang 1997, 255). Systematic reviews are distinct 
from meta-analyses but are sometimes listed alongside them because both studies 
amalgamate evidence. Howick defines a systematic review as, “[a] synthesis of all relevant 
evidence” (Howick 2011, 17), but generally these also involve a set of standard practices for 
the selection of search terms, explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria for sources, and a 
commitment to include all studies which fit within these criteria, including work from the grey 
42  
  
(i.e., unpublished) literature. RCTs, systematic reviews and meta-analyses are compiled into 
sets of guidelines and best practices of clinical decision-making that health professionals use 
during the clinical encounter. Over time, the EBM literature added two models of the EBM 
clinical encounter that include expertise as an important component, in contrast with the 
original model which advocated the de-emphasis of expertise from the EBM method.  
Overall, there is surprisingly little literature addressing the role of expertise in EBM. 
This is especially clear in comparison to the large amount of literature explicating, critiquing, 
and modifying EBM’s account of evidence, especially evidence hierarchies (Cartwright 2012; 
Worrall 2002; Bluhm, 2005; Clarke et al, 2014; Fiorentino 2015; Stegenga 2011).  
However, over time, three main models for the role of expertise in EBM were developed.   
The Pyramid Model   
The first of these models is the traditional pyramid-shaped EBM evidence hierarchy.  
There are many versions of this pyramid model, but most place “expert opinion” or  
“background knowledge” at the bottom followed by observational studies, single RCTs, and 
then meta-analysis and systematic reviews at the very top. Methods placed towards the top 
of the pyramid are to be preferred, and those toward the bottom are only to be used if 
research from “higher quality” methods are not available (and perhaps not even then). In this 
model, expert opinion is a source of evidence, but it is a low-level source. If others are 
available, practitioners are encouraged to look to these other sources rather than expertise.   
This model fits nicely with the “debut” article of EBM: “Evidence-based medicine de-
emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as 
sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from 
clinical research” (EBWG 1992, 2420).15 In this first model, though expertise had a low place 
on the hierarchy, it was still included as a possible source of evidence itself rather than, for 
instance, given an external to evidence amalgamation role.  
                                               
15 Emphasis mine  
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There is also an amended version of this first model. Worried that pyramid-style 
hierarchies left something to be desired by not allowing for variations in the quality of 
different evidence methodologies (i.e., the possibility of clinicians overestimating the 
usefulness of a poorly run RCT) the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM) at the 
University of Oxford developed the Grading of Recommendations Assessment,  
Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system. In this system, like the Pyramid model, 
RCTs begin at a high position and observational studies at a lower one, but RCTs or 
observational studies can be upgraded or downgraded based on the quality of the study as 
actually carried out. In principle, this allows an excellently executed observational study to be 
considered better evidence than a very poorly executed RCT (GRADE Working Group 2004, 
926). This additional vector of consideration—quality of execution—was not included in the 
original formulation.  
However, because the model still creates a hierarchy of evidence with expert opinion 
at an internal but very low position, I here classify it as a version of the Pyramid Model. The  
GRADE system creators had this to say about expertise: “Systems that classify ‘expert 
opinion’ as a category of evidence16 also create confusion. Judgment is necessary for 
interpretation of all evidence, whether that evidence is high or low quality. Expert reports of 
their clinical experience should be explicitly labelled as very low-quality evidence, along with 
case reports and other uncontrolled clinical observations” (GRADE Working Group 2004, 
925). This passage achieves two aims. First, it affirms the original Pyramid Model description 
of expert opinion as “very low-quality evidence.” This suggests that GRADE is properly 
thought of as a version of the Pyramid Model. However, it also introduces an ambiguity into 
the role of expertise in EBM, suggesting that expertise as judgment, that is, as external to 
evidence, will always be required in EBM, regardless of the low place of expertise as internal 
to evidence in the hierarchy. It is tempting to hang this distinction on the difference between 
the terms “judgment” and “expertise.” However, because of the inconsistent usage of these 
                                               
16 Emphasis mine  
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terms, I prefer here to discuss this issue in terms of a unitary kind of knowledge, which I here 
have called expertise. This unitary kind of knowledge nevertheless has dual functions or 
roles: external or internal to evidence. I discuss this dual notion of expertise in more detail in 
the section “Problems with the EBM Models of Expertise,” as it remains central to the 
controversy around the term.  
The Tripartite Model   
  A second model of expertise in EBM was introduced a few years later (Sackett et al,  
1996). This model features three interlinking rings, with the central overlap labelled “EBM.” 
The three constitutive rings are labelled “Best External Evidence” which perhaps includes a 
pyramid style hierarchy, “Patient Values and Expectations,” and “Individual Clinical  
Expertise.” In contrast to the Pyramid Model, which de-emphasizes the use of expertise, the 
Tripartite Model suggests that expertise can be an essential, constitutive part of EBM. 
Sackett et al. write of an EBM with integrated clinical expertise,   
Because it [EBM] requires a bottom up approach that integrates the best external 
evidence with individual clinical expertise and patients' choice, it cannot result in 
slavish, cook-book approaches to individual patient care. External clinical evidence 
can inform, but can never replace, individual clinical expertise, and it is this 
expertise that decides whether the external evidence applies to the individual 
patient at all and, if so, how it should be integrated into a clinical decision. Similarly, 
any external guideline must be integrated with individual clinical expertise in 
deciding whether and how it matches the patient's clinical state, predicament, and 
preferences, and thus whether it should be applied. (1996, 72)  
This explanation of the Tripartite Model makes clear an external role or roles of some kind 
for expertise, as it is not evidence itself, but a category outside of evidence. However, it is 
not clear if expertise is taken to be one of many inputs to be amalgamated in the clinical 
encounter, or the force that does the amalgamating, or perhaps both.   
The Amalgamation Model    
  A third model of expertise that debuted in an article by Haynes et al. (2002) keeps 
this structure of interlocking rings, but adds an additional component and shifts the role for 
expertise. In the Amalgamation Model, the three main interlocking rings are labelled 
“Patients’ Preferences and Actions,” “Research Evidence,” and “Clinical State and 
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Circumstances.” These components interlock in a similar way to the Tripartite Model, 
although no centre portion is labelled “EBM.” Additionally, a fourth component, “Clinical  
Expertise,” encompasses the other three components, holding them together. Haynes et al. 
write, “Clinical expertise includes the general basic skills of clinical practice as well as the 
experience of the individual practitioner. Clinical expertise must encompass and balance the 
patient's clinical state and circumstances, relevant research evidence, and the patient's 
preferences and actions if a successful and satisfying result is to occur” (Haynes et al. 2002, 
37). The account of the Amalgamation Model emphasizes, again, an external role for 
expertise, but specifies that the role of expertise is the amalgamation of other factors, rather 
than being one of the factors amalgamated, as was perhaps the case in the Tripartite Model.  
Problems with EBM Models of Expertise  
With this group of models in mind, clinicians and philosophers might worry that the 
EBM models of expertise fall short in a few ways. These models are not conceptually 
cashed-out, leaving most of the emphasis on the hierarchy of evidence. This is in line with 
the goals of the models. The Pyramid Model was created to differentiate between the quality 
of different kinds of evidence available to clinicians and to make claims about which kinds of 
evidence should be used most often. The Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model 
were created to make claims about the content of the EBM movement as a whole, to make 
clear that the well-known pyramid hierarchy of evidence was not the whole of the practice. In 
no case were these models created in order to explain expertise; their treatment of expertise 
was instrumental, in the service of other goals. This is not a strong critique of EBM, but 
rather an account of what makes it so difficult to say much of substance about expertise in 
EBM. Expertise is discussed, but it is rarely the main point of the discussion. We have these 
models developed for various purposes which include expertise, but they themselves do not 
tell us much.  
 There are however some points of the EBM treatment of expertise which do deserve 
critique. For example, the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model do not provide any 
guidance on how to perform the required integration, or on how high-quality expertise might 
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be distinguished from low-quality expertise. Additionally, in some cases these models leave 
the distinction between the kinds of work done by “internal” and “external” expertise implicit, 
or insufficiently described. In looking for an account of expertise in other sources that might 
enrich EBM, I will privilege accounts that can handle these problems.  
Internal vs External Distinction   
One important issue that an account of expertise that fills in the lacuna in the current 
EBM account of expertise needs to make a stand on is the issue of differing roles for 
expertise. While there are many different roles that expertise could serve in medicine, the 
roles typically discussed can usefully be categorised into two kinds; internal to evidence 
expertise and external to evidence expertise.17  
External to evidence expertise is expertise which is meant to play some role besides 
counting as evidence in its own right. These roles include: applying population-based 
evidence to particular patients, tacit expertise in taking in and acting on signs, symptoms, 
and patient histories, making decisions about the proper manner of patient communication, 
and amalgamating different kinds of evidence, among others.  These kinds of roles for 
expertise could also be described as “non-claim making” roles for expertise in a particular 
narrow sense; they do not involve making a claim that expertise is evidence guiding 
decision-making. These roles for expertise are much less controversial. Nearly every 
account of proper clinician behaviour when working in EBM methodology allows or even 
requires one or more of these roles for expertise.   
Internal to evidence expertise is expertise which, in itself, counts as evidence. This 
role for expertise could also be cashed out in terms of “making a claim.” When a clinician 
cites internal to evidence expertise, she is making a claim that her expertise should be taken 
as evidence for putting in place a particular intervention or making some other kind of 
                                               
17 I am using this distinction based on status as evidence, rather than something like a judgement vs testimony 
distinction for two reasons. The first reason is because of the importance of the concept of evidence for EBM. 
Expertise will be treated radically differently in this movement if it is a kind of evidence than if it not. The other 
reason is because of the plethora of definitions of “judgement” in medicine.  
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decision. This kind of role for expertise is much more contentious then the various external to 
evidence roles for expertise. However, a thorough investigation of the concept of expertise 
requires that I charitably consider the possibility of a legitimate internal to evidence role for 
expertise.18   
Applying the Internal/External Distinction  
Where do these roles for expertise show up in the various models of expertise 
discussed in EBM? While the EBM literature does not make use of the internal/external 
distinction that I draw here, the decisions made about expertise in each model differ along 
the lines of this distinction. In the Pyramid Model, expertise (sometimes discussed as “expert 
opinion”) is treated as internal to evidence. It is a part (although the lowest possible part) of 
the pyramid-shaped hierarchy of evidence. Expertise here is in line with my definition of 
internal to evidence in that experts are taken to be making a claim, something like, “My 
expertise on Y should be taken as evidence for the use of intervention A to treat condition B, 
provided that intervention A and condition B fall within the purview of Y.”   
This is not the case in the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model. In both the 
Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model, the expertise discussed is not taken to be a 
kind of evidence, since expertise is either a separate category from evidence which 
sometimes interacts with evidence (Tripartite Model), or is an amalgamating force which 
brings together other components including evidence, but isn’t itself evidence  
(Amalgamation Model). This kind of expertise could be said to “not make a claim” in contrast 
to internal to evidence expertise.   
Of course, all of this is complicated by the possible “nesting” of the models. If we take 
the “Evidence” component included in the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model to 
be the Pyramid Model itself, then the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model include 
                                               
18 This distinction is in some ways similar to the direct/indirect role for values distinction put forward by Douglas 
discussed in Chapter 4. They have in common that the more direct role is the one which is controversial. While I 
criticize that distinction because I do not believe it is the case that some values are always appropriate and 
others always not appropriate, this kind of distinction is close to what I mean here.    
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both internal to evidence and external to evidence concepts of expertise within the same 
model. That is, both the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model include a ring which is 
meant to represent “best evidence,” best evidence which is still arranged in a hierarchy as in 
the Pyramid model. Thus, if the models are “nested,” both the Tripartite Model and the  
Amalgamation Model are to include within them the Pyramid Model. This “nesting” 
interpretation remains controversial because it is not clear whether these models are meant 
to replace each other, or to build on each other as subsequent models were introduced. If 
they are meant to replace each other, as is sometimes claimed when strong criticisms 
continue to be made against the Pyramid Model by those outside of EBM, then we should 
not take them to be nested.   
The Search for a Legitimate Role for Internal to Evidence Expertise  
So, what is it that makes internal to evidence roles for expertise so problematic? It is 
possible that expertise collapses into the list of facts which an expert knows, in which case, it 
is not the expertise which is doing the work of being evidence, but instead these facts which 
make up expertise.  The expertise itself in this case adds nothing above and beyond these 
facts. On the other hand, internal to evidence expertise sometimes is described as whatever 
ideas about what should be done that are left when all the explicit facts an expert can 
marshal are left aside─ a fact-free gut feeling about what should be done. If this is what is 
meant by expertise and it is to be used as evidence, the worries here are clear; such gut 
feelings will not be consistent from person to person, do not take into account any facts, 
never mind the quality of those facts, and cannot be articulated to others in order to work 
toward a consensus or be checked by a second party. So, with these worries in mind, what, 
if any, possible legitimate uses are there for internal to evidence expertise?  
One possibly defendable use of an internal to evidence role for expertise involves  
Bayesianism. Bayes Theorem,   
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋|𝑌, 𝐼) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑌|𝑋, 
𝐼) × 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑋|𝐼 )  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦|𝐼) 
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can be rewritten as:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠|𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝐼) ∝ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎|ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝐼) × 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠|𝐼)19  
As Sivia and Skilling write in their book, Data Analysis: A Bayesian Tutorial,   
The quantity on the far right, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠|𝐼), is called the prior probability; 
it represents our state of knowledge (or ignorance) about the truth of the hypothesis 
before we have analysed the current data. This is modified by the experimental 
measurements through the likelihood function, or 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎|ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝐼), and 
yields posterior probability, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠|𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎), representing our state of 
knowledge about the truth of the hypothesis in light of the data. In a sense, Bayes 
theorem encapsulates the process of learning. (Sivia and Skilling, 2006, 6) 
  
 In this account, our priors provide an important baseline of knowledge. When 
confronted with new information, our priors are what we adjust in order to digest the new 
information and take it into account in our decision-making. While most of the “action” in 
Bayesianism happens after the priors have been determined, differences in the status of 
priors between agents can make an important difference in their predictions.20  
For example, imagine an expert cardiologist and an untrained but scientifically literate 
non-expert are presented with evidence from a well-designed and well-carried-out RCT for 
the use of statins in stroke before they are asked to suggest a course of action for a patient 
who is at high risk of having a stroke. Because of differences in their knowledge statuses, 
before they see the results of this study, the expert cardiologist’s priors suggest that perhaps 
statins might be a good idea for this patient- the non-expert has no such prior inkling. 
Suppose this study suggests that statins were successful in treating stroke on average in 
some population, and our patient is very similar to the population on which the test was  
                                               
19 This equation contains an often left out component, I. Sivia and Skilling write, “We have made the probabilities 
conditional on I, to denote relevant background information at hand, because there is no such thing as absolute 
probability…Although the conditioning on I is often omitted in calculations, to reduce algebraic cluttering, we must 
never forget its existence. A failure to state all the relevant background information, and assumptions, is 
frequently the real cause of heated debates about data analysis” (Sivia and Skilling 2006, 5). This seems to be a 
worthy consideration, so I have included this notation.   
20 A response here might be to claim that differences in priors “wash out” over time, so my claim that what internal 
to evidence expertise does is produce higher quality priors isn’t particularly important- it might be true, but is over 
all not important. As I said earlier, the idea here is to suggest something useful expertise might do, not to enter 
into ongoing debates in Bayesianism, but there seems to be some evidence that this washing-out defense only 
works in the very long run, and not at all in the short or medium runs (Earman 1996, 58).   
50  
  
done. Both the expert and the non-expert might conclude that the patient should take statins 
as treatment for a possible stroke. While it is true that they have both been presented with 
the same evidence, and both came to the same conclusion, and so in some sense have the 
same knowledge, in a Bayesian sense their responses cannot be the same, because of the 
differences in their priors. This suggests at least one legitimate role for internal to evidence 
expertise: in a Bayesian framework, it provides higher quality priors.   
It is tough to say exactly what exactly I mean by “higher quality priors.” I am tempted 
to say that higher quality here just means “more warranted” priors, but there is a question of 
how priors can be warranted at all, given that they are taken to include general background 
knowledge and values. Instead, perhaps higher quality priors are just those priors which are 
“closer” to the revised knowledge status, such that individuals with internal expertise “travel” 
less far in getting from the prior to the posterior. This suggestion avoids the debate about 
warrant, in that it makes no claims about warrant itself, instead noting that some priors 
require less “effort” in moving to a particular revised knowledge status than others. It looks 
like we could comfortably identify these priors as being derived from expertise. 
How the Internal/External Distinction is a Problem for the EBM Models  
So, a distinction can be made between (1) expertise that constitutes evidence in itself  
(“internal”) and (2) expertise that is or does something else (“external”). The “something else” 
might consist of making judgments about the quality of the evidence, integrating best 
evidence with patient values, or improving the benefits of interventions (e.g., through the 
placebo effects associated with “good bedside manner” or successful task performance 
which comes through continued repetition, such as recognizing symptoms, signs, taking 
measurements, or performing surgery).21 Often the various models of expertise in EBM take 
the details of this distinction for granted, leaving it unclear which type of expertise is being 
                                               
21 This dichotomy goes by several names: internal/external, constitutive/contextual, experience/judgment, expert 
opinion/judgment, or simply bad expertise/good expertise There are other axes along which we might differentiate 
kinds of expertise—for example, a bodily/cognitive distinction. However, given the important role of evidence in 
EBM, a distinction that clarifies the relationship between evidence and expertise is of primary importance here, 
and is therefore the focus of this section.  
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discussed. In the Pyramid Model, it seems fairly clear that internal expertise is being 
deemphasized, given that the model itself is a ranking of different kinds of evidence. It is less 
clear if the expertise(s) involved in the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model is 
internal or external or both. This starts to look like a possible contradiction between the 
models, especially if we consider, as is sometimes suggested, the Pyramid Model to be 
nested inside the “evidence” portions of the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model. 
Such a contradiction makes advice about when expertise is to be encouraged and when it is 
to be de-emphasized difficult to follow.  
Other Expertise Problems for EBM  
In addition to worries about the two kinds of work done by expertise, it is not clear 
that the uptake of each new model involves the abandonment of the previous model. It could 
be that we are expected to consider all three models at once, given continual references to a 
Pyramid Model outlook in EBM work published long after the introduction of the Tripartite 
and the Amalgamation models, such as the GOBSAT acronym joke (Greenhalgh, 2010; 
Howick, 2011; Wollersheim, 2009). The GOBSAT (Good Old Boys Sit Around a Table) joke 
about the kind of expertise on display at consensus conferences suggests that in some 
ways, expertise remains framed as a force in opposition to EBM, rather than an element to 
be incorporated.22 The fact that Pyramid Model is in direct conflict with the Tripartite Model 
and the Amalgamation Model, in that it allows an internal role for expertise while the 
Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model do not, is problematic if we consider all three 
models to be current and helpfully descriptive.  
However, even if we should “replace” the older model with the new one each time, 
and so currently just consider Amalgamation Model, there are still questions. What prompted 
the extensive changes, including the move from internal to external, from Pyramid Model to 
the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model? How does the integration required by the 
                                               
22 The GOBSAT joke is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 on values. In this chapter, it just serves as evidence that 
some kinds of EBM opposition to expertise continued after the introduction of the Tripartite Model and the 
Amalgamation Model.   
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Amalgamation Model work? How do we distinguish high-quality from low-quality expertise? 
And how do we develop this high-quality expertise?  
Arguing for an Augmented Account of Expertise  
Many arguments might be given in defence of allowing the EBM conception of 
expertise to remain as it is, in an impoverished state. I consider several of these arguments  
(the “already dealt with” argument, the “everybody knows” argument, the “wishy-washy” 
argument, and the “but what about value-freedom!” argument) in turn, together with their 
counterarguments. I conclude that despite the range of arguments suggesting that what has 
already been said by EBM about expertise is sufficient, confusions and problems about 
expertise in EBM remain. A public discussion about the role of expertise in EBM could 
provide many benefits to EBM and the health care sector generally. Having this conversation 
with patients and practitioners should be a prime concern for EBM proponents. These 
proponents include groups such as the “EBM Renaissance” movement at Oxford, as well as 
traditional centres of EBM thought like McMasters and York University. The section 
concludes with recommendations for which questions regarding expertise should be 
regarded as most pressing for these stakeholders. These questions centre around the nature 
of expertise, tools for distinguishing between “good” and “bad” expertise, and a careful 
investigation into the possibility of expertise as evidence itself.  
The first of these arguments for no future work on expertise in EBM I call the “Already  
Dealt With” Argument. The Sackett et al. articles of 1997 and 1996, upon which the Tripartite 
Model is based, and the Haynes et al. article of 2002, upon which the Amalgamation Model 
is based, both discuss expertise. Sackett et al. write,   
The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating individual clinical 
expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research. 
By individual clinical expertise we mean the proficiency and judgment that individual 
clinicians acquire through clinical experience and clinical practice. Increased 
expertise is reflected in many ways, but especially in more effective and efficient 
diagnosis and in the more thoughtful identification and compassionate use of 
individual patients' predicaments, rights, and preferences in making clinical decisions 
about their care. (1996, 71)   
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Haynes et al. write, “Clinical expertise includes the general basic skills of clinical 
practice as well as the experience of the individual practitioner. Clinical expertise must 
encompass and balance the patient’s clinical state and circumstances, relevant research 
evidence, and the patient’s preferences and actions if a successful and satisfying result is to 
occur” (2002, 38). The popular EBM textbook, Evidence-Based Medicine: How to Practice 
and Teach EBM, includes expertise in step 4, the final step of the EBM process, writing that 
this step requires, “integrating the critical appraisal with our clinical expertise and with our 
patient’s unique biology, values, and circumstances” (Straus et al. 2010, 3). In fact, this 
relatively short text mentions expertise 24 times! It looks as if an EBM proponent could be 
rightfully exasperated at the demand for more coverage of expertise in EBM as it is already 
talked about so much.  
These sources do include references to “expertise” but say very little about what 
expertise is, how good expertise can be differentiated from bad, or indeed anything at all. So, 
while it is the case that EBM does mention expertise often, this high quantity of mentions 
does not provide much of substance to help clinicians understand how to integrate and 
evaluate expertise. The “Already Dealt With” argument does not provide a reason to avoid 
additional in-depth discussion of expertise in EBM.  
The second possible argument against attempting to understand more about 
expertise in EBM might be called the “Everyone Knows” argument. This argument suggests 
that it is intellectual overkill to bring in additional theoretical resources to explain a concept 
that there is no confusion about. Such additional theorizing is unnecessary and weighs down 
EBM with unnecessary and confusing jargon-indeed, perhaps worsening the problem (lack 
of clarity about expertise) that it is trying to solve.  
While this argument might seem to be the same as the “Already Dealt With” 
argument at first glance, it is importantly different. While the first argument leans on the 
number of mentions of expertise in the EBM literature to make its case, the second argument 
leans on the pedestrian accessibility of the term to suggest that there is nothing else to say 
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about it-surely a dictionary definition or the common understanding of it in the community is 
more than enough explanation?  
This is far from the case. Expertise plays importantly different roles in all three main 
models of EBM as discussed in the previous section. Because of these conceptual 
differences, it is far from the case that everyone already knows what is meant by expertise.  
The “Everyone Knows” argument does not provide a reason to avoid additional in-depth 
discussion of expertise in EBM.  
Perhaps surprisingly, an additional possible argument runs in exactly the opposite 
direction from the “Everybody Knows” argument, but with the same conclusion. The “Wishy- 
Washy” argument suggests that, far from everyone knowing what expertise is already, 
expertise is a non-standard wishy-washy term, a term that different speakers make very 
different use of in very different contexts. The project of trying to get clearer about what 
expertise is in EBM is bound to fail on this account because of this multitude of possible and 
equally plausible candidates for what expertise means. There are no criteria, this argument 
might insist, by which we could distinguish which among the conceptions of expertise is the 
one which ought to be endorsed by EBM.  
It is a mark of the confusion around this topic that both the “Already Knows” and the  
“Wishy-Washy” arguments are presented as defendable. It is true that there are many uses 
of the word “expertise” in play in EBM and in medicine generally, but this does not mean that 
nothing can be done to make distinctions between these uses or to weed out some accounts 
of expertise that do not fit well with other EBM values or clinical need. Conceptual tools like 
the internal to evidence/external to evidence distinction can be used in order to pull apart 
some of the many meanings of expertise. There are in fact some well-developed accounts of 
expertise that can be rejected as a poor fit with EBM goals. I will reject several of these 
accounts in what follows in this chapter.  
A final concern about a further investigation of expertise in EBM charges that this 
project is not in some way properly objective. I call this the “No Longer Value-Free” 
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argument. This argument claims that discussion about what expertise is is a matter of values 
and preferences, not a matter of facts, and because of this, an investigation of expertise is 
an inappropriate project for EBM. Such a project would compromise the value-free purity of 
EBM.  
While I disagree with the conclusion of this argument, (because I think much of the 
work EBM supporters need to be doing has to do with clarifying values), I do agree that a 
further investigation of expertise in EBM will be a matter of values. I discuss the role of 
values in EBM more thoroughly in Chapter 4, but here I will just briefly say that EBM is not 
value-free, and what is more, should not be value-free. Projects which discuss values in  
EBM, far from being contaminants, are desperately needed if the EBM project is to continue.  
Because of this fundamental disagreement about the role of values in EBM, I do not find the  
“No Longer Value-Free” argument compelling.  
Because the project of improving the account of expertise in EBM is not often 
suggested, these arguments are not directly stated in the literature. I have cobbled them 
together from other kinds of methodological remarks and arguments made in EBM and 
responded to them as charitably as I can. Now that I have made this proposal, it is possible 
that EBM proponents will suggest some new, not yet considered reason to leave the account 
of expertise in EBM as it is. I will eagerly consider and respond to these arguments as they 
arise.   
However, these arguments against investigating expertise in more depth are 
unconvincing. I argue that EBM should adopt a more robust account of expertise. What 
would a more robust account of expertise in EBM achieve that has not already been 
accomplished by these models? This account should give us guidance on how to perform 
the integration of evidence required by the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model. 
This guidance should include what is to be done when the demands of one of the component 
parts (patient values, evidence from the hierarchy and clinical expertise in the Tripartite 
Model, and patient values, evidence from the hierarchy and the clinical circumstances, 
56  
  
mediated by clinical expertise in the Amalgamation Model) come into conflict with the others, 
as examples from bioethics, such as cases in which religious commitments conflict with best 
evidence for effectiveness, suggest that they will. This will inform clinician’s deliberations 
regarding how to weigh the various portions of the EBM encounter. It will also make clear 
whether or not the expertise in mind includes expertise as evidence (internal), expertise as 
other nonevidentiary roles(external), or some combination of both. This will determine which 
kinds of expertise to cultivate and which to avoid. Lastly, a more robust account of expertise 
should include an explanation of how expertise is acquired: how do we become experts? 
This explanation will allow for programmes of medical education to include components 
designed to encourage the development of expertise.23  
It is for these reasons that the EBM account of expertise needs to be developed in 
more detail. However, it is not necessary to create a bespoke account of expertise for EBM. 
Many other disciplines including philosophy, sociology, computer science, science and 
technology studies, and artificial intelligence have ready-made conceptions of expertise 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Dreyfus 1992; Turner 2013; Bishop and Trout 2004; Epstein 
1998; Collins 2004; Collins and Evans 2007).  
Of these, perhaps the most widely discussed is the Dreyfusian account of expertise 
in the philosophy and artificial intelligence literature. This account has already been taken up 
in the nursing literature. Of course, it might be the case that nursing and EBM are 
significantly different such that an account being preferred by nursing is no reason to 
suppose that the account will be a good fit with EBM. However, because including expertise 
in EBM is a way of showing that EBM is responsive to the needs and worldviews of 
clinicians, examining a clinician-discussed account of expertise is a good place to start. Of 
the suggested possible accounts above, the Dreyfus account is the only one to boast 
                                               
23 It is possible to see a lack of clarity about expertise as a kind of boon for EBM. A multifaceted and 
nondifferentiated expertise could be considered a balm, a stop-gap, for all uncertainties left when the evidence has 
been consulted. For another possible take on the role of uncertainty and expertise in EBM, see Timmermans and 
Angell, 2001.  
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clinician endorsement. Can the Dreyfusian account of expertise flesh out the EBM account of 
expertise in these three models?   
The Dreyfusian account  
The Dreyfusian24 account of expertise development25 arose out of their critique of the 
artificial intelligence(AI) program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), but was 
eventually extended to AI programs in general. They suggest that these programs are the 
inheritance of various philosophers (e.g., Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Husserl) who argue that 
cognition is a matter of representation of the outside world within our minds, that wisdom can 
be articulated in explicit principles and rules, and that complex problems can be broken 
down into their parts in order to grasp the whole's underlying rules for putting them together 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). Dreyfus and Dreyfus find themselves more in line with what 
they call the “anti-philosophers” (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Pascal, Wittgenstein).  
They claim that, “Human understanding was a skill akin to knowing how to find one's way 
about in the world, rather than knowing a lot of facts and rules for relating them. Our basic 
understanding was thus a knowing how rather than a knowing that” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986, 4). The work of these “anti-philosophers” pointed them towards a problem that, they 
argued, poses insurmountable difficulties for the AI project. They called this problem “the 
frame problem.”  
The frame problem is, “the attempt to capture human temporal, situated, continuously 
changing know-how in a computer as static, desituated, discrete, knowing...more specifically 
it is the problem of representing in some systematic way that as time passes and/or actions 
are performed, some but not all facts change and only a few of the changes are relevant to 
                                               
24 I am most closely examining the account laid out in Mind Over Machine, which is written by two Dreyfus 
brothers, Hubert (a philosopher) and Stuart (an industrial engineer and early computer programmer). Hubert went 
on to develop the account further in several other books including What Computers (Still) Can’t Do. When referring 
to work done by both brothers, I reference plural authors, but otherwise make reference to “the Dreyfusian” 
account, encompassing both the co-authored and single-authored work.  
25 The Dreyfus brothers are answering a slightly different question than the one I am interested in. Their work 
answers the question, “How does one become an expert?” while I am explicitly interested in the question, “What 
is expertise?” However, their answers to their question have important baring on my question.  
58  
  
the current action” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, 82). Dreyfus and Dreyfus argued that no 
matter how many pieces of data were stored within computers, since computers do not  
“have a world” they could not, just on the basis of these facts, find the relevant facts to deal 
with changes in their environment.   
With this in mind, Dreyfus and Dreyfus sought to provide an account of expertise that 
explains why, rather than a building-up of facts, expertise involves a deepening of our 
understanding of which knowledge is relevant in a given situation. Such knowledge allows 
the expert to react to changes in the environment by recognizing which elements are similar 
to situations the expert has been in before, and which elements are importantly new. It is 
important to emphasize that a Heideggerian account of the world (on which Dreyfus is 
relying) includes other people—the world into which we are thrown and from which we gain 
this kind of expert, context-dependent understanding is fundamentally social. We learn what  
“one” does in particular situations from the actions of others.  
Understanding the details of the Dreyfusian work is required in order to evaluate the  
“fit” between the gap in EBM and the solution that the Dreyfusian account offers, which has 
been readily taken up in some parts of medicine. What follows is a brief sketch of those 
details.  
The Five Stages of Skill Acquisition  
  The Dreyfusian account of expertise involves five progressive stages. The first stage 
they call “novice.” In this stage, the novice's attention is drawn to facts and is generally 
presented with information as a set of usual rules that are “context free” in order to make 
them cleaner and clearer. Dreyfus and Dreyfus use a series of ongoing specific examples to 
illustrate their stages. One of these follows the development of expertise in a nurse,26 which 
                                               
26 Dreyfus does not differentiate between the sort of jobs we might think of as trades (Heidegger has often been 
accused of romanticizing and overemphasizing this kind of work) from those we think of as intellectual. His list, 
“the expert business manager, surgeon, nurse, lawyer or teacher is totally engaged in skillful performance” 
includes both the sort of labor that we might easily accept as best operating using a smooth flow of experienced 
effort (say carpentry, or in this list, surgery) and the sort of occupations and activities that we often take to be very 
cerebral and involving explicit decision-making and deliberation (like teaching or lawyering). For Dreyfus, there is 
not a divide here; insofar as someone is an expert at any of these activities or occupations, they will, provided 
everything is going well, smoothly go about their business without explicit deliberation.  
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is relevant to the question at hand. In the novice stage the nurse is “taught how to read blood 
pressure, measure bodily outputs, and compute fluid retention and is given rules for 
determining what to do when those measurements reach certain values” (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986, 22).  
The second stage is called “advanced beginner.” In this step, the learner begins to 
recognize regularities in her particular situation based on “perceived similarities with prior 
examples” which are not given in the “context free” rules provided to her as a novice. The 
advanced beginner nurse, “learns from experience how to distinguish the breathing sounds 
that indicate pulmonary edema from those suggesting pneumonia. Rules of treatment can 
now refer to the presence or absence of such sounds” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 23). At 
this point, rules are still involved, and now that the learner has enough experience to 
understand the proper references, even more rules can be meaningfully used.   
Upon reaching stage three, “competence,” the learner can recognize both the 
appropriate context-free rules and situational elements of various kinds in a given 
circumstance. At this stage, the two kinds of information seem to be equally relevant and can 
become overwhelming. The learner, having trouble ranking the vast amount of experience-
gained insight and context-free rules that may apply (and possibly disagree) in a given 
situation, must eventually attempt a hierarchical plan to synthesize which experience-gained 
insight or context-free rule to apply first.  
 To apply this to a medical setting, Dreyfus and Dreyfus write,  
The competent nurse will no longer automatically go from patient to patient 
in a prescribed order but will assess the urgency of their needs and plan work 
accordingly. With each patient, such a nurse will develop a plan of treatment, 
deciding that if certain signs are present a certain number of days after surgery, 
say, the time has come to talk with a patient about his wound and its care outside 
the hospital. When discussing the matter, various medical aspects of the patient's 
condition will be ignored, and psychological effects will become important. (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986, 26)   
  
In this example, it is especially clear that on the Dreyfus model, expertise is both evidence 
itself and a way of amalgamating evidence. The nurse has expertise in knowing when a 
patient is ready to go home, but expertise can additionally be a way of pulling together other 
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data (number of days after the surgery, the look of the patient, the condition of the wound 
etc.) to come to the conclusion that the patient is ready to go home.  
To be clear, for Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the creation of this plan cannot be done with a set 
of meta-rules for, say, work-planning. It would be all too easy to fall into a regress here, 
creating rules, then rules for work planning, then rules for planning work planning. They 
write, “Choosing a plan is no simple matter for the competent individual. There is no 
objective procedure like the novice's context-free feature recognition” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986, 26). Because this choice of a plan is the first part of the expertise that the learner does 
not just follow (like rules) or recognize (like experience patterns), but creates herself, it is at 
this level that the learner first feels responsibility for her actions.27 I will later show that this is 
the highest stage that can be acceptable to EBM, as the two highest levels of skill are  
“characterized by a rapid, fluid, involved kind of behaviour that bears no apparent similarity 
to the slow detached reasoning of the problem-solving process” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 
27), a description that comes into conflict with the goals of EBM.  
In the fourth step, proficiency, learners will not only experience tasks as things they 
are responsible for but will have a particular perspective on the task at hand. It is at this point 
that something like an expert’s “voice” or “style” becomes clear. This perspective, itself 
developed without a set of concrete rules, is essential in allowing the learner to depend even 
less on explicit rules and guidelines, but to go about her tasks smoothly. This is unpacked 
using our familiar nursing example: “The proficient nurse will notice one day, without any 
conscious decision-making, that the patient is psychologically ready to deal with his surgery 
and impending release. However, during the conversation, words will be carefully and 
                                               
27 An important part of the Dreyfus and Dreyfus system is their account of where and when responsibility comes 
into the picture for learners along the expertise continuum. In the Dreyfus and Dreyfus account, responsibility only 
becomes involved when rules and explicit instructions become less important and less necessary. If this is in fact 
true, one of the implications of EBM's dependence on, and lauding of, explicit guidelines and evidence supported 
rules is a reduction in the amount of responsibility health care professionals could possibly feel for their actions. If 
the use of explicit rules relieves health professionals of their responsibility (or perhaps never allows this 
responsibility to develop), this could have very large implications for the discipline of bioethics and would make a 
substantial portion of the literature on topics like physician regret seem misinformed.    
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consciously chosen” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 30). The emphasis here is generally on the 
lack of choice or deliberation in the shifts of attention that occur, while denying that the  
Dreyfus account makes a virtue of thoughtlessness. While expertise may mean fewer explicit 
rules, a Dreyfusian expert need not be thoughtless regarding patient communication.  
Proponents of EBM methods might be concerned that this lack of deliberation would lead to 
poor patient outcomes. However, on the Dreyfusian account, this is just how we live the 
majority of our lives in realms in which we are comfortable. Importantly, this ability is 
categorized as “intuitive,” bringing into play one of the key concepts EBM was created to de-
emphasize in medicine (EBMWG, 1992). Intuition is further clarified this way in the section 
“Problems with the Integration of the Dreyfusian Account and EBM.”  
“Expertise” or “skilled coping” is the fifth and final stage. This stage involves the learner 
moving away from a “problem solving” mode of operation, to a simple, mature knowledge of 
what needs to be done. This knowledge will not stand out to the expert as something she must 
struggle for or produce, but instead be instant and invisible, even to her. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
compare this relationship to skilled knowledge with our relationship to our own body, writing, 
“an expert’s skill has become so much a part of him that he need be no more aware of it than 
he is of his own body” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). 28  
For Dreyfus, the expert, far from needing checklists29 or other materials with 
statements of guidelines or rules, can actually be hindered by these rules as they take her 
back to the stage of competence, if not further, perhaps resulting in poor patient outcomes.  
  In saying this, the authors are not saying that deliberation never occurs; it just occurs 
with less frequency and upon different things than those who find EBM methods salient 
might think. They write,   
In the idealized picture of skilled coping I have just presented, it might 
seem that experts never think and are always right. Of course, in reality, things 
are otherwise...when time permits and outcomes are crucial, an expert will 
                                               
28 This parallel drawn between the immediacy of the body and the immediacy of expert skill might suggest that 
interesting work could be done to discuss expertise using the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2013).  
29 With Dreyfus' account in mind we might more easily see how, though they seem to be effective, experts might be 
unenthusiastic about the introduction of checklists into the medical profession (Gawande 2009).  
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deliberate before acting. But... this deliberation does not require calculative 
problem solving but rather involves critically reflecting on one’s intuitions. 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, 31)   
At first it seems that with this admission, Dreyfus will open the door to EBM-style 
insistence on continual overt evidence-based deliberation, but by suggesting that what 
is deliberated upon is actually intuition, this door is shut firmly.30  
Against the Calculative Rationality Model  
  By creating this account of the stages of expertise, the authors are attempting to 
refute a “calculative rationality” model of knowledge and skill. This was the sort of model 
used by the artificial intelligence lab at MIT in which both brothers were involved. The gist of 
this model (which might be seen as in line with EBM methodologies) is that skills and 
knowledge are made up of facts and rules about how and when to apply those facts. If skills 
or knowledge have not been attained, the problem is a lack of proper facts or rules. The 
addition of more facts or rules will solve the problem. Instead, Dreyfus and Dreyfus predicted  
“success with simple mechanical forms of information processing, then great expectations, 
and finally failure when confronted with more intuitive forms for intelligence” (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986). The Dreyfusian model, with its emphasis on the epistemic work done by our 
bodies’ interaction with the world provides an alternative to the Calculative Rationality Model 
and explains some of that model’s failures.   
What problems would the Dreyfusian account of expertise solve for EBM?  
  The Dreyfusian account can augment what EBM has already said about expertise in 
several ways. It takes a stand on the role of expertise: on the Dreyfusian account, expertise 
is both evidence and the process for amalgamating evidence. This issue is left uncertain in 
                                               
30 Some readers may hear something in this passage of Kahneman’s Two System Theory from his very popular 
book, Thinking Fast and Slow. In this theory of cognition, “System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little 
or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that 
demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice and concentration” (2011, 20).  In so far as Kahneman is interested in the 
investigation (and salvaging the reputation) of System 1, he and the Dreyfus brothers could be considered allies. 
However, their underlying commitments and worldviews are quite different and their systems are far from 
equivalent. For example, on the Kahneman account, certain kinds of activities are just always done by System 1, 
rather than (as perhaps the Dreyfusian account would have it) activities done by System 2 originally and 
eventually only needing System 1. There is not the same emphasis as in the account given by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus on a developmental progress; on the same activity requiring over time less active attention and instead 
being done in a skillful flow.    
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EBM’s current account of expertise. It also provides a clear account of how we end up with 
good experts by including the developmental processes that are necessary to facilitate the 
training of good experts. In a Dreyfusian account this requires that developing experts first 
be given rules and procedures to follow, but as their expertise develops, that they are given 
the opportunity to take responsibility for their actions and develop patterns of practice not 
obviously called for in explicit rules. Taking up the Dreyfusian account of how to produce 
good experts has implications for practices in medical education. For example, a Dreyfusian 
influenced medical education might have coursework of a shorter duration and a longer 
period of residency. Adopting the Dreyfusian account of expertise would add clarity to EBM’s 
current stance on the matters of expertise as amalgamating force and pedagogy which 
encourages the development of good expertise.    
Problems with the Integration of the Dreyfusian Account and EBM  
  
  Dreyfus is critiquing a particular “calculative” conception of rule-based rationality and 
decision-making. This critique is in line with EBM’s insistence that it is not “cook-book 
medicine” as claimed by Sackett and his co-authors in their well-cited article. However, given 
that rule adherence remains a backbone component of EBM practice, the Dreyfusian 
account of expertise remains at odds with EBM components.   
Proponents of EBM are eager to claim that dependence on rules and guidelines does 
not entail that that EBM is “cook-book medicine.” Sackett writes, “Evidence based medicine 
is not ‘cook-book’ medicine. Because it requires a bottom-up approach that integrates the 
best external evidence with individual clinical expertise and patient choice, it cannot result in 
slavish, cook-book approaches to individual patient care...any clinical guideline must be 
integrated with individual clinical expertise...” (Sackett 1996).   
These fears about cook-book medicine derive both from a fear of a lower status for 
health professionals and worries about a lack of responsibility that over-dependence on 
guidelines might allow. Although supporters want to make clear that EBM is not cook-book 
medicine, this does not negate the fact that in practice, in terms of use in medical education 
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and in the clinical encounter, EBM is based on a system of systematic reviews and meta-
analyses that work as guidelines for best practices in various circumstances. And although 
supporters of EBM added a role for clinical judgment in their overall system, the emphasis is 
still on decision-making and intervention selection based on rules created from test results 
(Sackett, 2000). These are the emphasized commitments for EBM practitioners of all kinds, 
not just medical students and new clinicians. In fact, EBM founding mythology and central 
texts emphasize that mid- and late-career researchers and practitioners are also susceptible 
to the kind of lapses in evidence-based practice that they are seeking to avoid (see chapter 
1). While EBM supporters might declare that there is still a role for judgment and expertise in 
deciding to apply findings, at a basic level formal rules are taken to be the building blocks of 
decision making for EBM. This commitment to rule-based action places EBM squarely in the 
camp of those traditional philosophers and AI scientists that are subject to the Dreyfusian 
critique.    
It might be possible for EBM proponents and texts to accommodate this sort of 
conception of expertise, but the accommodation would not be complete and any 
accommodation would happen in such a way as to undermine the critique Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus were hoping to make clear. One might also think that EBM proponents could insist 
that the continual creation of additional evidence means that it is appropriate for health care 
professionals operating within EBM to just remain at the level of novice in the Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus account. These health professionals ought never to reach the Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
level of expertise, because this would require too much distance from the explicit rules and 
guidelines that are so important to EBM. Given that the reason for discussing the Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus account in the context of EBM was to deepen the EBM concept of expertise, a 
solution which does not leave open the possibility of health care professionals reaching the 
stage of expertise on that model does not provide a useful solution. Is there any way in 
which the Dreyfus and Dreyfus account remains a good fit for this goal of deepening the 
account of expertise in EBM. 
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 The first three stages of the Dreyfusian system are in some ways perfectly in line 
with what EBM tells us about expertise, especially in relation to the Tripartite Model and the 
Amalgamation Model. On this version of EBM, a learner is initially given experience-free, 
evidence-based rules. Then she progresses and receives some experience such that more 
rules have meaning and can be understood and applied, and then, overwhelmed by the pull 
of different rules, she builds a hierarchical plan in order to manage the different sets of rules. 
But here is where proponents of EBM would say that their health professionals ought to stop 
moving up the stages of expertise to proficiency and then skilled coping (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986).31 Health professionals who move on from this stage have left behind the 
proper role of evidence-informed clinician and are now operating without the direct support  
of that evidence. This follows from the EBM injunction to avoid operating independent of the 
“findings of the best available evidence.” This situation, which supporters of EBM see 
leading to inconsistency, hubris, and poor patient outcomes, is where Dreyfus sees the 
beginning of a “flow” of actual involved expertise. This makes for a poor fit between EBM 
and the Dreyfusian account. The other reason the Dreyfusian conception of expertise might 
be a poor fit to fill in the relatively shallow account of expertise in EBM because of the 
radical difference between the two parties’ accounts of intuition and rationalization. Dreyfus 
writes of rationalization,   
The nurse's desire to rationalize her intuition shows the pressure which 
often leads to rationalization, especially in our modern Western culture. There 
are, of course, two interrelated senses of the word 'rationalization.' Once a 
decision intuitively presents itself, rationalization in the first sense describes the 
attempt to find a valid explanation by identifying the elements of the situation 
and combining those elements by a decision rule to justify the chosen 
decision...She [the nurse] realizes, however, that 'all I am really trying to do is 
find words within the jargon to talk about something that I don't think is 
particularly describable.' If, indeed, elements and principles play no role in 
mature, practiced decision-making, rationalization in this sense amounts to the 
invention of reasons—rationalization in its second and generally derogatory 
sense. (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 35)  
                                               
31 EBM might also be somewhat accepting of a reversal of Dreyfus' steps. This reversed set of steps would begin 
with intuition-based expertise and then move “up” to expertise based on the application of abstract principles, 
but this acceptance might also be based on the difference in “intuitions” discussed. In addition, I see no reason 
to think that Dreyfus would accept as meaningful the use of his stages if inverted.   
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It is clear from this description that Dreyfus thinks of rationalization not as a fundamental and 
necessary step for being a proper expert, but instead as a pasted-on explanation for 
something for which there is no explanation, for which there “are no words.” For Dreyfus, 
rationalization is ultimately synthetic and deceptive, as it does not represent the way we go 
about our work as experts.   
  EBM is based on the premise that the delivery of superior care depends on 
immediate access to rational evidence (as well as some combination of values, 
circumstances and expertise). In the interest of attaining this superior care, “clinicians should 
regularly consult the original literature (and read and be able to critically appraise the  
‘Methods’ and ‘Results’ sections) in solving clinical problems and providing optimal patient 
care” (EBMWG 1992, 2421). Much emphasis is placed on the ability to consistently make 
reference to the published evidence upon which a health professional is acting. This 
emphasis has softened somewhat over time, as clinicians are now directed to pre-approved  
EBM resources, rather than expected to do the critical appraisal themselves (see Chapter 1).  
 
This is in contrast with Dreyfus' model in which, though “that type of carefully thought 
out behaviour certainly occurs, frequently for learners of new skills and occasionally even for 
the most skillful, an unbiased examination of our everyday behaviour shows it to be the 
exception rather than the rule” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 28). Given that EBM is interested 
in trying to modify everyday behavior, and Dreyfus and Dreyfus are interested in basing their 
account of expertise on our unchanged current behavior, this suggests that their account is 
not a good fit.  
  With this deep divide separating the EBM conception of rationalization from the 
Dreyfus conception of rationalization, it is no surprise that Dreyfus' conception of expertise 
looks incompatible with the goals of EBM. But this is not the most radical difference between 
the two accounts. The most radical difference between Dreyfus and those who support the  
EBM movement, the reason that will ultimately prevent the acceptance of the Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus account of the stages of expertise, is the difference in their concepts of intuition.  
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 In accounts of the goals of EBM, intuition is depicted as an imprecise relic from 
physicians’ authoritarian past that is best avoided. In the movement's debut article, the 
evidence-based working group writes, “one must be cautious in the interpretation of 
information derived from clinical experience and intuition, for it may at times be misleading” 
(EBMWG 1992). In so far as intuition may have any role in the clinical setting, it is to provide 
the first idea behind a possible testable hypothesis. The debut article suggests that the fruits 
of intuition may “prove extremely useful, and ultimately be proved valid through rigorous 
testing” (EBMWG 1992). But intuition is certainly not to be the basis for everyday decision- 
making in EBM. In this way, intuition may overlap with external expertise, the kind of 
expertise involved in the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model, in that it has uses, 
but these uses do not count as evidence in itself. If it could be clarified that the expertise 
which is permitted in the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model was only external 
expertise and not internal expertise, perhaps an argument could be made that intuition is 
compatible with EBM as depicted the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model.  
However, the possible “nesting” or cumulative use of the models makes this distinction 
impossible to make without additional information about the models provided by EBM. That 
is, if the models were nested, the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model would be 
compatible with intuition at a macro level but would include within them a “nested” 
component, the Pyramid Model, which explicitly rejects an internal role for intuition. If this 
were to be the case, in EBM models the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model 
intuition would be strictly limited to these external roles and, even then, only used when other 
options are not available. This is in contrast with the Dreyfus account in which intuition plays 
a non-negotiable, bedrock role in the skilled-coping of an expert.  
  For the Dreyfus brothers, intuition is clearly described in order to avoid confusion. 
This is important, as it would be easy to misconstrue the sort of intuition their conception of 
expertise relies on. They write, “intuition or know how, as we understand it, is neither wild 
guessing nor supernatural inspiration, but the sort of ability we all use all the time as we go 
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about our everyday tasks” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 29). For the Dreyfusian account, 
intuition is the hard-won result of the development of a perspective, a perspective that can 
only arise from a situatedness in the world.  
We can see from this explanation that they too seem to discount the sort of intuition 
that EBM has historically worried about—the “guesses” and the “metaphysical feelings.” But 
for all that agreement, the Dreyfusian account still finds a sort of intuition that is worth 
protecting (which indeed represents the best sort of “flow” and skillful coping), in direct 
conflict with the EBM goal of deemphasizing intuitions as described in the debut article 
(EBMWG 1992). If EBM wants to continue to suggest that intuition should be de-emphasized 
in the clinical encounter, it will remain incompatible with a Dreyfusian account of expertise.   
Rejection of the Dreyfusian Account for EBM Expertise Augmentation  
Despite its uptake by the medical community, the Dreyfus account of expertise is not 
a good fit with EBM.  It is because of radical differences in these concepts of rationalization 
and intuition that those who support any model of EBM are likely to be suspicious of Dreyfus’ 
account of expertise, as well as Dreyfus’ underlying goal of offering an alternative to the 
Calculative Rationality Model. Because of the central place of these issues in EBM, it seems 
unlikely that proponents would be willing to sacrifice them in order to gain an improved 
account of expertise. However, this rejection of the Dreyfusian account is not the end of 
EBM’s concern with expertise. The account provided within the EBM literature remains 
impoverished and requires augmentation. Accounts of expertise from other disciplines stand 
ready to be examined for fit with the framework of EBM. In order to be a satisfactory account 
of expertise for EBM an account should, in addition to not being in conflict with the main 
components of EBM, take a stand on the issue of expertise as internal or external, explain a 
method for any required amalgamation, differentiate high quality from low quality expertise 
and consider how to produce high quality expertise. Supporters of EBM should continue to 
look to the rest of the rich interdisciplinary literature on expertise for augmentation and 
deepening of the account gestured toward in their three models. Additional information from 
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EBM supporters about what it requires for a useful account of expertise would also be helpful 
to expertise theorists who would seek to offer varied accounts of expertise for use. The 
adoption of one of these accounts of expertise would be of interest, not only to the EBM 
community, but also to would-be Evidence-Based practitioners in other fields and expertise 
theorists in many disciplines. In what follows I begin such a project, investigating accounts of 
expertise provided by Turner, Bishop and Trout, and Collins and Evans.  
The Turner Account  
The sociologist and philosopher Stephen Turner offers a different model of expertise 
in works like The Politics of Expertise and “What is the Problem with Experts?” (Turner  
2013; Turner 2001). Unlike the Dreyfusian account, Turner’s account of expertise does mesh 
with the implicit worries about expertise in EBM. In this section I will explain Turner’s account 
of expertise in the context of political philosophy and social systems. Lastly, I draw on the 
few EBM depictions of expertise, mainly as a form of authoritarian control that was privileged 
before EBM to show how Turner’s account fits with what EBM has said about expertise and 
can further clarify EBM’s concerns about expertise.  
For Turner, the discussion of experts and expertise is an important component of 
political philosophy and sociology. Of specific importance is the rise of experts as a political 
and bureaucratic force within liberal societies during the 19th and 20th centuries. This rise 
poises a problem for liberalism in that expertise,   
is a kind of violation of the conditions of rough equality presupposed by democratic 
accountability. Some activities… are apparently out of the reach of democratic 
control…precisely because of imbalances in knowledge, simply because “the public” 
as a public, cannot understand the issues… So, we are faced with the dilemma of 
capitulation to ‘rule by experts’ or democratic rule which is ‘populist’—that is to say, 
that valorizes the wisdom of the people even when ‘the people’ are ignorant and 
operate on the basis of fear and rumor. (Turner 2013, 159)   
 That is, a political system which relies on experts for much of its decision making 
and administration, as ours does, undermines the very conditions of assumed equality which 
make liberal democracies possible. Alternatively, if we think of differences in knowledge not 
as levels of access to a substance to which access is unequally distributed, but instead as a 
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series of equally relevant viewpoints, then the work that governments do in an attempt to 
force equality of knowledge (a standardized science education, the public support of experts 
whose work is measured in terms of its impact on the public) also constitute an infringement 
of what Turner takes to be fundamental liberal principles; impartiality and neutrality.  Taken 
together, these two problems place liberal democracy in a troubling position; “If experts are 
the source of the public’s knowledge and this knowledge is not essentially superior to 
unaided public opinion, not genuinely expert, the ‘public’ itself is presently not merely less 
competent than the experts but is more or less under the cultural or intellectual control of the 
experts” (Turner 2013, 161). In other words, experts represent a sort of modern oligarchy, 
and, though this oligarchy is needed for the everyday working of a liberal democracy, it also 
undermines it.   
In order for experts to attain this status, they must first have established their 
authority. In his discussion of the development of authority, Turner takes as his paradigm 
case the expert physicist. Authority begins in an audience’s general knowledge of the 
efficacy of the products and technologies based on physics; in this case, nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons. Given that the audience is aware of the efficacy of these outputs of 
physics, Turner claims that we can say that non-experts do know when to give authority to 
experts without knowing as much as the experts or relying on a kind of blind faith (Turner 
2013, 166). However, what makes different types of experts different is their relationship to 
the various audiences they have persuaded of their expertise, who then confer upon the 
experts their authority. For Turner, there are five kinds of experts, and each group is 
demarcated by differences in their relationships with the different groups which confer 
authority upon them. Type I consists of experts whose authority is universally acknowledged. 
Type II consists of experts whose authority is accepted by a particular non-universal group or 
sect. Type III is made up of experts whose expertise is tested and accepted by private 
individuals. Type IV is made up of “experts whose audience is the public but who derive their 
support for subsidies from parties interested in the acceptance of their opinions as 
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authoritative” (Turner 2013, 177). And Type V consists of experts whose “audience is 
bureaucrats with discretionary power, such as experts in public administration whose views 
are accepted as authoritative by public administrators” (Turner 2013, 177). According to 
Turner, Type I experts have authority conferred upon them by the most universal of 
audiences, while Type V experts the least universal. I will examine each group in turn, giving 
examples of these kinds of experts and noting the dangers liberalism faces from these 
various kinds of experts.  
The Turner Types of Expertise  
For Turner, the Type I expert is exemplified by the expert physicist. The audience 
who confers authority upon the expert physicist is not a niche part of society, but instead 
society at large. Turner writes, “In the case of physics…there was a kind of generalized 
approbation and acceptance on the grounds of indirect evidence of the physicist’s claim to 
expertise, and the claim to exercise powers of self-regulation and certification that should be 
honored by the public at large” (Turner 2013, 175). Since, according to Turner, authority is 
given to physicists based on a broad knowledge of the functioning of the products of physics 
by society at large, this type of expert poises little threat of undermining the foundations of 
the liberal state. Indeed, by relying so strongly on near universal acclaim, and requiring 
neither faith nor perfect knowledge of those who give them authority, these experts are 
actually quite in line with the egalitarian spirit underlying liberalism.  
The Type II expert is the first sort of expert which Turner claims poses a threat to 
liberalism. This type is best exemplified by the theologian or the prophet. They are given 
authority by a large and organized sect of the population. Given that they have no claim to 
universally derived authority, as Turner says the physicist does, they do not warrant as far 
reaching legitimization as the physicists do. However, given that, perhaps a very large 
portion of the population considers these experts to be experts, and that liberalism does 
make use of experts in deciding on policy, the liberal is left with a difficult issue- since 
various theologians and prophets do not have the same advice to offer the state, not all of 
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their advice can be consulted. The liberal state does have a standard response to this 
predicament. As Turner writes,   
The religious sectarian is excluded by way of the concept of the neutrality of 
the liberal state; the domain of politics is delimited, by agreement, to preclude the state, as 
the First Amendment puts it, from establishing a religion. But literally ‘establishing’ religion 
and at the same time restricting it (on, for example, the model of the established churches of 
European states), can serve the same purpose of both separating religion from politics and 
assuring that the boundaries of the domain of the political are decided politically rather than 
by religious experts. (Turner 2013, 168) 
Given this standard response, Type II experts are effectively eliminated as threats to 
liberalism, according to Turner.  
The Type III expert is best represented by writers of self-help books or massage 
therapists. The audience which confers authority in this case is not the general public, but 
instead those who read the books or used the services and found them helpful. Writers of 
self-help books or massage therapists may not have the level of professional training or 
licensure that is commonplace in the case of the physicist but given that these authors have 
no claim on an authority derived from a general public, but rather just from their readership 
or those who found their therapy to be effective, this training is not necessary according to 
Turner. This type of expert also poses little threat to the liberal state because of the nature of 
the group conferring authority. Because the group has no significant ties other than a feeling 
that “X worked for me” and because their interaction with these experts take place as private 
individuals, usually through the means of consumption, nor is there any idea that only certain 
people have the epistemic resources to belong to the group bestowing the authority, the 
liberal state has no reason to interfere with this group of experts.  
Type IV experts pose more of a difficulty. According to Turner, this group was created 
more recently, “at the end of the 19th century in the United States, and developed hand-in-
hand with the development of philanthropic and charitable foundations” (Turner  
2013, 169). These experts are “those who are subsidized to speak as experts and claim 
expertise in the hope that the views they advance will convince a wider public and thus impel 
them into some sort of political action or choice” (Turner 2013, 169). Turner takes as his 
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examples advocates for civil improvements such as city playgrounds and sewers or groups 
like the Sierra Club, who were not originally conferred authority by anyone, but devised 
methods, including the social survey, to depict their knowledge to those with means as 
generally authoritative expertise worthy of public attention. Turner writes,   
Experts of the fourth kind, whose audience is the public, do not support themselves 
by persuading the public directly of the worthwhile character of their services or 
advice… but by persuading potential subsidizers of the importance of getting their 
message out to the public and accepted as legitimately expert…the purpose of the 
survey was not to advance knowledge but to demonstrate to the public how far below 
the standards their community was and thus, to spur it into action. (Turner 2013, 171)   
However, in an attempt to leave the specific subsidizers out of the picture presented 
to the public, who might reject these “experts” as not neutral if their funding practices were 
completely transparent, Type IV experts attempt to project the neutrality and authority 
granted by a general population to a Type I expert. However, given liberalism’s experience in 
dealing with these kinds of non-neutrality, in both historical and contemporary examples, 
governments were able to exert pressure on Type IV experts to create separate and more 
disinterested boards to allocate funding, causing these experts to more closely resemble 
Type I experts. Thus, there is a strong precedent for the disarming of Type IV experts before 
they can represent a serious threat to the liberal state.  
It is not clear that there is a hard difference between Type IV experts and Type V 
experts. Instead Type V seems to be a subset of Type IV. Turner writes, “The fifth type of 
expert is distinguished by a crucial difference in this triad: the fact that the primary audience 
is not the public, but the individuals with discretionary power, usually in bureaucracies” 
(Turner 2013, 172). The reason for this more specific subset of what in Type IV was an 
appeal to general subsidizers is the content of these experts’ expertise; it must be the kind of 
subject which is not in the purview of the general population. The example given by Turner is 
public administration. To be clear, the claim here is not that the general population, say, has 
a deep and nuanced knowledge of physics, but not about public administration, but instead 
that the public is aware of the efficacy of the outputs of physics, and is less aware of how 
public goods come to be, and even what successful public administration looks like. The 
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audience which confers authority on public administrators, according to Turner, is other 
professional public administrators, “who are not accepted as experts by the public (and 
ordinarily are not even known to the public)” (Turner 2013, 172). But what exactly makes 
these kinds of experts dangerous to liberalism? Turner writes, “In the case of the experts I 
have been discussing here, there is, in contrast, a discrepancy between the sectarian 
character of their audience and their role in relation to political authority. Since a great deal 
of political authority in modern democratic regimes resides in discretionary actions of 
bureaucrats, the control of the bureaucracy by a sect can amount to the denial of the original 
premises of liberal regimes” (Turner 2013, 174). In addition to the sort of difficulties Type IV 
experts present to liberalism, the obscurity of the subject in which Type V experts are 
experts and the in-group nature of the sect which confers authority upon them create the 
opportunity for extra difficulties for liberalism.  
The Application of the Turner Account to EBM players  
Now that the main structure of Turner’s account of expertise has been laid out, where 
within this structure would the main players in EBM fit in? What type of expert is your local 
practitioner? How about the industry sponsored biomedical researcher? What type is 
celebrity anti-vaccine activist Jenny McCarthy? An explanation of these players in the EBM 
world will provide additional insight into the possibility of the application of these principles 
developed by Turner for use in the historical example of public administration and civic 
activism to the medical world, specifically EBM.  
Generally, an orthodox general practitioner can, I think, be best described in this 
account as a Type I expert. Of the offered type examples, in this case, the medical 
practitioner most closely resembles the physicist. While it is certainly true that the general 
public does not have a nuanced and complete knowledge of medicine, the public is aware of 
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the general efficacy of the outputs of medicine.32 It is from this general audience that 
medicine derives its authority.  
  Especially lately, various kinds of alternatives to traditional western medicine have 
gained popularity. These include homeopathy, acupuncture, massage therapy, and 
chiropractic, among others. Because these alternatives often have underlying accounts of 
medicine which are at odds with those in play in EBM and because their practices are 
sometimes particularly difficult to test using RCTs, these practitioners are regarded as 
suspect by EBM supporters. But does this mean that they have a different expert status from 
traditional medical practitioners? EBM supporters might want to say they are not experts at 
all, because of the suspect nature of the fields in which they practice. However, in Turner’s 
account of expertise, these sorts of practitioners would be categorized as Type III experts.  
Indeed, Turner uses the example of massage therapists to illustrate his conception of Type 
III experts. These other practitioners follow a similar model and are granted authority by a 
group of (otherwise unconnected) satisfied customers who testify that the unorthodox 
treatment in question works.  According to Turner, the diffuse nature of the sect which 
supports Type III experts and the consumerist bent of the expert’s interactions with this sect 
means that Type III experts pose little threat to liberalism. However, it seems likely that these 
groups may soon find it to their benefit to engage in political activism, attempting to convince 
a general audience of the benefits of their services.  
Other important players in the EBM paradigm have different expert types. Given  
EBM’s implications for decision-making about which research programmes to privilege and 
which to dismiss, the biomedical researcher is another relevant expert. Given that in the US 
almost 94% of biomedical researchers have financial ties to pharmaceutical companies  
                                               
32 This is not to say that the public as a whole completely trusts medicine. Indeed, a significant portion of 
philosophy of medicine is dedicated to investigating (or in certain cases, encouraging) public distrust of medicine 
(Navin 2015; Stegenga forthcoming; Collins and Pinch 2005 and many others). Here I am thinking of the way in 
which medical technologies are often given as reasons for thinking that science more broadly is a successful 
endeavor, or the way in which people who work in health care are treated socially with additional deference and 
respect.   
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(Reiss 2010, 437; Campbell 2007, 1746), a typical biomedical researcher would be either a 
Type IV or V expert, depending on the extent to which governmental bureaucracy with 
explicit liberal commitments is also involved (for example the Food and Drug Administration 
or the National Institutes of Health in the United States). Given the large body of literature 
attempting to defend pharmaceutical company involvement in biomedical research, this 
classification remains controversial. It is not the case that in itself involvement with 
pharmaceutical companies necessitates this lower ranking of these experts. Rather, in this 
case pharmaceutical companies take on the role played by large philanthropic trusts like the  
Rockefeller Trust in Turner’s original example. Because experts must appeal to this kind of 
subsidiary group, rather than creating their own persuaded sect of the general population, 
appealing to an already created sect of the population, or appealing to the public at large, 
they qualify for inclusion in the Type IV or possibly V group.   
A last sort of expert who might be relevant to a discussion of EBM might the celebrity 
activist. Where does someone like Jenny McCarthy, an entertainer famous for her claims 
that the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine caused her son’s autism, fit in this schema? 
She has no medical or science degree and cites the debunked work of Andrew Wakefield as 
evidence of the proof of her claims. Surely, she is no kind of expert at all? In fact, on  
Turner’s account, she fits quite nicely into the Type III expert category. Her authority is 
derived from a small sect of the general population who found her theories and advocacy 
compelling and propelled the issue into the national spotlight. While it is true that this 
relationship between Type III expert and her audience is less commercial than the other 
examples given, it does still seem to be the case that her audience has “bought” something 
and is pleased enough with their purchase to recommend that others buy in as well. None of 
these requirements for inclusion in the group Type III expert mean that we cannot consider  
McCarthy’s role to be political as well. Turner writes of his paradigmatic Type III expert “...Dr. 
Ruth might run for the Senate, for example, or promote some political cause, such as sex 
education in elementary schools…” (Turner 2013, 168).  
77  
  
What Problems Would the Turner Account Solve for EBM?  
  
I stipulated that in order to be a satisfactory account of expertise for EBM an account 
should, in addition to not being in conflict with the main components of EBM, take a stand on 
the issue of expertise as internal or external, differentiate high quality from low quality 
expertise and consider how to produce high quality expertise.   
  The Turner account has little to say about other important components of the EBM 
literature, such as the viability of the particular EBM hierarchy of evidence, and so can 
reasonably be said to not be in conflict with the main components of EBM. This is less 
because of sustained agreement than because of a lack of topic overlap between these two 
literatures. The Turner account also does take a stand on the issue of taking expertise to be 
internal to evidence or external to evidence. On the Turner account, expertise is external to 
evidence. Expertise is, on the Turner account, something that is conferred on various 
individuals by various publics based on the trust those publics have in those individuals and 
in the technological interventions put forward by those individuals. Evidence does not play a 
role in this conception of expertise, making it easy for the Turner account to take a stand on 
this question: expertise is external to evidence.   
  However, given Turner’s goals and topic, his account quite reasonably says very little 
about differentiating high quality expertise from low quality, or about developing pedagogical 
techniques for encouraging medical students to become high quality experts. This is 
because the Turner concept of expertise is set up to categorize expertise in terms of their 
threats to liberal democracy. Perhaps it might be possible to develop a set of public relations 
or rhetorical strategies for ensuring that the various relevant publics did indeed confer expert 
status on an individual who desired that outcome. However, the relational nature of expertise 
as described by Turner makes it difficult to see how such expertise could be conceived as 
high quality or low quality or could be taught. The Turner account is unable to provide a 




Problems with the Integration of the Turner Account and EBM  
  
The picture Turner paints of expertise, which is relational and conferred by social 
groups based on contingent power-circumstances and public perception, suggests that 
expertise is just the kind of thing EBM is right to be suspicious of. These suspicions are 
reflected in the early literature of EBM which is filled with stories of early EBM proponents 
pushing back against the socially-conferred authority of their instructors.   
The Turner account, for all it can do in providing a typography of the major players in  
EBM in terms of expert types, fits very poorly with the Tripartite Model and the  
Amalgamation Model. It’s not clear how Turner expertise could be used in concert with 
evidence and clinical circumstances in the case of the Tripartite Model or used to 
amalgamate evidence, clinical circumstances and patient values in the case of the 
Amalgamation Model. The Turner account leaves something to be desired, which may not 
be surprising, because it is developed to address socio-political concerns rather than the 
more immediate epistemic concerns that especially early EBM focuses on.  
 One might be tempted to say that the Turner account is of use to EBM in that it 
identifies a kind of expert, the Type I expert, that EBM practitioners should hope to become. 
However, even this would be a poor fit with the goals of EBM, because EBM seems likely to 
insist that the authority of their experts should not be conferred by the public (as occurs in 
the Turner account) or anyone else for that matter. Instead, expertise should be the result of 
something about the experts themselves- either their knowledge or experience or judgement, 
or something else. Stipulating that expertise comes from authority conferred by other 
persons, as Turner does for all his expert types, is not a good fit with EBM.  
Rejection of the Turner Account for EBM Expertise Augmentation  
  
  Though the Turner account provides an interesting genealogy of relationally 
conferred expertises which illuminates the nature of some traditional EBM players, my 
discussion points to its being a poor account with which to augment the current simplistic 
EBM account of expertise.  
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The Bishop and Trout Account  
In their book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgement, Michael 
Bishop and J. D. Trout put forward a very different account of expertise. While they are both 
trained in philosophy, the book also incorporates work from many other disciplines, including 
psychology, statistics and decision theory.   
Explaining expertise is, as in the case in EBM, not the explicit goal in this work, but 
rather is a required step in their related argument. Their goal is to argue that psychology, 
specifically Ameliorative Psychology, can legitimately dispense normative advice on the 
basis of Statistical Prediction Rules (SPRs). This results in a new concept of epistemology, 
which they call Strategic Reliabilism, which “holds that epistemic excellence involves the 
efficient allocation of cognitive resources to robustly reliable reasoning strategies applied to 
significant problems” (Bishop and Trout 2004, 4). They embrace this goal because they think 
that epistemology, like ethics, should be used to call people to account when things go 
wrong in practical situations. Indeed, they claim that many issues which look to be ethical 
failures, such as opposition to “policies that would provide opportunities and services to the 
disadvantaged” (Bishop and Trout 2004, 6), are in reality failures of reason, failures that they 
say we currently lack robust tools for intensifying and condemning. They call an 
epistemology that could rise to this challenge, “deeply naturalistic” (Bishop and Trout 2004, 
7).  
What do they mean by a “deeply naturalistic” epistemology? Perhaps the distinction 
lies in what they take an epistemological theory to be doing. They write, “Traditional 
epistemological theory is supposed to account for or explain. Traditional epistemological 
theories aim to provide a theory that captures our considered epistemic judgements, in 
particular, our considered judgements about knowledge and justification. Our 
epistemological theory aims to uncover the normative assumptions of a branch of science” 
(Bishop and Trout 2004, 8). The Bishop and Trout worry about current mainstream 
epistemology is that epistemology assumes that most of our current epistemic judgements 
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get things right. Mainstream epistemology attempts to explain how all this good judgement 
making comes about. Bishop and Trout think this first assumption is terribly dangerous, 
especially given research into the prevalence of bias and heuristic use in psychology. They 
worry about the ways in which proposals in traditional epistemology are rejected by 
reference to the ways in which they conflict with intuitions.  Bishop and Trout call this the 
conservatism of traditional epistemology.   
Instead, they, “view epistemology as a branch of philosophy of science. From our 
perspective, epistemology begins with a branch of cognitive science that investigates good 
reasoning. It includes work in psychology, statistics, machine learning and Artificial 
Intelligence” (Bishop and Trout 2004, 11-12).  
Bishop and Trout take their cues on the topic of expertise from the 1954 book by Paul  
Meehl, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the  
Evidence. They write, “Meehl reported on twenty experiments that showed that very simple 
prediction rules were more reliable predictors than human experts” (Bishop and Trout 2004, 
12). This finding, they claim, has been repeated many times in this literature, and has 
resulted in “The Golden Rule for Predictive Modeling: When based on the same evidence, 
the predictions of SPRs are at least as reliable, and are typically more reliable, than the 
predictions of human experts” (Bishop and Trout 2004,12). Bishop and Trout support the 
robustness of this Golden Rule with reference to 10 different studies in which SPRs beat out 
expert prediction in a wide range of fields, including; psychology (predicting success of 
electroshock therapy, diagnosing patients as neurotic or psychotic, predicting progressive 
brain dysfunction, predicting the presence, location, and extent of brain damage, predicting 
violence), criminology (predicting recidivism), education (predicting academic success), 
banking (predicting default), medicine (predicting Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS)), 
and oenology (predicting the quality of Bordeaux wine).  
Based on this impressive list, Bishop and Trout suggest that these findings have a 
normative force; when one of these good SPRs is available, it should be used in place of 
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expertise. When one is not available, predictive modelling may still have suggestions for 
augmenting or improving human reasoning in their place (Bishop and Trout 2004,15).  
What is Expertise for Bishop and Trout?  
For Bishop and Trout, expertise is consistently used in their work as the control arm 
of experiments about the best ways to reason or make predictions. That is, their goal is not 
to articulate an account of expertise (like Dreyfus and Dreyfus did) or a kind of genealogy of 
expertise (like Turner did). Instead, experts play an important role in their work by being the 
bar that their SPR’s need to clear in order to be considered successful. Experts are the other 
possible option for prediction making for Bishop and Trout. So, what makes these experts 
experts for Bishop and Trout? Generally, these control arms include individuals who do have 
professional credentials; terminal degrees and eminent status are both referenced in the 
studies that make up the Golden Rule of Predictive Modeling. But these experts are also 
supposed to be operating on “bare judgement.” This seems to mean that they are assumed 
not to have had any information on the sort of methods for improving reasoning championed 
by Bishop and Trout.33   
We learn more about what expertise is for Bishop and Trout in their Appendix, in 
which they respond to possible objections to their general account of epistemology. One of 
these concerns was about the possibility of the abuse of SPRs. In response they write,   
We must compare the threat of the increased use of SPRs to the threat posed by 
expert judgement. Perhaps those who are suspicious of SPRs supposes that 
while expert judgement is inferior in accuracy, it is also less prone to abuse. But 
this is by no means obvious. As Robyn Dawes has pointed out many times, 
expert judgement is more mysterious, more covert and less available to public 
scrutiny than SPRs. (Bishop and Trout 2004, 176)   
So, per Bishop and Trout, expertise is inferior in accuracy to SPRs and at least as, if 
not more, prone to abuse because of its mystery, covertness and lack of transparency. For 
Bishop and Trout, expertise is that which allows us to make predictions (for better or worse) 
without assistance from SPRs. 




What Problems Would the Bishop and Trout Account Solve for EBM?  
Bishop and Trout’s account of expertise seems to be quite amenable to the needs of 
EBM. In order to be a satisfactory account of expertise for EBM an account should, in 
addition to not being in conflict with the main components of EBM, take a stand on the issue 
of expertise as internal or external, differentiate high quality from low quality expertise and 
consider how to produce high quality expertise.   
The Bishop and Trout account of expertise is not the centre of their work, but rather a 
side effect of it; experts are the baseline against which more systematic and explicit tools for 
reasoning are measured. As such, this expertise is non-explicit and in principle not 
explainable, perhaps even mysterious. Experts on their account are largely identified through 
credentialing; perhaps in virtue of special degrees, awards, years in the field, or public and 
disciplinary recognition.  
The Bishop and Trout account of expertise is not in conflict with many components of  
EBM. In fact, the goals of Bishop and Trout’s larger epistemological project of naturalizing 
epistemology seem quite in line with EBM. This account does not use the language of 
comparing roles for expertise internal to evidence and external to evidence, but they do 
focus on a kind of internal role for expertise, in that their concept of expertise is always a 
type of evidence, a type against which other more systematic evidences are measured. For 
Bishop and Trout, there is not really a way to differentiate high quality from low quality 
expertise ─all expertise is low quality reasoning for them, in that expertise is consistently 
beaten in the frequency of correct predictions by SPRs. However, Bishop and Trout do think 
that reasoners (including experts presumably) can improve their reasoning using many 
techniques uncovered by Ameliorative Psychology. Experts who benefit from these 
systematic improvements in reasoning could perhaps be said to have higher quality 
expertise and making use of these techniques could be considered pedagogy for producing 
good expertise. However, since Bishop and Trout seem, in using expertise as their 
consistent contrast class, to be committed to expertise as “bare” or “pure” judgement, 
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meaning that an expert who makes use of these improvement techniques is no longer acting 
solely out of expertise at all. With this is mind, it cannot be said that Bishop and Trout 
provide anything like pedagogical advice on how to produce high quality expertise, since on 
their account, such high-quality expertise does not exist.  
Because we had hoped to find an account for use in EBM, and because one of the 
questions about expertise that remains to be answered in EBM is if expertise can be taught 
and if so how, it matters that this question does not even make very much sense to ask 
about in the Bishop and Trout account. Rather than providing suggestions regarding how to 
produce high-quality expertise, their project is a wholesale replacement of expertise with 
SPRs- that is, a kind of rule.   
But even without fulfilling these last two requirements, it might seem as if we have 
reason to think the Bishop and Trout account of expertise would be a good fit to augment the 
current lack of explanation about expertise in EBM. Indeed, EBM’s early placement of 
expertise at the bottom of the hierarchy of evidence could even be bolstered by the empirical 
work at play in the Bishop and Trout work. The use of the Bishop and Trout account of 
expertise could provide warrant for the normative claims made by EBM in the Pyramid 
Model. Why should health professionals be wary of relying on expertise? Because in 
decades worth of tests in a variety of fields, expertise consistently preforms worse than 
SPRs. 
Problems with the Integration of the Bishop and Trout Account and EBM  
However, the Bishop and Trout account of expertise fits less well with expertise as 
expressed by EBM in the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model. Recall that these 
models seek to include expertise in some larger practice, either as a component alongside 
evidence and clinical circumstance, or as a force for the amalgamation of evidence, patient 
preferences and values, and clinical circumstances. On the Bishop and Trout account, 
expertise is always a second-rate kind of evidence. On their account, if you have evidence 
from a more other source, especially an SPR, you would be wise to ignore the predictions of 
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experts. Thinking of expertise this way, it is hard to see any reason to want to include 
expertise in the larger process of EBM, either as a component or as an amalgamative force.   
Rejection of the Bishop and Trout Account for EBM Expertise Augmentation  
The Bishop and Trout account of expertise fits nicely with the way EBM presents 
expertise in the Pyramid Model but very poorly with the way it is presented in the Tripartite 
Model or the Amalgamation Model. It might remain possible to consider the Bishop and  
Trout account for use in EBM if we had good reason to think that most important or most 
representative model was the Pyramid Model. Indeed, given the continued popularity of the 
Pyramid Model as a symbol of EBM, this is tempting. However, because of the recent 
insistence on the Tripartite Model or the Amalgamation Model, the Bishop and Trout account 
is not a good fit with EBM.  
Collins and Evans’ Account   
An additional possibly useful account of expertise for EBM to make use of in order to 
augment its own seemingly contradictory skeleton account of expertise is that put forward by 
Harry Collins and Robert Evans in their book Rethinking Expertise and elsewhere. While the 
reader at this point may despair of ever finding a useful account of expertise to assist with 
the lacuna in EBM, I will eventually argue that this account of expertise is the currently 
existing account which is best suited to assist EBM, although additional clarification of a very 
particular type from within EBM would be very helpful.  
Unlike the Bishop and Trout project, which explored the topic of expertise only in the 
service of a larger project of reforming epistemology, the Collins and Evans account34 is 
focused explicitly on expertise. They motivate their project through discussing a brief history 
of science in the late 20th century. In their telling, a series of technological mishaps and 
disasters as well as theoretical shifts such as the publication of Kuhn’s non-progressive and 
                                               
34 I will refer in this work to the “Collins and Evans account” of expertise. I will, however, also be referencing 
works in which Collins defends or extends the ideas in “Rethinking Expertise” either as a solo author or with 
additional co-authors who are not Evans. I will still call the account here the “Collins and Evans account” for 




paradigm-based account of science undermined the previously privileged place of science in 
society. They write in their introduction, “In today’s world the scales upon which science is 
weighed sometimes tip to the point where ordinary people are said to have a more profound 
grasp on technology than do scientists. Our loss of confidence in experts and expertise 
seems poised to usher in an age of technological populism” (Collins and Evans 2007, 2). As 
a result, they propose that their book will be an analysis of experts, that is, “people who know 
what they are talking about,” with the normative goal of encouraging society to listen to these 
people and implement the interventions they suggest, even if science itself does not 
progress as straightforwardly or is not as truth conducive as we may have once thought.   
They characterize their account as taking expertise to be “real and substantial” and, 
therefore, not “relational.” According to them, “relational approaches take expertise to be a 
matter of experts’ relations with others. The notion that expertise is only an “attribution”—the, 
often retrospective, assignment of a label—is an example of a relational theory (Collins and 
Evans 2007, 2). On this definition, both the Turner and the Bishop and Trout accounts of 
expertise are relational. Given that those accounts did not prove to be a good fit for the EBM 
problem we are looking to solve, that Collins and Evans are taking a new approach is 
possibly encouraging for their account.   
Their rejection of the relational account does not entail a wholesale rejection of the 
notion that expertise is social, however. They make much of the social components of 
achieving expertise; that is, being involved in a community of current experts who pass on 
their knowledge. They sometimes cash this sociality out in terms of tacit knowledge, which 
they define as, “the deep understanding one can only gain through social immersion in 
groups who possess it” (Collins and Evans 2007, 6), or variously, “things you just know how 
to do without being able to explain the rules for how you do them” (Collins and Evans  
2007,13), or “an understanding of rules that cannot be expressed” (Collins and Evans 2007,  
17). On their account, “individuals may or may not possess expertise independently of 
whether others think that they possess expertise” (Collins and Evans 2007, 3). This is in 
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contrast to accounts that rely on credentials (Bishop and Trout) or public conferral of 
authority (Turner) as the creators of expertise. They claim that taking this stance not only 
makes them realists about expertise, a bolder claim than that made in many accounts of 
expertise, but also means they avoid the problem of equating an expertise that is commonly 
possessed in a particular society with a lack of expertise. For example, while many people 
speak French at an expert level in France, the ubiquity of the skill does not mean it is not 
expertise. This places the Collins and Evans account, on this topic at least, in relative 
harmony with the Dreyfus account, which some have found baffling for including relatively 
common activities like driving a car as an expert skill.  
The Collins and Evans Periodic Table of Expertise  
The Collins and Evans account of expertise centres around a “periodic table of 
expertises” which is, “a classification of the expertises that individuals might draw on when 
they make technical judgements” (Collins and Evans 2007, 11). This table includes 
dispositions, specialist expertises, meta-expertises and meta-criteria. This table is included 
in the Appendix. It is important to make a note about how this table is to be used. In contrast 
to the Dreyfus account, which was divided into stages through which a novice advanced to 
become an expert, this table is not a list of stages. Indeed, it is not even clearly a hierarchy 
given that distinctions in the complexity of the expertises listed advance on multiple axes. 
Instead it is better thought of as a concept map, creating a taxonomy of the different kinds of 
expertise and attempting to demonstrate various relations between them.    
Dispositions are “personal qualities” such as linguistic fluency and analytic flair  
(Collins and Evans 2007, 13). They are divided into interactive abilities and reflective abilities 
(Collins and Evans 2007,14). As they are neither novel nor particularly politically charged 
concepts, Collins and Evans spend little time explaining or defending them. They are 
included on the periodic table of expertise because of their important relation to interactional 
and contributory expertise (Collins and Evans 2007, 38-39).  
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Specialist expertise is divided into two more specific groups: first, ubiquitous tacit 
knowledge expertises, which include beer-mat knowledge, popular understanding and 
primary source knowledge, and second, specialist tacit knowledge which includes 
interactional expertise and contributory expertise. Because the concept of interactional 
expertise is especially novel in accounts of expertise, the authors defend this new category 
in the remainder of the book. I will discuss each of these kinds of expertise in turn.  
First of the ubiquitous tacit knowledge expertise is so-called “beer mat expertise.” 
This category is named after the practice of printing trivia-style facts on beer mats for patrons 
to read in bars. When one has read facts on a beer mat, or has learned a list of rules for how 
to play a game like chess, in what sense is one an expert? Collins and Evans give the 
example of knowing the rule for moving the bishop in chess; “the bishop may move, only 
diagonally, any distance, backwards or forwards” (Collins and Evans 2007, 18). Someone 
who had read this information on a beer mat could then answer the trivia question, “In chess, 
what is the rule for moving the bishop?” However, the authors write, “Crucially, knowing the 
bishop’s move in that way does not imply that one knows much about what it might mean” 
(Collins and Evans 2007,19). Knowledge that would allow you to successfully move the 
bishop would require all kinds of background information about relevant chess units of 
movement, turn taking, chess win conditions and that not all the bishops on the board are 
yours to move. Beer mat expertise, then, does not allow anyone to do anything more than 
answer directly relevant questions.  
The next category of ubiquitous tacit knowledge expertise, more complex than beer 
mat knowledge, is “popular understanding.” While Collins and Evans do not specify the 
content of many other kinds of expertise, here they specify that they have in mind a 
particular content of the knowledge, that is science. Popular understanding can be obtained 
through mass-media and by reading popular books, or from talking to another person who 
does. This understanding makes more of claim on meaning than beer mat knowledge and 
permits some basic creative application and interpretation of the included knowledge. In 
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cases where the science is relatively settled, Collins and Evans claim that differences 
between popular knowledge and deeper kinds of scientific understanding are unproblematic, 
in that they will result in the same judgements and support the same policies. However, 
where the science is not settled, differences between popular understanding and deeper 
forms of expertise are the source of disputes which claim to pit expertise against democracy.  
Collins and Evans explain these difficulties by noting that in popular understanding, “distance 
lends enchantment” (Collins and Evans 2007, 20); that is, to those outside the science, things 
can seem clearer, less detailed and therefore less fraught and more certain then it may seem 
to those with expert knowledge of higher kinds.   
The final category of ubiquitous tacit knowledge expertise is “primary source 
knowledge.” Primary source knowledge is a deeper kind of knowledge than beer mat 
knowledge or popular understanding and “comes with reading primary or quasi-primary 
literature” about a topic (Collins and Evans 2007, 22). However, it can be easy to overstate 
the depth of this knowledge because, “reading the primary literature is so hard and the 
material can be so technical, that it gives the impression that real technical mastery is being 
achieved. It may be that the feeling of confidence that comes with a master of the primary 
literature is a factor feeding into the folk wisdom view” (Collins and Evans 2007, 22). Part of 
the reason that Collins and Evans do not equate understanding of primary sources with 
higher kinds of expertise is because of their commitment to a social understanding of 
expertise. Without the knowledge and interaction of a group of experts, the possessor of 
primary source knowledge is liable to make poor inferences based on their reading of the 
primary literature, fail to detect disagreement or even outright fraud in the literature, apply 
knowledge from the primary literature to inappropriate situations or to fail to hold the 
grounding assumptions about what is so basic that it need not even be included in the 
primary literature.  
After the final category of ubiquitous tacit knowledge, the authors turn to expertises 
which involve specialist tacit knowledge. Collins and Evans credit the work of philosophers 
89  
  
like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi with a shift in the concept of expertise toward a 
kind of practicality; expertise as located in socially and culturally embedded practice, rather 
than in texts or minds (Collins and Evans 2007, 23). This practicality and social-
embeddedness are what separate the expertises in the ubiquitous tacit knowledge group 
from the specialist tacit knowledge. The later require immersion in a community while the 
former just require literacy. The authors identify two kinds of ubiquitous tacit knowledge: 
interactional expertise and contributory expertise. Although interactional expertise is to be 
considered the shallower form of expertise, Collins and Evans first briefly explain the more 
traditional contributory expertise. A more in-depth explanation of the novel concept of 
interactional expertise follows.   
Collins and Evans write that contributory expertise, “enables those who have 
acquired it to contribute to the domain in which the expertise pertains: contributory experts 
have the ability to do things within the domain of expertise” and is “the traditional category of 
ability to perform a skilled practice” (Collins and Evans 2007, 24). Such a definition is in line 
with the emphasis on practicality in expertise identified above.   
One problem with the Collins and Evans account might be that it includes as one of 
its components the Dreyfus account of expertise. The Collins and Evans section on 
contributory expertise is almost entirely explained in terms of the Dreyfus account. Recall 
that at the beginning of this chapter the Dreyfus account was ruled unable to do the work 
that the thin EBM account of expertise leaves undone because of serious differences 
between this account and EBM on the issues of rationalization, intuition and the calculative 
rationality account. If the Collins and Evans account contains within itself the Dreyfus 
account, then perhaps it too can be rejected on the same grounds the Dreyfus account was 
rejected. However, contributory expertise is only one of many kinds of expertise that Collins 
and Evans analyse. Indeed, they seem to take it to be rather uninteresting, spending only a 
few pages on it before moving on to their original contribution, interactional expertise. 
Although the Dreyfus and Collins and Evans accounts overlap, the Collins and Evans 
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account includes a great deal of additional material, material which may be helpful in doing 
the work for EBM we are looking to get done. For this reason, including a kind of expertise, 
contributory expertise, which is based on the Dreyfus account I have already rejected does 
not rule the Collins and Evans account out of consideration.   
In addition, Collins and Evans do not take on the Dreyfus account wholesale. Indeed, 
they criticize the Dreyfus model for neglecting the social, writing, “A problem with the five 
stage model, even as a discussion of contributory expertise, is its individualistic nature” 
(Collins and Evans 2007, 26). As a result, their account of contributory expertise includes a 
further distinction between mimeomorphic actions and polymorphic actions. They write,   
Mimeomorphic actions, however complex, and however hard to master, do not turn 
on social understanding and can, in principle, be reproduced by mimicking fixed 
behaviours—though sometimes these will be too complex in practice to be 
accomplished…On the other hand polymorphic actions, which do depend on social 
understanding, require that behavior fits changing social circumstances, and they 
cannot be mastered by machines, failing a way of making machines that fit as 
smoothly into social life as humans. (Collins and Evans 2007, 27)   
They introduce this concept as a way of dealing with what they see as the lack of sociality in 
the Dreyfus account. However, the Heideggerian grounding that is at play in the Dreyfus 
account means that Dreyfus would in fact deny the possibility of mimeomorphic actions at all, 
because all actions performed by an agent are a result of the inescapable “thrown” nature of 
that agent. While they focus on this distinction in relation to contributory expertise, they note 
that it could perhaps be included as an additional dimension of distinction in all portions of 
the periodic table. The mimeomorphic/polymorphic distinction is more fully described and 
defended in the Collins and Kusch work, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines 
Can Do (Collins and Kusch 1998).  
In contrast, interactional expertise is, “expertise in the language of a specialism in the 
absence of expertise in its practice” (Collins and Evans 2007, 28). They argue that this type 
of expertise has been overlooked because of the way in which work on expertise focuses on 
the formal/informal dichotomies. Interactional expertise is neither fully formal, requiring that 
mastering a domain requires only the acquisition of propositional knowledge nor fully 
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informal, requiring full immersion in a form of life to achieve mastery. Since both theoretical 
critiques and failures with artificial intelligence suggest that the formal account is mistaken, 
the informal account has been assumed to be correct. This overlooks the possibility of 
interactional expertise, which does not make claims only about propositional knowledge, nor 
requires full social immersion.  However, Collins and Evans do place interactional expertise 
closer to the informal than the formal because of its emphasis on being embedded in a  
social community. They make their claim about the nature of interactional expertise in a way 
which echoes the Turing test.35 They argue that “the strong interactional hypothesis states 
that, in principle, the level of fluency in the language of a domain that can be attained by 
someone who is only an interactional expert is indistinguishable from that which can be 
attained by a full-blown contributory expert” (Collins and Evans 2007, 31). The original 
example they give of individuals who are likely to be interactional, but not contributory, 
experts are sociologists36, but we can also imagine philosophers, managers, journalists, and 
interdisciplinary workers of all kinds to be likely to be interactional experts (Collins and Evans 
2007, 32). Sociologists of science are a particularly useful example, because it may be the 
case that in order to be a contributory expert in their own field they will also have to be an 
interactional expert in another field.  For example, in order for Collins to do his work as a 
sociologist of physics, specifically working on the theory of amorphous semiconductors, he 
needed to know more about physics. His lack of expertise made it difficult to know what his 
subjects were talking about, and a great deal of time was wasted in his sociological 
interviews when his subjects attempted to explain the basics of their field to him and got little 
chance to say anything of substance. If he had instead been an interactional expert from the 
beginning, say Collins and Evans, these frustrating instructional sessions could have been 
replaced with real conversations.   
                                               
35 The relationship between their strong claim of interactional expertise and the Turing test is more thoroughly 
discussed in chapter 4 of Rethinking Expertise.  
36 They do however want to leave open the possibility that sociologists can become contributory experts in a 
scientific field but note that without extensive additional training in the relevant field, this is very rare.  
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For Collins and Evans, the content of these conversations is an important marker that 
an agent has reached the level of interactional expertise. Hallmarks of a conversation 
between someone with interactional expertise and someone with contributory expertise 
include: the possibility that the interactional expert will explain a technical concept to the 
contributory expert, ask them a question which is surprising and new to them, and that the 
contributory expert will take seriously criticisms of the field levelled by the interactional 
expert. Additionally, both interlocutors will be able to enjoy and appreciate discipline-specific 
jokes. In short, the contributory expert should not be able to tell from the conversation that 
the interlocutor is an interactional expert and not in fact another contributory expert.   
There are additional differences between interactional expertise and contributory 
expertise for Collins and Evans. One of these is pedagogical: they claim that contributory 
expertise is something that can be taught by contributory experts to create new contributory 
experts. Contributory experts might also teach in a different manner to produce new 
interactional experts, but interactional experts cannot teach interactional expertise to create 
new interactional experts. They write,   
Contributory expertise—such as gravitational wave physics—can be taught to 
new recruits and is passed on from generation to generation by apprenticeship and 
socialization; someone who has the contributory expertise can pass it to someone 
who does not have it…It is not at all clear that interactional expertise, which, in 
practical fields, is always interactional in another expertise, can be passed from one 
person or generation to another (in the absence of contributory expertise). 
Interactional expertise in a specialism seems to be learned exclusively through 
interaction with communities who have contributory expertise in that specialism, not 
persons who have interactional expertise in that specialism. (Collins and Evans 2007, 
35)  
Collins and Evans do make a few claims about the relationships between these kinds 
of expertise. They claim their account of expertise is transitive, which here means, “If you 
possess one of the higher levels you will possess, at least in principle, all of the lower levels, 
but not vice versa” (Collins and Evans 2007, 36). The “in principle” hedge here allows for a 
few specific exceptions. The first is when expertise is latent, that is, not felt by the 
practitioner. The second is when those who we might otherwise take to have the top kind of 
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expertise, contributory expertise, actually only have second-hand knowledge of the primary 
literature, part of the third kind of expertise, primary source knowledge. The third exception is 
the possibility that, “specialists in general knowledge quizzes and the like could have a 
greater breadth of knowledge than a domain specialist” (Collins and Evans, 2007, 36).  
In addition to being transitive, Collins and Evans also claim their kinds of expertise 
are unequally distributed. That is, as you go up the scale of Specialist Tacit Knowledge, 
fewer and fewer people will qualify as having that expertise (Collins and Evans 2007, 36-37).     
Meta-expertises and Meta-criteria  
The Collins and Evans periodic table of expertises contains another section; meta-
expertises and meta-criteria. Meta-expertises are, “expertises used to judge other 
expertises” (2007, 45). These include external meta-expertise, which does not require the 
acquisition of the expertise itself, and internal meta-expertise, which does involve “an 
acquaintance with the substance of the expertise being judged” (Collins and Evans 2007,  
45).37         
The most basic kind of external meta-expertise is ubiquitous discrimination. This is 
the kind of judgement which often uses social cues in order to determine “if someone knows 
what they are talking about,” not only in the scientific or other technical fields, but in 
navigating everyday life. Collins and Evans identify this kind of meta-expertise as what 
makes it possible for most citizens to avoid believing in conspiracy theories, such as the 
somewhat prevalent claim that the moon landing by NASA in 1969 was faked, and the press-
circulated film of the event was created in the American desert. They write, “it is beyond the 
bounds of sociological credibility, even ordinary people’s sociological credibility, that the 
thousands of people involved in the Moon missions could all have been organized to lie so 
constantly and consistently; we know that if there were any possible credence to the story of 
                                               
37 While Collins and Evans are here using the terms “internal” and “external” to make an important distinction in 
their account, this distinction does not map on to my “internal to evidence” and “external to evidence” distinctions 
about expertise itself.  
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the fake, the Russians, deeply involved in the cold war as they were, would have exploited 
the doubts—yet they did not” (Collins and Evans 2007, 47).  
In a more scientific realm, external meta-expertise is claimed to be responsible for 
the public’s (or at least the parts of the public who are “reasonably literate members of  
Western Society”) eventual recognition of the failure of cold fusion.  Collins and Evans claim 
that, “This knowledge has nothing to do with scientific competence. On the contrary, it was 
vital to ignore scientific credentials, and even track records of success, if a socially 
appropriate judgement was to be made” (Collins and Evans 2007, 47).  
A second kind of external meta-expertise is local discrimination. According to Collins 
and Evans, this is the kind of expertise exhibited in Cumbrian sheep farmers, who had 
important information to share with the larger world after their pastures were contaminated 
by radioactive fallout.  Brian Wynne’s work on this phenomenon in the 80’s and 90’s coined 
the term “lay expertise” to describe the knowledge of these Cumbrian sheep farmers, but  
Collins and Evans do not adopt this terminology. They claim that,   
‘lay expertise’ was an unfortunate choice of term because of its potential to 
cause confusion. For example, the term has often been interpreted as meaning that 
laypeople possess specialist expertise [in virtue of being laypeople]. It would have 
been better if Wynne had talked of experts without formal qualifications. For example, 
the sheep farmers are not laypersons; they are experts in sheep farming who happen 
to have no paper qualifications. The sheep farmers have a specialist contributory 
expertise. (Collins and Evans 2007, 49)   
In this chapter however, a different aspect of the sheep farmer case is salient. The 
famers have local discrimination, a kind of meta-expertise, which allows them to make 
judgements about the veracity of statements from commercial and governmental officials 
about the safety status of their fields based on the source of the statements. This is meta-
expertise in that the farmers are making judgements about whether or not they should take 
the authors of these statements to be legitimate experts. Collins and Evans write, “the 
farmers…had long experience of the nuclear industries pronouncements concerning 
radioactive contamination; they knew that these pronouncements could not be taken at face 
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value. An outsider with less experience of discussions of radioactive contamination in this 
particular social and geographical location, would not have been able to judge the 
pronouncements with such finesse” (Collins and Evans 2007, 49).  
   It is unclear how “local” this example is however. Surely more universal principles 
which suggest exercising scepticism about pronouncements from industries about issues 
which involve significant conflicts of interest would do this same work, without the sheep 
famers expertise about the state of their pastures and the behaviour and health of their 
sheep. Nevertheless, it is surely the case that in some circumstances, if not this example 
situation, localized knowledge, not just social indoctrination, is needed in order to make 
judgements about expert claims, and that this kind of local discrimination is open not just to 
experts with paper qualifications, but to all of the public which is in a particular locality.  
Both these kinds of external discrimination have the same kinds of difficulties and are 
not to be considered scientific. Because they do not involve any knowledge of the content at 
hand of the experts being judged, they must rely on non-technical and social cues to come to 
correct judgments. These kinds of external discrimination, “are very unreliable because of 
the temptation to read too much into stereotypical appearances and stereotyped behaviour.  
It was this tendency to read too much into appearance that was exploited by the ‘scientists in 
white coats’ who for many years, assumed, and were given licence to speak with authority 
on almost any subject” (Collins and Evans 2007, 51). So, while it is useful, perhaps 
especially in democratic societies, to discuss and make use of this kind of discrimination 
which is available to all, external discrimination cannot be relied upon.       
The other kind of meta-expertise is internal discrimination; that is, judgements which 
are based on content knowledge in the field in question. Collins and Evans are quick to point 
out this does not cleanly map on to the group “credentialed experts” by looking at the well-
known case study of AIDS activism, as reported by Epstein’s 1996 book, Impure Science:  
AIDS, Activism and the Politics of Knowledge.   
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AIDS activists formed pressure groups such as ACT UP (the AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power) which lobbied scientists, the Food and Drug Administration and 
pharmaceutical companies to change drug testing practices. This was in response to both 
the speed of the disease, and the serious restrictions placed on those with AIDS enrolled in 
randomized controlled trials, who were instructed not to undergo other interventions and 
were sometimes in placebo arms of the studies, thereby receiving no treatment. At first, 
these activists largely relied on their lived experience of the disease to make their case and 
were largely ignored by scientists. However, these activists educated themselves using the 
primary scientific literature on these issues to a very high standard and were able to make 
their voices heard via this technical expertise. Robert Gallo, co-discoverer of HIV and 
credentialed medical researcher, said of one of these activists “It’s frightening sometimes 
how much they know and how smart some of them are” (Epstein 1996, 338). The success of 
these groups suggests that credentialing and group membership are not by themselves 
satisfactory ways of sorting out who is an expert and who is not. Some other methods will be 
needed at the level of internal meta-expertise, given the prevalence of frauds and hoaxes 
and the high stakes that are often involved in making judgments about expertise. The three 
methods for making these judgements, separating experts from frauds, according to Collins 
and Evans, are credentials, track record and experience.   
While Collins and Evans do include credentials as a possible way of differentiating 
experts and frauds because of the usual dependence on this method they highlight its flaws. 
Many areas in which we want to make judgements about expertise do not have credentialing 
systems. They write, “there are no credentials for fluency in one’s native language, nor for 
moral judgement, nor for political judgement…Above all, there are no credentials for experts 
such as the Cumbrian sheep farmers or the AIDS activists” (Collins and Evans 2007, 67).  
Collins and Evans agree with philosopher Alvin Goldman that track record might be a 
better criterion for distinguishing expertise than credentialing (Goldman 2001). However, 
they worry that relying on track records will inappropriately exclude those who are working in 
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new fields, as well as examples like the Cumbrian sheep farmers and the AIDS activists, but 
who they wish to include as true experts.    
But Collins and Evans have the most faith in their third criterion, experience, to 
demarcate exports and frauds. This is partly because of its inclusivity; it nicely allows in the 
Cumbrian sheep farmers and AIDS activists which the other two criteria rejected. However, it 
is not very clear what this experience consists in. They write, “We know from the outset that 
without experience within a technical domain, or experience at judging the products of a 
technical domain, there is no specialist expertise. Without the experience of doing science, 
talking to scientists, playing or listening to violin playing, or looking at and discussing 
bathroom tiling, the minimal standards for making judgements in these areas have not been 
met” (Collins and Evans 2007, 68). But this is all that they tell us about experience. What is 
this experience? It must not be expertise, since kinds of expertise are what they are 
attempting to describe, and it would be odd to use the concept you are trying to describe to 
do most of the work in the description. But experience must also be something besides 
repeated past successes at an action, because this would collapse into the separately 
discussed track record criterion. So, while Collins and Evans see the experience criterion as 
the most promising tool for making judgements about the expertise of others, it is not clear 
what this experience amounts to.38  
What Problems Would the Collins and Evans Account Solve for EBM?  
In order to be a satisfactory account of expertise for EBM an account should, in 
addition to not being in conflict with the main components of EBM, take a stand on the issue 
of expertise as internal or external, differentiate high quality from low quality expertise and 
consider how to produce high quality expertise.  
                                               
38 There might be a worry here that the Collins and Evans account is unacceptably permissive. While wanting to 
broaden the definition of expert so that their examples of AIDS activists and sheep farmers can count as experts, 
they have unintentionally forced us to accept, say, astrologists as experts. They might respond that their first two 
criteria, credentials and track record of success will rule out astrologists, in that there are no respectable 
institutions from which a credential could be obtained in astrology, and no possibility of a track record of 
astrological success given that the happenings of human life are not impacted by particular planetary 
movements.   
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Collins and Evans investigate the question of how to produce high quality expertise 
when they distinguish interactional expertise from contributory expertise based on 
pedagogical possibilities. They claim that contributory experts must be the ones to teach 
novices who are interested in becoming contributory experts, but that interactional experts 
cannot teach interactional experts. Indeed, they write, “One would guess that, if the attempt 
were made to transmit interactional expertise in the absence of contributory expertise in the 
absence of contributory expertise over several generations, it would rapidly become 
distorted…” (Collins and Evans 2007, 35). This attention to matters of pedagogy in expertise  
is one reason to turn to the Collins and Evans account.  
The Collins and Evans account of expertise might be especially useful for EBM 
because of its distinction between the two top levels of specialist tacit knowledge; 
interactional expertise and contributory expertise. EBM has long struggled with the question 
of how much individual responsibility for the production and assessment of research to place 
on the shoulders of individual practicing clinicians. In early EBM manuals like the 1992  
Evidence-Based Medicine Working group article and Evidence-Based Medicine: How to 
Practice and Teach It, clinicians were expected to formulate a searchable question which 
would assist in their clinical problem, find the evidence related to that questions, assess the 
quality of that evidence and put the answer they found to work in their practice (EBMWQ 
1992; Sackett 2000). While all four of these steps can be difficult without proper training and 
access to research resources, the third step, personally assessing the quality of the 
evidence available, came to be seen by clinicians as particularly taxing. In later works, this 
criterion was dropped, and clinicians were instead directed to sources of evidence which had 
been pre-assessed by experts (Guyatt and Djulbegovic 2017).   
I am concerned about what this distinction might mean for expertise in EBM. If we 
once considered statistical knowledge, knowledge about the hierarchy of evidence, and 
knowledge about how to recognize a well-done trial a kind of expertise of EBM, we now 
seem to have two levels of experts. One level is made up of clinicians who need to be able 
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to talk about and put into practice knowledge about statistics, the hierarchy and well 
conducted trials, and one level is made up of researchers who need knowledge about 
statistics, the hierarchy and well-conducted trials in order to create the research that 
clinicians will use. This distinction between clinicians and researchers maps nicely onto the 
distinction between interactional and contributory experts in the Collins and Evans account.  
EBM has been characterized (perhaps unfairly) as a stick with which researchers beat 
clinicians into epistemic submission. Being able to account for the differences and yet the 
worthiness of the two groups’ expertise may ease this tension. Although this was not one of 
the top listed items for a useful account of expertise to provide for EBM, this additional 
helpful piece of conceptual apparatus should count in Collins and Evans’ favour.   
 Related to this, the Collins and Evans account provides a nuanced account of 
expertise both as internal and external to evidence. Expertise can be internal to evidence in 
that expertise provides a reason to act on a particular intervention and policy, and expertise 
can be external to evidence, in that it allows experts to do many additional kinds of activities 
(application, amalgamation, even joke-telling). The distinction discussed above allows for the 
possibility that expertise might be both internal and external to evidence and provides 
additional vocabulary for talking about these differences in kinds of expertise. Given the EBM 
confusion on this issue, an account of expertise which has the flexibility to talk about 
expertise in both ways is a real boon. 
Another possible reason to take the Collins and Evans account as useful to 
supplement the EBM account of expertise is because of the methods that they use to 
determine who has interactional expertise. They claim that an agent has interactional 
expertise when, “the level of fluency in the language of a domain that can be attained by 
someone who is only an interactional expert is indistinguishable from that which can be 
attained by a full-blown contributory expert” (Collins and Evans 2007, 31). In order to 
ascertain who has interactional expertise, Collins and Evans ran a series of tests on experts 
in the field in which it seemed possible that Collins might be an interactional expert ─in this 
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case gravitational wave physics. One of the authors, Collins, participated in this test because 
of the sociological work he had done over several years on this topic. They hypothesized 
that Collins was an interactional expert. Their hypothesis would be confirmed if an expert 
judge failed to choose the “real” contributory expert when offered the answers that Collins 
and the “real” contributory expert produced to a standard set of non-mathematical technical 
questions about current debates in the field when asked to identify the “true” expert. For their 
results they found that, “out of nine judges, two chose Collins as the gw [gravitational wave] 
physicist and seven were unsure…Collins then had demonstrated his interactional expertise 
according to the standards of the test” (Collins and Evans 2007, 107).  
The use of these kinds of experiments that approximate as best as possible an RCT39 
might be another reason to take the Collins and Evans account seriously as a good fit for 
EBM. Not only are they not in conflict with EBM principles, they themselves seem to make 
use, as best they can given the content involved, of the kinds of methods that EBM 
champions. This is different from the way in which expertise was used as the control group in 
the Bishop and Trout case; there, providing an account of expertise was an accidental 
symptom of their goal of founding a new kind of epistemology, not a goal itself. This is not a 
feature of any other account of expertise here considered, and so might make this account 
especially appealing to EBM supporters.  
Problems with the Integration of the Collins and Evans Account and EBM  
However, a closer look at what seems to be methodology in the Collins and Evans 
account which is close to EBM might give us pause. The final arbiters of who counts as an 
expert are experts themselves. In addition, the interviews of these judging experts suggest a 
significant amount of inconsistency in the reasons they gave for thinking one set of answers 
rather than another belonged to an expert. One judging expert used a principle of fluidity to 
                                               
39 The experiments that Collins and Evans design do not feature randomization (the R of RCT) because of the 
content they are testing. Unfortunately, it is not possible to randomize people before they begin their academic 
careers to become either experts in physics proper or sociologists with a high level of physics knowledge. Such 
restrictions might be seen to be similar to issues in public health in which it would be useful to be able to 
randomize individuals to smoke or not to smoke, but not ethical, and not respectful of individual choice.  
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decide between the sets of answers he was provided with; the expert was the one who had 
produced the answers which sounded the most casual and smooth, and the least like a 
textbook. He writes, “Set [P, not Collins] looked more like they had been answered by 
looking up a book. Set [Q, Collins] looked as if they came rapidly out of the mind” (Collins 
and Evans 2007, 107). Other experts attempting to make this distinction relied on another 
aspect of style: hastiness. “Collin’s style was preferred because his answers were shorter 
and thus bore the hallmarks of someone who was answering impatiently —this suggested a 
scientist to other scientists” (Collins and Evans 2007, 107). One expert chooses the Collins’ 
answers because they are casual and non-technical and another chooses them because 
they are short and impatient. These answers tell us something about what experts think 
other experts are like ─experts are comfortable enough with the topic not to need to lay on 
the jargon too thickly, and they are very busy people, with little time to fill out a simplistic 
survey about their discipline in a thorough fashion.  However, all of this has gotten rather far 
from the EBM methodology that was supposed to be a particular benefit of the Collins and 
Evans account, and might provide a reason to think that the indistinguishability criterion is 
dubious epistemically. 
What looked to be quite close to an EBM approved methodology for determining 
membership in a particular kind of expertise instead is based in two of the concepts that 
EBM originally sought to de-emphasize. The experiments make use of the expertise, in that 
the “answer keys” are provided by expert judges. The experiments make use of 
mechanisms, in that these follow up interviews about how the judges came to their 
conclusions are taken to be explanations for their choices which do their explaining by 
identifying the components of these choices and then how those parts work together. If it is 
true that the Collins and Evans account has the kind of intuitions about empiricism that EBM 
has approved of in the past, it is also true that they make use of expertise and mechanisms, 
which EBM has de-emphasized in the past. This puts the Collins and Evans account of 
expertise on par with EBM- they have similar commitments to the creation of empirical 
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evidence, and find themselves, perhaps against their declared wishes, making use of 
expertise and mechanisms in order to create this evidence.   
A possible problem for the Collins and Evans account’s fit with EBM could be one of 
their exceptions to the transitivity they claim for their account. Recall that by calling the 
contributory part of their account transitive, they mean that if you have a higher kind of 
expertise, you will also have the lower kinds of expertise which come before it. They claim 
that one way in which their account isn’t transitive, is that one could be a contributory expert 
and yet not have the knowledge of the primary sources, instead learning about the literature 
second-hand. This allowance is in conflict with the early EBM commitment to appraising 
evidence at an individual level as discussed in the above section on the usefulness of the 
interactional/contributory expertise distinction for EBM.  
Acceptance of the Collins and Evans Account for EBM Expertise Augmentation     
Because the Collins and Evans account does not conflict with the central 
components of EBM, takes a stand on the matter of expertise as internal or external to 
evidence, makes a distinction between high-quality and low-quality expertise, and provides 
suggestions about the kind of pedagogy needed to develop each kind of expertise, while 
also providing additional conceptual tools that are useful for EBM (like 
interactional/contributory expertise), I suggest that it is the most useful current account of 
evidence available in the literature. I recommend that those within the EBM literature 
consider making use of this conceptual resource to deepen and clarify their current 
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The “Scope Problem” 
The current philosophical discussion about causes and mechanisms is diverse and 
robust. This literature includes debates regarding causal/non-causal explanations, the 
possibility of a causality without necessity, and mechanisms as instances of invariance (or at 
least constant conjunctions) (See Mumford and Anjum 2011, Cartwright 2009, Illiari et al. 
2011 for a sample). However, the debate on the role of mechanisms in the philosophy of 
medicine is unique. Because the history of medicine is riddled with cases of what looks like 
the terrible (and deadly) consequences of poor mechanistic reasoning,40 clinical medicine is 
currently characterized by an aversion to mechanistic approaches. In contrast, paradigms 
such as Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) rely on large-scale studies of the efficacy of 
interventions, while attempting to avoid the additional concern with mechanisms which lie 
behind this efficacy.   
In this chapter, I argue that in order for mechanisms to be given the important role for 
intervention selection that the Russo-Williamson thesis, (RWT)40 affords them, additional 
theoretical work is needed. The RWT is, roughly, the claim that evidence from both 
mechanisms and probabilistic relations is needed to warrant causal claims. This work is 
needed to narrow the scope of mechanisms in response to concerns raised in EBM manuals 
and by RWT critics, who contend that mechanisms may be so large, that is, include so many 
components, when possible confounders are included that it is impossible to articulate them 
in a way that is useful for intervention decision-making. If all confounders are not accounted 
for, we will draw wrong, often very wrong, conclusions. In short: the worry is that what it 
takes to make a usable mechanistic claim that allows us to draw roughly reliable conclusions 
is just too demanding.  This narrowed-scope can be provided by the Strevens account of 
ceteris paribus hedges (Strevens 2013), which allows for a formalization of mechanisms 
                                               
40 These often-cited historical cases include bloodletting for any number of ailments, anti-arrhythmic drugs for 
myocardial infarction, and putting babies to sleep on their stomach in order to avoid SIDS. (Howick 2011) 40 The 
RWT is not at all the only thesis of its kind, with significant philosophical precursors, but given its uptake in 
current debate, I focus on it here.  
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which avoids traditional ‘Empty’ and ‘Boring’ accounts of dealing with possible confounders 
to leave us with more manageable “sized” mechanisms. Addressing the “size” of the 
mechanisms in question will help to bring RWT in line with concerns expressed by critics, but 
disagreements remain. One reason for these disagreements is a difference in the 
understanding of the relation of knowledge to the goals of medicine.  
I develop this argument in four sections. First, I discuss the points of tension between 
medicine’s historical distrust of mechanisms and those who insist that mechanisms have an 
essential role to play in medicine, such as Russo and Williamson of the RWT. I argue that 
this tension stems from the assumed impossibility of understanding mechanisms in light of 
their immense scope. Second, I present the Strevens account of ceteris paribus hedges and 
argue that the “scope reducing” power of this account can help address concerns about the 
RWT. Third, I consider a possible objection to my modification of the RWT. Finally, I discuss 
what makes medicine not a science (or a science and an art) and how a clarification about 
the goals of medicine could also help to simplify the conceptual knots that surround the issue 
of mechanisms in medicine.  
The Russo-Williamson Thesis and its Critics  
  The RWT claims that mechanisms play a crucial role in medicine. Specifically, they 
argue that generally both probabilistic relations (the kind of evidence often produced by 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs)) and mechanisms are required for warranting claims 
about the results of a particular intervention. Both components are necessary because each 
compensates for the methodological weaknesses of the other (Russo and Williamson 2007).  
Probabilistic relations, they argue, can mistake correlation for causation. In Clarke et al.’s 
2013 article, this is illustrated with the example of a RCT on remote, retroactive intercessory 
prayer to shorten the length of stay in hospital. While the RCT found a significant correlation 
between the two variables, mechanistic evidence can help us to suggest that “current 
science holds no place for any mechanisms that can explain the putative effect in terms of 
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the putative cause” (Clarke 2013).41 This flaw, mistaking correlation for causation, can be 
combated by including mechanistic evidence, which does not have this weakness.  
On the other hand, mechanistic knowledge cannot on its own warrant a causal claim 
because, “it may be the case that the purported cause, although prior to the effect and 
mechanistically connected to it, actually makes little or no difference to it” (Russo and 
Williamson 2007). Such cases parallel the famous storm-barometer case; although a falling 
barometer reading happens prior to a storm and is in some way mechanistically connected 
to it, the low barometer reading does not cause the storm (Lewis 1973). The authors 
illustrate this point with the claim, “smoking causes cancer.” Until information about 
probabilistic relations was provided, hypotheses like that of Fisher, who suggested that 
perhaps some common cause was responsible for both cancer and smoking, could not be 
ruled out. This problem can be addressed through the addition of probabilistic relations 
obtained through methods such as RCTs, because they do not have this methodological  
frailty.  
In this way, Russo and Williamson argue that only together can probabilistic relations 
and mechanisms provide a reason for the adoption of particular medical interventions.42 This 
thesis is in direct conflict with the presuppositions of the EBM movement, which privileges 
RCTs, systematic reviews or meta-analyses of RCTs. Rather than being required alongside 
evidence from RCTs, mechanisms are considered dangerous or are only allowed to play a 
role when no research of a “higher” methodological type in the hierarchy is available  
(EBMWG 1992; GRADE working group 2008). Russo and Williamson write, “We argue that 
the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical 
mechanisms and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely 
in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do 
                                               





justice to the causal claims of these sciences” (2007).43 Russo and Williamson do not argue 
for the superiority of one approach to the study of causality (as there are many), or for a 
general, indefinite pluralism about causal information. Rather, they argue only that causal 
claims in the health sciences should include a mechanistic component and a component that 
demonstrates a probabilistic relationship.  
But what kind of Mechanism?  
  It seems important to clarify what is meant by “mechanism” within the context of the 
RWT. At least in the 2007 article, the authors remain agnostic on this important issue, 
writing, “Exactly what constitutes such mechanisms will not concern us here—some view 
mechanisms to be processes transmitting conserved physical quantities; others claim that 
mechanisms are composed of chains of probabilistic or counterfactual dependencies, others 
that they are composed of chains of theoretical explanations” (Russo and Williamson 2007).  
Howick, in his critique, follows the lead of Russo and Williamson, saying, “A problem with 
exploring how mechanisms provide evidence is that ‘mechanism’ has recently been 
characterized in several ways…for present purposes these definitions are sufficiently similar.  
The heart (as a pump), the brain (as a ‘control center’), and the liver (as a detoxifying agent, 
among other things) are all mechanisms in the senses described above” (Howick 2011).   
Two Worries by a Critic  
  Given the RWT’s opposition to traditional historical narratives in medicine about the 
danger of relying on mechanistic reasoning, it is not surprising that the RWT has received 
strong resistance. While Howick has other worries with the RWT, including attempting to 
argue that access to resources like “the principle of total evidence” and assessments of RCT 
quality might eliminate any need for mechanisms, he does have two worries about 
                                               
43 Emphasis original. In this passage, Russo and Williams are very comfortable talking about the production of 
causal claims in medicine. In another passage, they write “It is quite uncontroversial that the health sciences look 
for causes, namely causes of disease and for effective treatments.” I am not sure this is the case in medicine, 
although it may be true in other sciences. There is significant language in the medical literature to suggest that 
the discipline views looking for causes themselves as a vain and impractical goal, a goal which demonstrates a 
commitment to the satisfaction of curiosity above the production of interventions. However, pressing this point is 
outside the scope of this chapter.  
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mechanisms themselves—worries that he says are “overlooked” (Howick 2011b, 927). I 
argue that these two worries both stem from a concern with the “scope” or “size” of 
mechanisms.  
The first problem, according to Howick, is that mechanisms are difficult to identify. He 
points to cases from the EBM historical literature on mechanisms to suggest that medicine 
has often been wrong about particular mechanisms, including “bloodletting, placing babies to 
sleep on their stomach, anti-arrhythmic drugs and many other[s]” (Howick 2011b, 934). 
Howick offers an explanation by example for these historical errors; even mechanisms we 
take to be basic, such as metabolism, which is important in all drug-based interactions, are 
very complex. In the example mechanism of metabolism, Howick emphasizes a complex 
diagram with 49 notes highlighting areas of the mechanism where we lack knowledge, as 
well as possible confounders to the system. He writes, “The partial ignorance about the 
metabolic mechanism means that we cannot be sure what mechanisms are eventually 
activated by any drug (or its metabolites) that have been swallowed. More generally, the 
complexity of the human body makes it difficult to identify all relevant mechanisms activated 
by an intervention” (Howick 2011b, 936).  
The second problem for Howick is “that it is difficult to predict how mechanisms will 
behave under interventions” (Howick 2011, 936). Here Howick has in mind cases where a 
particular drug can either alleviate or aggravate a particular disorder, depending on 
additional mechanistic confounders in an individual patient or environment. He writes, “Smith 
et al. have listed many drugs that sometimes worsen the condition for which they are 
indicated. To name a few, antiepileptic drugs can both prevent and cause seizures, 
antidepressants can both ameliorate and worsen depressive symptoms, and antiarrhythmic 
drugs can cause arrhythmias (Howick 2013, 284).” He also emphasizes how mechanisms 
can impact each other, producing unexpected results such as cases in which mechanisms 
act as possible confounders for each other (Howick 2011, 936).  
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These two concerns—the difficulty of identifying mechanisms and the difficulty of 
predicting how mechanisms will behave under interventions—are related. The underlying 
worry here is that if mechanisms are large enough to account for the environmental changes 
that bring about these paradoxical effects, that is, ambitiously attempt to include information 
about all possible confounders, then they are so large that it is nearly impossible to have 
knowledge of all the relevant conditions, to fill in all the gaps. To capture all the relevant 
factors, mechanisms have to be so large as to be exceptionally unwieldy and perhaps 
impossible to fully describe. Even those who do think of mechanisms as providing important 
information for causality and explanation are aware of this problem. Craver writes, “Few if 
any mechanistic models provide ideally complete description of a mechanism. In fact, such 
descriptions would include so many potential factors that they would be unwieldy for the 
purposes of prediction and control and utterly unilluminating to human beings” (Craver 2006, 
5). As a result, obtaining knowledge of mechanisms is an incredibly high epistemic bar—so 
high that other methods, even those that do not provide causal explanations, but also do not 
require so many epistemic (and economic) resources, are preferred. So, we seem to be at 
an impasse: mechanisms which are “large” enough in scope to be useful seem very difficult 
to have knowledge of. But what if there were a way to make reference to large and inclusive 
mechanisms, and to work on filling in as much information as was needed to make decisions 
about mechanisms, without needing complete knowledge of all the components to go 
forward? This kind of solution might be available in a slightly different literature: the literature 
on the non-vacuous use of ceteris paribus hedges in scientific laws.  
The Strevens Account  
Based on this analysis of an important critique of the RWT, a large problem with 
mechanisms is their “size.” In his article, “Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal Voodoo That  
Works,” Strevens suggests a possible way to restrict mechanisms to a manageable “size.” A 
ceteris paribus hedge is a constraint clause, usually added to a law, which stipulates that the 
law holds “all else being equal.” Like Howick, many have worried about the “size” of ceteris 
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paribus hedges. Do we need to list all the components of the “all else” in order to say that we 
understand a process or to manipulate it? Is this exhaustive listing even possible? Can we 
avoid this problem without making the vacuous claim that there exists some set of 
conditions, all of which are possible confounders, that ceteris paribus hedges address?  
Strevens’ answer to these questions provides a way of constraining the size of  
mechanisms.44  
Strevens allows us to move beyond two unemployable conceptions of what is going 
on in ceteris paribus hedges, which I call the “Empty” and the “Boring” accounts. His account 
manages to be both well-formulated and useful and, in so doing, avoids some of the 
traditional critiques of ceteris paribus hedges. His articulation points us to a conception of 
mechanism which is neither empty of specifics nor so expansive that it is impossible to 
describe.   
In the Empty account, ceteris paribus hedges are expressed as follows:  
If Ф, F → G  
If conditions Ф obtain, F brings about G.  
  Under this account, a ceteris paribus hedge is not even understandable as a 
functioning claim, since there is no attempt to describe the content of Ф, without which this 
expression cannot have truth value. While this rendition matches what we often seem to 
mean when employing ceteris paribus hedges, it leaves much to be desired.  
  In the Boring account, ceteris paribus hedges are expressed as follows:  
                                               
44 What I have in mind here is similar to “mechanism sketches” as discussed by Machamer, Darden and Craver 
2000 and Craver 2006. These are mechanisms which are incomplete because of gaps of various kinds. These 
authors argue that these sketches can be useful for many purposes, though they are incomplete. Carver 
writes, “[Mechanism sketches] characterize some parts, activities and features of the mechanism’s 
organization, but it has gaps.” My version is somewhat different in that the content of the gaps in my 
manageable mechanisms are all confounders, rather than having gaps for a variety of unknown elements. In a 
recent conference talk, Darden presented a mechanism sketch she is currently working in a biological 
applications lab, which featured several black boxes for components the team did not yet fully understand. 
When asked when they could stop worrying about the black boxes, Darden laughed and said, “When the 
application works!” (Darden 2017).  
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ΣФ(If Ф, F→G)  
There exists some set of conditions Ф, such that if Ф obtains, F brings about G.  
This account has the benefit that ceteris paribus hedges state functioning claims. The 
replacement of the Ф with ΣФ avoids the problem of the Empty account; it stipulates the 
existence of some set Ф, but there is no requirement that Ф be filled in with content before 
the statement can have truth value and count as a claim. Unfortunately, this work-around 
weakens the claim until it is Boring. Of course, there is some set of conditions for which, 
should they hold, F brings about G—any set of circumstances in which it does not fail that F 
brings about G.   
The Boring account gives rise to one of the traditional concerns about ceteris paribus 
hedges, that they are vacuous (and therefore useless). All they really say is “F brings about 
G unless it doesn’t.” Merely stipulating that there is some set of circumstances provides little  
guidance to the prospective mechanism-user.  
In contrast with these two accounts, Strevens offers an account that has content— 
useful content—without listing each individual component feature in the set of circumstances 
where F brings about G (which is not generally a practical possibility).   
The Strevens account—“By way of the target mechanism M, the conditions Z and the 
property F bring about G”—can be formalized as follows:  
  If M, [(F+Z)→G]  
  If the mechanism M obtains, conditions Z and the property F bring about the result G.  
In restating ceteris paribus hedges in terms of mechanisms, Strevens avoids the problems of 
both the Empty and the Boring accounts. First, since there is no unspecified Ф, an actual 
truth value bearing claim is made. Strevens supposes that the context and practices are 
sufficient to secure reference to the intended mechanism in the ceteris paribus hedges he 
addresses.   
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In contrast with the Empty account, on Strevens' account ceteris paribus hedges 
have content because in any concrete ceteris paribus hedge, M is filled in (if only implicitly) 
by a term that refers to a specific mechanism. Even though the identification of the 
mechanism is less specific than if it were identified by a list of the individual properties that 
make it up, we can still refer to the mechanism and, I argue, make use of the ceteris paribus 
hedge in predicting and making changes in the world. Additionally, the Strevens account is 
more interesting than the Boring account because ceteris paribus hedges do not turn out to 
be trivially true. That is, ceteris paribus hedges express something more than “F brings about 
G unless it doesn’t.” They could be false, because the intended mechanism does not give 
rise to the regularity described in the law, or they could be without truth value because M 
does not after all refer to any mechanism. So Strevens shows that mechanisms are the way 
that we can “make cp claims without delimitating cp conditions” (Strevens 2012). This saves 
us from having to give up on the project of uncovering laws because of the infinite length of 
conditions we would need to stipulate to be sure that those laws hold and prevents us from 
saying something vacuous about these conditions.  
  The usefulness of Strevens’ formulation becomes even more apparent when 
employed in a simple mechanical situation. In Cartwright’s traditional example, this is 
expressed in “toaster terms” as follows:45  
  In M [(F+Z)→G]  
  “In toasters, the pushing of a lever causes toast.” (Cartwright 2007)  
  Where the mechanism “toaster” picks out a relevant set of circumstances whereby 
pushing a lever causes toast, the mechanism portion identifies the relevant set of features 
                                               
45 These kinds of “toaster examples” are not universally appreciated. Howick writes in his 2013 article, “Cartwright 
cites the example of a toaster’s mechanism. But mechanisms in the human body and social world, especially 
those that are pertinent to clinically relevant outcomes, are generally far more complex than toasters and other 
mechanical machines” (284). While this is possibly true, my list of possible confounders and intervening forces on 
toasters suggests that toasters can be pretty complex systems themselves. Toaster examples here are meant as 
models.    
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and their arrangement that gives rise to the regular association between pressing the lever 
and toasting.   
However, the identification of a mechanism “toaster” does not contain all the possible 
reasons for there to fail to be toast when a lever is pushed. Confounders like electrical 
outages remain outside of the purview of the mechanism. This is why in Cartwright's 
rendition there is always some additional caveat on how M operates, like “properly shielded” 
or “without disturbance” (Cartwright 2007). So, just as Strevens posits, along with Cartwright 
and other mechanists, that there are mechanisms that give rise to the regularities reported in 
ceteris paribus hedges, they must also posit interfering conditions external to the mechanism 
that we can refer to even if we cannot list them one-by-one that must also be mentioned (if 
only implicitly) for the cp hedge to be true.  
On Strevens’ account, the conditions involved do not exist without specification, but 
are not included in the mechanism themselves. Not all confounders are to be considered part 
of the mechanism. This significantly shrinks the “size” of the mechanism to a much more 
manageable level.  
Practical applications: Nutrition in Bangladesh and Statins for Stroke  
Worries about the complications of listing all possible needed conditions for a given 
effect are especially salient in real world policy situations. Take, for example, the case of the 
Intensive Nutrition Programme (INP) developed in Tamil Nadu and exported for use in 
Bangladesh (Cartwright and Hardie 2012). The idea was to improve the quality of children’s 
nutrition by providing mothers with nutrition education and additional funds for the children’s 
food. While the program was declared to “work” in Tamil Nadu, it was a failure in its 
transplant environment of Bangladesh. While Hardie and Cartwright explain why the program 
“working” in Tamil Nadu should not have been taken as evidence that it would work 
elsewhere, here I want to focus on how the Strevens account can help us identify a 
manageable mechanism.  
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Of course, making a list of all the possible conditions that must be in place before the 
Tamil Nadu intervention might work in Bangladesh is too high a bar: there must be food; 
families; no interference with the transportation of food; no weather conditions that limit local 
agriculture; workers willing to provide the educational nutrition classes; no political or labor 
disputes that mean that such workers are unavailable, an accessible time and location for 
the classes, childcare for the classes…we could go on indefinitely. This is not a practical way 
to delineate a mechanism.  
However, the Boring and the Empty accounts would not help us either. The 
statement:  
“If all the right conditions are in place, then the INP will bring about improvements in 
children’s nutrition.”  
a version of the Empty account of ceteris paribus hedges:  
If Ф, F → G  
If conditions Ф obtain, F brings about G.  
does not tell us what we need to know. Because it does not fill in the content of Ф, this 
statement does not even have truth-value. This will not help us to identify relevant causal 
factors differentiating Bangladesh from Tamil Nadu.  
  The Boring account is also unhelpful;  
  “There exists some set of conditions Ф, such that if Ф obtains, the INP brings about 
improvements in children’s nutrition.”  
  A version of the Boring account of ceteris paribus hedges:  
ΣФ(If Ф, F→G)  
There exists some set of conditions Ф, such that if Ф obtains, F brings about G.  
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does not do anything more useful than the empty account. In so far as it only stipulates the 
existence of some set of conditions, it avoids lacking truth-value, but instead begins the 
circularity we have been trying to avoid: “The INP causes improvements in children’s 
nutrition, unless it doesn’t.” This does not allow us to express what happened in the case of 
the INP.  
  But the Strevens’ account does allow us to express what happened, in that it allows 
us to point to a mechanism, or a coherent group of interrelated causes—one that is more 
than a stipulation of the existence of some relevant causes and less than an exhaustive list 
of all the causes involved. In this case, the relevant mechanism is family structure; in Tamil 
Nadu, the mother ran the household, had access to money and made food shopping 
decisions. In Bangladesh this position was filled by the mother-in-law. Since the mother-in-
law might privilege the well-being of different members of the family and was not the family 
member sent to the nutrition education workshops, the mother’s education about pediatric 
nutrition did not translate into improved nutrition for her children (Cartwright and Hardie 
2012).  
For a brief medical example, consider the construction of a manageable mechanism 
for the use of statins to treat stroke. Statins are a widely proscribed class of drugs used to 
treat a variety of cardiovascular diseases. However, a 2011 Cochrane review found that 
there was not yet enough evidence to show if statins are effective in treating stroke 
(Squizzato 2011). When considering a possible manageable mechanism for the treatment of 
stroke with statins, what do we need to consider? Howick’s critique would have us include a 
broad range of possible confounders (perhaps all of them if we could). This broad range 
might include not only metabolization, but also patient non-compliance and interactions with 
diet and exercise (which might also be prescribed for a variety of cardiovascular diseases, 
including for stroke prevention). While we need to take care to include some relevant 
confounders (perhaps a difference between ischemic and hemorrhagic stokes), including all 
possible confounders makes a mechanism too large to be manageable.    
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An Objection and a few Replies  
 
Perhaps the most serious objection to my augmentation of RWT has to do with one 
of the most widely accepted uses for mechanisms: generalizability. It has been argued that 
one of the most important things mechanisms can do for us is provide information about 
whether “what worked there, will work here (Clarke 2013; Russo and Williamson 2007; 
Bennetti 2012; Illari 2011. Reiss 2007 also considers the question but concludes that a 
plurality of methods might result in generalizable explanations).”  
  Arguing that mechanisms provide generalizability is outside the scope of this work. 
For my purposes, it is enough to show that it is often taken to be an important ability of 
mechanisms. My augmentation of the RWT with a Strevens style account of mechanisms 
weakens mechanisms’ ability to do the work of generalizing.  
  This augmentation constrains the content of mechanisms to stipulate that they need 
not contain all possible confounders. This allows knowledge of mechanisms to become less 
daunting and narrows the content of mechanisms to a manageable size. However, this 
manageability comes with a trade-off; confidence about generalizability. When mechanisms 
were larger and unwieldy we could be reasonably certain that they would contain the 
information needed to confidently make generalizability claims; since all information about 
possible confounders was (ideally) contained within these expansive mechanisms, they were 
all that were required to make strong generalizability claims. However, the augmented RWT 
does not have this character. Because not all confounders are included within the 
mechanism, more information than just a mechanism, so defined, will be required in order to 
make confident claims about generalizability. By narrowing mechanisms in order to bring 
them within our epistemic reach, I have lost some of the power mechanisms are said to have 
for generalizability.   
There are several possible responses here. One would be to say that making 
confident claims about generalizability will require more than just mechanisms—it will require 
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a “tangle” of evidence of all kinds (Cartwright 2013). However, this answer would mean 
significant modification to the RWT, which claims that mechanisms and knowledge of 
probabilistic relations are all that is required and say little about other forms of evidence 
reinforcing claims about generalizability.  
Another possible response might be to admit that my augmentation does mean some 
loss of the power of mechanisms to generalize, but that is not all that mechanisms can do. 
They can also provide explanations, justify pursuit and suggest hypotheses. They can do all 
of this better while they are epistemically possible and manageable, that is, without including 
all possible confounders.  
 I have argued that one reason for the lack of uptake of mechanisms in medicine is 
uncertainty about the “size” of mechanisms; if they are large enough to include all 
confounders, then they are likely too large to ever successfully know. I follow Strevens in 
suggesting that mechanisms need not include all confounders, which reduces them to a 
manageable epistemic “size.” However, with this manageability comes a trade off in 
generalizability, which may be a particular problem for the RWT as currently formulated.   
Medicine is not a Science: the “Primacy of the Practical”  
It is not surprising that the role of mechanisms and causality in medicine should be 
fraught territory. This is because clarifying this role requires a particular understanding of 
what medicine itself is, an understanding that is not captured by declaring that medicine is 
both an art and a science. In what follows, I argue that attempts which use this dichotomy to 
explain the nature of medicine neglect what I call the “primacy of the practical.” That is, what 
is foundational in medicine is helping patients to be well (See Gilewski 2001 for good 
example of a clinical view on this “helping”).46 Yes, this will have an epistemological 
                                               
46 Cashing this out in practice would be much easier if we could agree on crucial definitions of concepts like 
“health,” “disease,” and “well-being,” either in naturalistic (for example: Boorse 1977;1997) or normative (for 
example: Kingma 2010; Nordenfelt 2007) terms. These definition projects have proved notoriously difficult for 
the philosophy of medicine to answer and are some of the field’s most important questions. They are not, 
however the subject of this work. For my purposes, it is enough to say that the goals of medicine are practical, 
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component in order to be successful, but unlike in other sciences, this epistemological 
component is not foundational, but a mere means to an end. There is a tension in medicine 
because of this biological, biochemical, anatomical, epidemiological and many other kinds of 
knowledge are necessary for its success, but the use of this knowledge to help patients is 
the true goal. Efforts to gain knowledge must always be explained and justified in terms of 
these practical aims. Perhaps science is interested in discovering true things, (or true-
enough things (Elgin 2004)) about the world through making causal claims, but that is not the 
main goal of medicine.  
This tension is evident in the EBM literature, where bench scientists or clinician 
researchers are accused of inappropriately abstract interests in. John Ioannidis cites Sackett 
as expressing the problem well, “The issue is that basic medical scientists have hijacked the 
granting bodies and have erected their own research policies that place greater value in 
serving their own intellectual curiosities than in serving sick people” (Sackett 2004). That is, 
knowledge gained for its own sake is treated with suspicion, the suspicion that that kind of 
medical researcher has lost sight of the goal of medicine: helping patients.  
Of course, other sciences have applications that can help (or harm) people. And 
sometimes science is done specifically with these applications in mind. The lucrative nature 
of the applications of science are part of the reason for its success. However, medicine is not 
quite a science, because unlike science, where the desire for knowledge leads and useful 
applications sometimes follow, the goal of medicine just is these useful applications that help 
sick people, and knowledge through understanding causes sometimes follows and feeds into 
future development of applications.    
Sometimes the strange status of medicine as not exactly a science is cashed out by 
saying that medicine is both an art and a science (Battista et al. 1995; Gilewski 2001; 
                                               
to do with improving “health, mitigating “disease,” and supporting “well-being.” Since we don’t know exactly 
what those terms mean, it is true that we can’t be too clear about what exactly this requires, but we can say 
that medicine is foundationally practical, not epistemological.  
119  
  
Saunders 2000; many others). The additional component “art” is meant to explain why 
medicine isn’t exactly a science. It has other requirements of its practitioners that they must 
learn in order to say that they practice medicine. These might include “rules of thumb” 
(Gilewski 2001, 20), “rapport” (DiMatteo 1979, 12), and “sympathetic understanding” 
(Peabody 1927/2015). While this addition of “art” can help explain the practices and the 
pedagogy involved in medicine, it does not get at what makes medicine different from 
science, since this is not about either practice or pedagogy, but about goals and motivations.   
Medicine is Not a Science: Implications for EBM and Mechanisms  
How is this cashed out in the debate on mechanisms? From the very beginning, 
Russo, Williamson, Illari and Clarke and others47 in the pro-mechanisms camp take what 
medicine to be up to is finding the causes of illness. They take the goal of medicine to be an 
epistemological goal (improving knowledge) which then has very important practical 
implications (helping people to be well). We can see this in their statements of what they 
take EBM to be doing. They write:   
“Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading 
evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation 
produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of 
mechanisms produced by other methods” (Clarke et al. 2014, abstract).  
“According to current hierarchies of evidence for EBM, evidence of correlation (e.g., 
from RCTs) is always more important than evidence of mechanisms when evaluating and 
establishing causal claims” (Clarke et al. 2013, abstract).  
                                               
47 Here I write as if Russo, Williamson, Illari, Clarke and others always act as a unified group with a consistent 
view. This is not the case, although they do often co-author work together and are active members of the EBM+ 
research group (which, fair disclosure, I am also a part of). I do believe it is fair to claim that they all hold this 
“epistemology first” concept of medicine based on the literature they have produced.   
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“In this article, I will be examining mechanistic evidence and I will say comparatively 
little about any other kind of evidence. But I do not believe that mechanistic evidence can 
replace good difference-making evidence, such as that gained from well-conducted RCTs.  
My aim, along with Russo and Williamson, is to examine how good mechanistic evidence  
can complement good difference-making evidence in establishing causal claims” (Illari, 2011, 
140).  
“We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence 
both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies” (Russo and 
Williamson 2007).  
All of this assumes that the goal of EBM, (a kind of medicine) is making causal 
claims, an epistemic goal. This gets things the wrong way around from the very beginning. It 
is true that causal claims are often made in medicine- I am not disputing that. But this is not 
the goal of medicine as discussed above.  
While it is clear from the previous section that I am sympathetic to the goals of the 
Russo-Williamson project to reintegrate mechanisms and kinds of causal reasoning, I think 
this lack of agreement about the goals of medicine is another obstacle to this reintegration. If 
you think that making causal claims is the goal of medicine, as it might be in some sciences, 
then it will be very clear why EBM should talk about mechanisms. Mechanisms improve our 
knowledge about what is going on in our interventions. If you think that improving patients’ 
health is the goal of medicine, mechanisms can still help, but their role is less clear and less 
fundamental. Epistemic goals about improving our knowledge of interventions can serve the 
goal of improving patient health, but it is no longer a goal in itself, and may seem like a 
luxury, given that it does not always contribute to improving patient health.   
It might seem that EBM is also “epistemology first.” After all, especially in the 
classical texts of EBM, all the focus is on which methodologies lead to trustworthy evidence. 
But this discounts the fact that, right from the beginning, EBM emphasized techniques for 
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accessing this evidence so that it could be brought to bear on practice. While it is true that 
EBM didn’t always give the best advice about how to apply population-based evidence to 
patients, the patients were always the goal. In EBM, epistemology is (sometimes clumsily) in 
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  In this chapter, I trace the ways in which values have played important roles in EBM.  
Early in the movement’s history values were not emphasized at all, as the emphasis was on 
the creation and defence of a hierarchy of evidence. Later models of EBM did include a 
discussion of values, but only as patient values, one of many factors which are to be taken 
into consideration in the EBM clinical encounter. Partly in response to this, Bill Fulford 
created a parallel movement, Values-Based Practice (VBP) in order to take into 
consideration, not just patient values, but the values held by all participants in the clinical 
encounter-clinicians, social workers, carers, and family members. While VBP has some 
theoretical difficulties, it remains an important improvement over EBM’s early account of 
values.  
  However, neither EBM nor VBP address a different role for values; values which are 
not held by particular individuals interacting with EBM, but instead are in evidence in the 
movement itself. EBM does not discuss these values explicitly. I argue that we can learn 
something about what these values are in other ways, like the oft-repeated GOBSAT joke. 
Because these values are implicit, EBM proponents do not have the opportunity to reflect on 
these values and perhaps attempt to modify them. To this end, I argue for a set of guidelines 
for adopting values which avoid the problems of wishful thinking and relativism, along the 
way critiquing previous attempts to provide these guidelines and defending my system from 
a series of objections. While these guidelines can go far in emphasizing the way in which 
facts and values work together in scientific projects, the traditional fact/value distinction is still 
made use of.   
  One such use is in criticizing a new trend called Evidence-Based Ethics. While I 
agree that the trend is in need of critique, I argue that using a sharp distinction between facts 
and values as a tool for disciplinary demarcation is a flawed way of going about this critique. 
Finally, I examine very recent work by EBM proponents on the importance of values for their 
project. While this work suggests that the movement has come a long way in its thinking on 
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values since 1992, there remain areas in which my suggested guidelines for value adoption, 
and the philosophical values in science literature writ large, can be of help.  
EBM’s early accounts of values  
  Early EBM had little to say about patient values as the priority of the movement was 
on providing the best evidence, as illustrated in the hierarchy, for use in the clinic. At this 
early stage EBM, “de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and 
pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the 
examination of evidence from clinical research” (The EBMWG 1992, 2420). Creating a 
systematic way of ranking and using evidence was the most important goal of the movement 
at this early stage.  
  Later models of EBM sought to integrate values.48 While it is difficult to say exactly 
what brought on this sea change in the role for values in EBM, the timing of this change 
corresponds with several other movements. These include the rise of patient-centered care 
and other forms of patient activism and values-based practice. Given this background, the 
expansion of EBM to deal with the role of patient values in the clinical encounter is not 
surprising.   
  Once the EBM movement accepted this larger role for values, they envisioned a 
three (or in some accounts four) part system.49 The three components are the much-
discussed pyramid of evidence, with meta-analysis of RCTs at the top, balanced with clinical 
expertise and the patient’s values and preferences (Sackett et al. 1996). The 4-part version 
includes the evidence pyramid, patient values and preferences, and the clinical situation 
(climate, socio-economic situation, transportation, availability of space) with clinical 
judgement as a fourth part, the glue that holds it all together (Haynes et al. 2002). In either 
                                               
48 See the brief history in Chapter 1 for a more in-depth discussion of these texts.  
49 These models are additionally discussed in the sections, “the Tripartite Model” and “The Amalgamation Model” of 
chapter 2.  
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case, the patient’s values are to be taken into consideration. Indeed, according to these 
models, we can infer that they are to be given as much weight as the evidence.  
Critiques of Early EBM Accounts of Values  
  There are multiple lines of critique that could be deployed against these early EBM 
accounts of values. In this section, I focus on three important uncertainties left open by these 
early accounts. First, how should these patient values be ascertained? EBM seems to point 
in two very different directions on this, sometimes suggesting that patient values should be 
gleaned from social science work on what subgroups of patients value on average and then 
applied to particular patients, other times suggesting that speaking with individual patients is 
necessary for fulfilling this portion of EBM. Secondly, it is not clear if this set up, in which 
patient values are a separate category from evidence, clinician expertise and clinical 
circumstance, entails that there are no values at work in evidence, clinician expertise and 
clinical circumstance. Finally, by emphasizing that it is patient’s values which are to be taken 
into consideration, does EBM mean to privilege patient values above the values of other 
stakeholders, like clinicians and carers, or to claim that clinicians should attempt to be value-
free, to avoid having any values which will affect the clinical encounter at all?   
  The source of these integrated values in EBM is unclear. One popular handbook for 
the use of EBM suggests that information about patient values should come from the work of 
social science. In this case, average patient values should be determined based on survey 
data from a particular population, and then applying average data to particular patients, 
mirroring the EBM process for finding and applying the best evidence. The authors write,   
  Linking treatment options with outcomes is largely a question of fact and a 
matter of science. Assigning preferences to outcomes is a matter of 
values…Clinicians should look for information about who was involved in assigning 
values to outcomes or who, by influencing recommendations, was implicitly involved 
in assigning values. Such expert panels may be subject to intellectual, territorial and 
financial biases…Clinicians using a decision analysis will not face the huge problem 
of implicit and hidden value judgments that affect practice guidelines. The reason…is 
that decision analysis requires explicit and quantitative specification of values. These 
values, expressed as utilities, represent measurements of the value to the decision 
maker of the various outcomes of the decision…For analyses built to inform clinical 
policy, credible ratings could come from 3 sources. First, they may come from direct 
measurements from a large group of patients with the disorder in question…Second 
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ratings may come from other published studies of quality of life judgments by such 
patients…Third, they may come from ratings made by an equally large group of 
people representing the general public. (Guyatt et al. 2015, 15)50  
 
Criticism of this way of looking at patient values does not come, as some might think, only 
from ethicists or philosophers. EBM supporter Greenhalgh is sharply critical of this type of 
account of values, writing, “Perhaps the most powerful criticism of EBM is that, if misapplied, 
it dismisses the patient’s own perspective on their illness in favour of an average effect on a 
population sample, or a column of QALYs calculated by a medical statistician (Greenhalgh  
2010, 12).” For Greenhalgh, the authors of the Users’ Guide go too far in their attempts to 
avoid bias and end up ignoring individual patient values in favour of data about values in 
populations.  
It is not the case that EBM is consistently interested in values as discovered by large 
population studies. In the same influential handbook, the authors write, “The preferences or 
values that determine the correct choice when weighing benefit and risk are those of the 
individual patient. Great uncertainty about how best to communicate information to patients 
and how to incorporate their values into clinical decision making remains. Vigorous 
investigation of this frontier of evidence-based medicine is, however, underway” (Guyatt et 
al. 2015). The authors do not cite any additional research here which would tell us which 
methods of value incorporation EBM finds to be at least most promising. However, even this 
short paragraph conveys a very different message than seen elsewhere in the book. Here 
the emphasis is on communicating with an individual patient (as difficult and unstructured as 
that might be) in order to determine and integrate the individual patient’s values. This is in 
contrast to the earlier passage which suggests that “integrating patient’s values” might not 
require communication with any specific patient, but rather knowing what social science has 
told us about what large populations of people similar to the patient in question tend to value.  
Even within one prominent text it is unclear what kind of stance EBM has on values; are they 
                                               
50 Emphasis mine.  
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individual and require communicating with the patient, or are they derivable from population 
data?  
This is not an argument to avoid this kind of social science investigation into patient 
preferences. Social science work on these topics can be incredibly helpful in policy-making 
and hospital administration, when decisions are made about which resources to invest in for 
patient use. Given these uses for this work, the critique that information about patient 
preferences should be gathered from individual patients should not be taken as a criticism of 
doing this work at the population level at all, but a worry about using these average 
calculations of patient values as stand-ins for a particular patient’s values.  
In both preference-inclusive accounts of EBM, values are a separate sphere, a 
separate component. Labelling a portion of the movement “patient values” suggests that the 
other spheres, the hierarchy of evidence and the clinical situation, have no relevant values to 
consider or investigate. This eliminates the need to consider possible values in play within 
the hierarchy itself, a problematic simplification. These possible values may include 
preferences for quantification, preferences for the testing of interventions which are easily 
compared or for which we have a useful placebo, and certain kinds of scientism and 
reductionism.  
In addition, in these models of EBM only patients are supposed to have values which 
require consideration. It could be argued that because of the trend towards patient-centred 
care, patient values are the only ones we care about. But additionally, portraying patients as 
the only ones with values that need considering reinforces the image of clinician as morally 
neutral scientist, an image that is difficult to uphold. These three reasons, that it is unclear 
where EBM intends to gather information about patient values, that values are structurally 
separated from the evidence and patients are the only people supposed to have values 




Value Based Practice Account of Values  
Value Based Practice (VBP) was part of a series of movements in medicine in 
response to EBM. VBP was developed by Bill Fulford in the field of psychiatry before being 
generalized to all health professions. VBP was to be a “'new partner' for evidence-based 
practice” (Fulford 2008,10). VBP “offers a new and primarily skills-based approach to 
working with complex and conflicting values in medicine” (Fulford 2008,13). A main 
component of this ‘new partner’ is the expectation that in addition to a standard history, 
clinicians working in the mode of VBP also take a systematic account of the patient’s values.  
In this account values are “preferences, needs, hopes, [and] expectations” (Fulford 
2008, 10). According to VBP, many conflicts in medical decision making have their root in 
unexplored differences in values. Since it is not only patients who have conflict-causing 
values, the values of other stakeholders including healthcare professionals, social care 
workers, family and carers are also to be taken into consideration.   
VBP is also unique in the extent to which it is willing to take values as difference 
making components in decision making. It might be clear that it helps to know about the 
patient’s values in order to communicate effectively with patients; knowing what news to 
break gently or the best way to frame choices.51 VBP goes farther than this. In VBP, values 
not only impact how a clinician communicates with a patient but may change which 
intervention is chosen. This is clear in Fulford’s case study involving an artist, which is 
discussed at length in the next section. This possibility of intervention change suggests that 
VBP is not interested in learning about patient values for merely instrumental reasons, for 
example, to make communication easier, but also to include as part of the decision-making 
process.  
                                               
51 EBM says very little about what is to be done in cases in which the evidence conflicts with the patient’s values, 
cases which are sure to arise. Given the various ways in which evidence was prioritized in early EBM it seems 
likely that this version of EBM would sacrifice the patient’s wishes to the direction of the evidence. It is less clear 
how EBM as represented by later models like the Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model would suggest in 
this case. Critics like Tonelli have charged that EBM struggles to actually integrate patient values into practice, 
except in areas of “professionalism” like the communication case above (Tonelli 2006).   
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Fulford insists that VBP need not be seen as a replacement for or competitor to EBM, 
writing, “A particular feature of values-based practice is that…it is fully complementary to and 
supports evidence-based approaches” (Fulford 2008, 13). Since EBM and VBP differ in their 
explanation of where clinicians should obtain information, Fulford makes use of the 
traditional fact/value distinction to carve out a distinct place for VBP that does not encroach 
on the territory of EBM. The structure of the partnership with EBM makes clear the traditional 
dichotomy; EBM is seen to deal in factual evidence and VBP to deal in the values of all the 
relevant actors in a medical decision-making arena. Fulford writes,   
  Thus, we can think of values-based medicine as being to values what 
evidence-based medicine is to evidence. Just as evidence-based medicine offers 
a process for working more effectively with complex and conflicting evidence in 
medicine, so values-based medicine offers a process, albeit a different process, 
for working more effectively with complex and conflicting values in medicine. 
(Fulford 2008, 12)  
Regardless of Fulford’s insistence on seeing VBP and EBM as partners with separate 
theoretical territory, newer versions of EBM which attempt to integrate values suggest 
that there is more overlap, and therefore more possibilities for conflict, than he suggests 
(Haynes et al. 2002; Sackett et al. 1996; Gupta 2011).   
VBP Case Study: The Artist’s Need to “See” Color  
In Fulford's illustrative example of the role of VBP in the clinical setting, an artist 
begins taking lithium to control her bipolar disorder on the advice of her clinician. From a 
traditional medical point of view, this treatment was very successful—the lithium controlled 
her mood swings and she had few side effects. However, she stopped taking the lithium 
because it blunted her perception of colour. This side effect, which had not seemed 
important enough to take into consideration in previous studies of the intervention, was well 
documented in the patient narrative literature. It was of paramount concern to this patient 
because of her set of values related to her role as an artist. Armed with this clarification of 
values, the artist and her clinician were able to find a more suitable intervention. In this case, 
the doctor’s values (e.g. use of best practices, importance of efficacy) were at first assumed 
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to be paramount to the patient’s values (e.g. quality of life, artistic functioning) as the 
patient’s full assortment of values was not made clear in the original encounter (Fulford 
2008). This case makes clear the benefit of taking values, as well as evidence, into 
consideration in clinical decision making. In this case, however, the patient was able to 
continue to express the ways in which her treatment was not in line with her values, even 
while experiencing the condition in question. In other cases, for example, in patients with 
depression, it is not as clear that this will be possible.  
Problems with the VBP Account of Values  
I argue that while the VBP account of values in clinical practice has several flaws, it is 
markedly more attentive to individual patients than the rival EBM procedures for taking 
values into account. These EBM procedures largely focus on using data from social science 
to create population-based accounts of patient values. I claim VBP procedures ought to be 
used in place of the EBM procedures given the inconsistency of EBM’s stance on values, 
current calls for Patient-Centered Care (PCC), and the uncertainty of the appropriateness of 
using the same methods to compare and discuss values and evidence.  
Fulford’s VBP account of values has several problems. These include a tendency to 
take values to be static, insufficient information about how to proceed in the face of medical 
conditions which shift or erode values, and a lack of procedure for dealing with values that 
are truly in conflict.  
Fulford takes values to be static. Even in cases when it seems clear that values have 
shifted over time, for example, in the maturation process of a teenager, becoming a parent, 
or undergoing a mental health crisis, values are discussed in terms of “uncovering true 
values” rather than values themselves changing (Fulford, Peile, and Carroll, 2012). While 
this stipulation that values do not change would greatly simplify the process of engaging with 
values, it is not reflected in our everyday experience. If the ambiguity caused by shifts in 
values cannot be handled by VBP, this is a reason to look to improve VBP.  
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There is one instance in which Fulford seems to contend with the possibility of 
shifting values. In his 1994 article written with Andrew Moore and Tony Hope entitled “Mild 
Mania and Well-Being,” Fulford and his co-authors examine the case of Mr. M, a patient who 
was diagnosed with “mild mania” (though his treatment with lithium begins after a depressive 
episode). Over the course of Mr. M’s treatment—including his time on and off lithium, periods 
in which he was manic or depressed, and periods of relative stability—Mr. M articulated a 
wide range of values; sometimes, “He found his wife and family boring and claimed that his 
marriage had never been good…openly expressing his intention to divorce his wife and to 
marry his girlfriend,” other times “he…described his relationship with his girlfriend as 
superficial and unimportant” (Moore et al. 1994, 167).   
In light of the difficulties inherent in taking seriously these shifts in values, the authors 
argue that we should cease to take the immediate values of the patient into account, writing,  
“…In the case of hypomania, it is the long-term welfare of the person concerned rather than 
his or her immediate express wishes, which is the relevant measure of his or her best 
interest” (Moore et al. 1994, 167). While Fulford and his co-authors seem aware of difficulties 
involved in changing and shifting values in the case of severe psychiatric disorders, their 
attempts at making sense of such values is quickly abandoned in favour of a more objective 
notion of the patient’s “well-being.” However, further disagreements about what constitutes 
well-being, as well as which kinds of well-being the clinician should aim to achieve for his 
patient, lead the authors towards paternalism.  
While Fulford and his co-authors fail to develop an unproblematic notion of well-being 
in their article, it is even more important to note that Fulford, in his subsequent works, 
returned to the idea of taking patients’ values seriously. However, rather than finding a new 
way to approach the problem of shifting values, he begins to rely exclusively on cases in 
which values do not change.  
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Fulford’s failure to address adequately the ways in which values can shift and change 
over time is a potential obstacle to the implementation of VBP in clinical practice. Fulford has 
been able to avoid confronting this obstacle by maintaining a methodological pluralism in 
regard to the question of how to actually obtain knowledge of a patient’s values. By 
portraying the process of obtaining knowledge of values as something distinct from the way 
in which one should use these values to make decisions in VBP, he has been able to avoid 
deeper questions about how we gain our values, how they develop, and how they can be 
altered in cases of severe psychiatric disorders.  
When Fulford is faced with a case study that might be interpreted as a dramatic 
change in values, he typically interprets it as a discovery of one’s true values, rather than a 
fundamentally new way of valuing. It might be the case that an individual’s values are hidden 
or undisclosed and a practitioner skilled in VBP must uncover them, but they do not change. 
This holds in cases in which patients pass through puberty, confront major illnesses, and 
undergo radical changes in goals. Even in the case of a teenager with schizophrenia who 
discloses after an episode that she is no longer as committed to her art as she once was and 
wishes to change her career goals in a way that will require a change in treatment program, 
her values are taken as unchanged by either maturation or psychosis. Instead, her  
“true” values were simply covered over by her artistic talents and her parents’ wishes for her 
future (Fulford, Peile, and Carroll 2012, 50). In contrast, a hermeneutic phenomenologist 
would interpret this as a major life event that fundamentally altered the teenager’s value set. 
While it is true that static values are much simpler to negotiate, it seems unlikely that an 
individual’s values will remain consistent from childhood through old age, in spite of major life 
events, changes in circumstances, or mental illness.  
In addition, VBP does not account for how clinicians are to respond to patients whose 
condition impacts their ability to value anything at all.  For example, in some patients, 
depression results in a degradation or sometimes the complete loss of the ability to value 
anything at all. What is a clinician who is committed to VBP to do in this case? Take the 
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patient’s previously held values (if known) as their current values? Take the current lack of 
values seriously, even though they may not be coherent with the rest of the patient’s history?  
Ask for the help of a surrogate (friend, family member) in determining the patient’s current or 
former values? Given the current epidemic of depression, it is important that VBP be able to 
answer this question.  
A last reason to worry about VBP is the lack of procedure for dealing with situations 
in which the values of different stakeholders in the clinical encounter are truly in conflict. 
Especially in his clinical workbook, Fulford does a good job discussing the way in which 
values are “squeaky wheels”—that is, they are always underlying the clinical encounter, but 
only tend to be noticed when they are causing conflict. Even in these “squeaky wheel” 
encounters, Fulford orchestrates examples in such a way that a mutually beneficial solution 
is always possible with all parties’ values intact and unchanged. Fulford even relates that an 
early reviewer of the book was confused that there were “no villains” in the cases studied; 
that is, Fulford gave no examples in which conflicting values could not be reconciled  
(Fulford, Peile, and Carroll, 2012). While the cases may not need “villains” to be compelling, 
it does seem unlikely that all values can be brought into accord—surely there are cases in 
which the differences in values between clinicians and patients are problematic and 
irreconcilable.  
Because of the static nature of its account of values, the lack of protocol for dealing 
with individuals who can no longer value at all, and the lack of guidance when values truly 
remain in conflict, VBP still has some worrisome kinks to work out in dealing with values in 
the clinical setting.  
Possible Improvements to Values in VBP  
  Supporters of VBP can remedy this failure to address the shifting nature of values or 
diminished ability to have values at all that occurs in disorders such as depression in several 
ways. The first, and perhaps most problematic remedy is to take the shift in values or the 
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inability to have values seriously. This might involve making changes to the individual’s plan 
of intervention based on the individual’s new values or new lack of values. This solution 
seems problematic in that, at least in the case of depression, this new set of values or this 
new lack of values might be understood as episodic, or transient. If this is the case, clinicians 
would want to plan interventions that are in line with the individual’s pre-episode values.  
   Another option is a pre-episode clinical encounter in which the clinician and the 
patient set out to discuss and record the patient’s values and preferences for future 
treatment. This option seems promising in that it most explicitly captures the values of the 
individual. In addition, this option provides a resource for the clinician to refer to in the future. 
However, this solution also presents some difficulties. First, episodes of depression and 
other disorders often arise with little warning, not allowing for a pre-episode interview in 
which a statement of values can be produced. In addition, this one-time clinical capture of 
values seems to suggest, as much of VBP does, that values are static and will not 
legitimately change over time—a problematic assumption. A solution to this might be more 
frequent, thorough discussions of values.  
A third possible solution to the difficulty of shifting or diminishing values for values-
based practice is the use of proxies. In other health care settings, the use of proxies, a 
relationship in which the decisions of a designated family member or friend stand in for the 
decisions of the patient herself, is standard practice. When applied to values-based practice, 
a proxy would be a designated individual whose job is to be an advocate for interventions 
that are in line with what they believe to be the patient’s values.  
A reason to prefer Fulford’s methods, even with their flaws, is the current demand for 
patient centred care (PCC). Clinical practitioners of all kinds, as well as patients, are making 
this call. While the movement is itself fractured, we can take these three definitions of patient 
centred care as somewhat representative.  
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   Martin and Felix-Bortolotti define PCC as, “a strong moral prerogative in health care 
delivery that entails a deep respect for unique living persons, and the obligation of health 
professionals and decision makers to care for them on their terms” (2014, 1). Here the 
emphasis is on the moral aspect of the charge and on the uniqueness of each individual, 
which suggests that making use of values derived from population level studies would not 
fulfil the requirements of PCC.  
The Institute of Medicine defines PCC as “providing care that is respectful of and 
responsive to individual patient preference, needs and values, and ensuring that patient 
values guide all clinical decisions” (2001, 6). Again, the emphasis on the individuality of the 
patients in question suggests that this will not be possible through the use of population level 
sociological data.  
  Ekman et al. write, “Person-centred care highlights the importance of knowing the 
person behind the patient – as a human being with reason, will, feelings, and needs – in 
order to engage the person as an active partner in his/her care and treatment” (2011, 2). 
This definition especially draws attention to the active role of the patient, in all their 
particularities, in their treatment.  
While these definitions do have some important differences, it seems quite safe to 
say that none of them have room for the practice of relying on “ratings made by an equally 
large group of people representing the general public” to determine a particular patient’s 
values, in place of communicating with the patient. Based on this diverse selection of 
definitions it is clear that such practices would not be patient-centred, providing another 
reason to prefer Fulford’s account, in which communication with the actual individual patient 
or other stakeholder in question is paramount (Fulford 2013). Of course, for compliance with 
PCC to count as a reason to prefer the VBP account of values to the EBM account, we must 
assume that PCC is a worthy goal. Defending this claim is well outside the scope of this 
section, but the wide acceptance of the goals of PCC by groups like the National Institute of 
Health and the National Health Service suggest that it remains an important concept.  
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A final reason to prefer Fulford’s method of working with values is EBM’s assumption 
that empirical methods will work just as well dealing with values as they do with evidence. 
The methods of EBM are set up to endorse evidence. A randomized controlled trial of 
patients similar in relevant ways to your patient is supposed to produce evidence that will tell 
you something about the evidence in your case, more or less given the quality of the study 
and the similarity of the patient to the population.52 The same cannot be said of values; even 
a very well-constructed poll of what thousands of other patients preferred need not tell you 
anything about what your patient prefers, regardless of how many characteristics they have 
in common with the polled population. As I noted earlier, an important EBM manual, one of 
the only places a clinician could learn how EBM suggests to ascertain and integrate patient 
values, suggests exactly this method.   
  These are not the only options for the discovery and investigation of values. There is 
a significant literature discussing possible methods for choosing the best values for use in 
science, once we have accepted that a value-free ideal is not possible or indeed, even to be 
hoped for (Douglas 2007, de Melo-Martin and Intemann 2016). These methods are quite 
diverse and may mirror the kinds of methods individuals use to choose their values. This 
literature includes suggestions to choose values based on the pragmatics of which values 
produce the best science historically (Clough, 2013), based on the standpoint of particular 
oppressed and marginalized groups (Wylie, 2003), based on empirical accounts of what the 
members of the community already value, or based on the results of encouraging a plethora 
of conflicting values so that in time the most radical are  
“washed out” (Longino 1990). My contribution to this debate follows in a later section, 
“Values that Fit: Guidance for Adopting Values in Science.”  
That there are many possible ways of systematically and thoughtfully choosing 
values is not a reason to think that any way is as good as any other, but instead is another 
                                               
52 It is far from clear that this even occurs in the case of randomized controlled trials. See (Worrall, 2002), 
(Cartwright, 2012) and (Fuller forthcoming) for more information about the limitations of RCTs.  
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reason that it is dangerous to believe that values can safely be assumed to be shared over 
populations. And while there are methods to determine values, and some of these have an 
empirical basis, it is much too quick to assume that the methods considered most successful 
for dealing with evidence, like the hierarchy, can also be considered most successful for 
dealing with values.  
Of course, none of this is to say that there is a strong line between facts and values, 
or that fact-finding practices are not themselves shot through with values, but if investigating 
values is our goal, it is not clear that we can use the same empirically based methods we 
use to produce evidence.  
It is because of this inconsistency in what EBM has to say about values and how they 
should be ascertained, the failure of EBM value practices to be patient-centred, and EBM’s 
attempt to use methods for evidence creation inappropriately on values that I suggest the 
use of Fulford’s system, flawed though it might be, as the current best practice for 
investigating and integrating patient values into clinician practice.  
  Given that there are these competing discussions of how to take patient and other 
stakeholder values into consideration in medicine, the above discussion of the features and 
flaws of VBP and EBM on values can be helpful for those considering the adoption of one of 
these systems. However, this is far from the only way that issues of values enter EBM and 
medicine as a whole. Neither EBM nor its more recent competitor VBP explicitly take into 
account a different use of values; values which are not held by individuals in the clinical 
encounter but are an integral part of the EBM movement itself. An awareness of these 
values could be very useful for the EBM proponent, in that it would allow the proponent to 
measure the appropriateness of new developments in EBM against these previously held 
values, or to consider and critique the appropriateness of these values to begin with. 
Because these values are not explicitly stated, (indeed, EBM sometimes attempts to claim 
that it is value-free) EBM values must be deduced from the writings of EBM proponents on 
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other topics. One particularly telling topic is the widely circulated GOBSAT joke. In the next 
section, I discuss what we can learn about EBM’s unstated values from this joke.  
What Can We Learn About Values from GOBSAT?  
 
EBM supporters have coined a term for the kind of medicine they see themselves as 
replacing: GOBSAT medicine (Good Old Boys Sit Around a Table)(Hartung 2009; Pitts 2004;  
Howick 2011). This term was first featured in Greenhalgh’s book, How to Read a Paper: The  
Basics of Evidence-Based Medicine. She writes,   
When I wrote the first edition of this book in the mid 1990’s, the commonest 
sort of guideline was what was known as a consensus statement—the fruits of a 
weekend’s hard work by a dozen or so eminent experts who had been shut in a 
luxury hotel, usually at the expense of a drug company. Such ‘GOBSAT (Good Old 
Boys Sit Around a Table) guidelines’ often fell out of the medical freebies (free 
medical guides and other ‘information sheets’ sponsored directly or indirectly by the 
pharmaceutical company) as pocket-sized booklets replete with potted 
recommendations and at-a-glance management guides. But who says the advice 
given in a set of guidelines, a punchy editorial, or an amply referenced overview is 
correct? (Greenhalgh 2010, 7)53  
I argue that there are two critiques implicit in this somewhat humorous, pejorative 
term. First, expressed by “good old boys” is the claim that pre-EBM medical traditions suffer 
from unsurmountable exclusion in terms of inviting only certain members of the scientific 
community to participate and neglecting to take into consideration the testimony of others, 
perhaps others who are most likely to productively disagree. Second, expressed by “sit 
around the table,” is the charge that pre-EBM medical traditions are rationalist; that is, that 
they seek to understand the causes or mechanisms behind diseases or interventions, rather 
than focusing the results of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs). For an EBM supporter, 
this sort of “rationalist” reasoning is what led to disastrous medical interventions such as 
bloodletting and anti-arrhythmia drugs and is dangerous to continue.  
I argue, first, that EBM is itself not free from the very critiques it levels in this joke:  
                                               
53 Other philosophers, Miriam Solomon in particular, have investigated the evidential practices involved in 
consensus conferences and found them to be much less problematic than here depicted. Since I am focusing on 
the way in which the GOBSAT joke reveals values in EBM, rather than how it functions as a critique of consensus 
conferences, I do not focus on this work here. See Solomon 2007 for a good explanation of consensus 
conferences.   
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there is both more exclusion, because of the high “start-up cost” of RCTs, and more  
“rationalism” in EBM than supporters often imagine. In response to the charge of rationalism,  
I argue that the reasons that EBM has given to worry about rationalism are unsatisfactory, 
and that a mix of rationalism and empiricism is needed for effective medical research and 
practice. Finally, I examine what this GOBSAT description of the kind of medicine EBM 
seeks to displace can tell us about the values implicit in EBM. I offer two possible sample 
values that can be implied from the GOBSAT joke. This investigation of the implicit values in 
EBM through the GOBSAT joke can help us to see the role that values play in EBM itself, as 
a movement, rather than only considering how patient values, or clinician values work within 
EBM.  
GOBSAT as a Charge of Exclusion and Rationalism    
The first charge implicit in the GOBSAT joke is a charge of exclusion, or, a lack of 
diversity.  This exclusion most often takes the shape of inviting only certain members of the 
scientific community to participate and neglecting to take into consideration the testimony of 
others, perhaps others who are most likely to productively disagree. This critique portrays 
medicine before EBM as necessarily conservative and defensive, even against those from 
within the profession who are, say, younger, from various under-represented groups, or 
those who occupy different positions in the health care field, such as nurses or social 
workers. Given that medical debate around the content of guidelines doesn’t seem to be 
worth very much if it is only composed of members likely to immediately agree, this is a 
serious charge indeed.  
Second, expressed by “sit around the table,” is the charge that pre-EBM medical 
traditions are rationalist;54 that is, that they seek to understand the causes or mechanisms 
behind diseases or interventions, rather than focusing the empirical results of Randomized  
                                               
54 Even if the reader is not convinced that this charge is implied in the GOBSAT joke, it is reasonable to infer 
because of the replication of this charge elsewhere. For a good explanation of the debate around empiricism and 
rationalism in EBM see (Bluhm 2017).   
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Controlled Trials (RCTs). For an EBM supporter, this sort of “rationalist” reasoning is what 
led to disastrous medical interventions such as bloodletting and anti-arrhythmia drugs and is 
dangerous to continue.55   
  I argue that these critiques do more to inform us about the goals and values 
underpinning EBM than they do to suggest that EBM is so very different from the medical 
traditions which preceded it. First, these critiques (the barring of diverse voices in evidence 
consideration and rationalism) might also be levelled at EBM. In the same way that the 
GOBSAT joke implies that in older medical traditions diverse voices are not allowed, EBM 
sharply restricts the methodologies which can easily be brought to bear on the consideration 
of a particular intervention. While it might seem what is meant by a lack of diversity in 
GOBSAT situations is quite different from the lack of methodological diversity in EBM, these 
lacks are at least analogous and the negative outcomes are the same. In each case, 
opportunities for capturing a fuller picture of the relevant viewpoints and information is lost 
because of the homogeneity of accepted voices. This is the case even in the newer GRADE 
system, where RCTs are still to be prized from the outset and observational studies are 
given a low starting value, although each may be awarded additional merits or demerits 
based on the quality of the particular study (GRADE working group 2008).  
In addition, like GOBSAT, EBM needs to make use of some “rationalist” thinking in 
order to begin the research process. Activities like hypothesis generation and selection, 
which are important for EBM, will require “rationalist” elements, such as mechanistic 
reasoning and the results of basic science.  
                                               
55 Of course, in Greenhalgh’s explanation of GOBSAT, we also see a concern about the role of industry in consensus 
conferences. It used to be thought that RCTs might provide a defense from industry involvement, but now most EBM 
supporters, including Greenhalgh, recognize that industry involvement continues regardless of RCTs (Greenhalgh 
2014). Indeed, the high cost of a large well conducted RCT makes EBM especially susceptible to industry 
involvement. However, I will not deal with this charge in this work, as many others such as Ben Goldacre (2012) and 
Bennett Holman (2016) have admirably stepped up to the task of investigating industry involvement in various parts of 




I follow others in suggesting that in order to be successful, EBM needs to take into 
account both empirical and rationalist considerations (Kelly and Moore 2012, Bluhm 2017).  
Without rationalist considerations, we can’t know where to next direct our inquiry and without 
empirical considerations, our theories are not yet fleshed out by data.  
Implicit Values in EBM 
 
The GOBSAT joke can point us toward some implicit values in EBM. EBM does claim 
to be value-free in some foundational texts. The Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature 
states, “Linking treatment options with outcomes is largely a question of fact and a matter of 
science. Assigning preferences to outcomes is a matter of values…”(Guyatt 2015). This 
passage seeks to separate the “value-laden” work of applying evidence from the supposedly 
“value-free” creation of evidence. In addition, part of the reason for the emphasis on 
evidence in the classic texts of EBM is as an arbiter of the subjective, authoritative, and 
value-laden teaching of medicine before EBM.56  
I argue in the “Values that Fit” section later in this work that a declaration of value 
freedom is to be discouraged in comparison to a declaration and defence of a clear set of 
values. Reasons to prefer a transparent account of values to a declaration of value-freedom 
include clarity of purpose and the opportunity for those within and outside of EBM to 
challenge and amend those stated values. What might EBM values include?  
Given EBM’s mockery of GOBSAT, a brief moment where we can infer what the 
values of EBM itself are, we can learn that EBM values include diversity (as opposed to the 
exclusion that supporters of EBM see in GOBSAT) and an empirically-driven engagement 
with the world (not armchair rationalism).   
Perhaps these are not the values that supporters of EBM would choose to adopt for 
their movement. I welcome the replacement of these values gathered from implicit sources 
                                               
56 See the “Classic Texts” section of Chapter 1 for more on this.  
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with explicit statements of values from within EBM itself. There is some movement by EBM 
advocates in this direction, which I discuss in the section “New Developments in Values in  
EBM.” It is not until these values are made explicit that the movement can be evaluated to 
see if these are in fact the values it wants to embrace, and how well the chosen values are 
being lived up to.  
I have argued that despite its lightweight content, the retelling of the GOBSAT joke 
can reveal quite a bit about EBM. It can reveal the complicated relationship EBM has with 
rationalism and exclusionary practices, in that these are critiques made of pre-EBM 
strategies that might also show up in EBM itself. And it suggests a set of values at play in 
EBM, values which shape both the hierarchy itself and its application in the clinic. While in 
the future EBM may choose to begin the hard work of explicitly adopting values, for the time 
being the values implicit in the GOBSAT joke will have to do as a starting point.  
But it is not just EBM that struggles in this aspect; many other scientific projects 
struggle to identify, articulate and adopt values. This is partly because of worries about 
relativism and wishful thinking in science that is not value-free, but also because of the lack 
of a systematic structure for doing so. In the next section, I respond to concerns about 
relativism and wishful thinking and provide such a systematic guideline.  
Values that Fit: Guidance for Adopting Values in Science   
  Philosophers have argued that the value-free ideal is neither possible nor to be 
wished for with increasing regularity over the last 50 years. This need not entail, however, 
that science be guided by just any values; it is important to think through what values matter 
to scientific work, state them clearly and transparently, and ask the scientific community to 
help them to live up to these stated values through peer review and other kinds of feedback. 
What are the methods for determining the values which are relevant to a scientific project? It 
seems unlikely that the usual empirical methods are up for this task.  Biddle sums up this 
concern nicely: “If it is either impossible or inadvisable to screen out all contextual factors 
from transiently underdetermined research, what kinds of contextual factors should be 
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allowed and which should we seek to exclude?” (Biddle 2013)57 Is there a principled way to 
adopt values in science?  
  Currently the most popular justifications for choosing some values rather than others 
to guide scientific practices are based on various distinctions between illegitimate and 
legitimate values. These distinctions include the indirect/direct role distinction, the 
epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, and the lexical priority distinction.  
  In this section, I will argue that current attempts to adopt values for use in science 
based on illegitimate/legitimate distinctions are unhelpful. I will then suggest a set of three 
new guiding principles to use in their stead: locality, context-dependency, and transparency. 
I provide an example of the use of these guiding principles for values adoption in a 
hypothetical scientific project: a randomized controlled trial for the use of statins in stroke. I 
conclude by examining a few likely objections to my proposal and offering some replies.   
 A Critique of Universal Illegitimate/Legitimate Distinctions  
  In this section, I criticise the current proposals for regulating the place of values in 
science more generally.58 These proposals differ in terms of the nature of the principle by 
which they attempt to make a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable values. 
These principles include the indirect/direct distinction, the non-epistemic/epistemic 
distinction, and the principle of “lexical priority.” I will characterize each of these principles in 
turn, but first I will say something about the class of illegitimate/legitimate distinctions as a 
whole.59 
                                               
57 Here as elsewhere, Biddle avoids value-based language to talk about this issue, preferring to speak of the 
issue of the “epistemic purity of science” rather than “values in science.” He has various worries about this older 
and more common terminology, which may be of interest to the reader. However, since I am interested in 
connecting the issues discussed here with larger problems related to the so-called “fact/value” dichotomy I will 
retain the use of value language.   
58 I make use of the methods for demarcating acceptable from unacceptable values in science generally, because 
no separate methods have been developed more specifically for medicine or EBM. For more on the relationship 
between science, medicine, and EBM, see Chapter 3. 
59 While I write that I am critiquing universal illegitimate/legitimate distinctions as a whole and additionally am 
providing an account of the particular difficulties which each attempted distinction, it could be said that really my 
own account (presented in “A Proposal for Guidelines”) is actually just another kind of illegitimate/legitimate 
distinction. I am, after all, attempting to provide a way to delineate projects in which values are being used 
appropriately from cases in which they are not; this is not “anything goes” chaos. However, my account remains 
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  This class of distinctions is to be praised for responding to the literature on values in 
science by attempting to carve out some role for values in science. However, these  
distinctions sometimes signal, rather than a rejection of the value-free ideal of science, 
instead only the admission that regardless of our policing, values will creep into science. 
These distinctions still function within a paradigm that longs for value-free science; but since 
value-free science is impractical in the world we live in, the pragmatic response is to limit the 
spread of values to particular zones of science. This pragmatism seems to overlook the 
more radical literature suggesting that value-free science is not just not attainable, but not 
even to be wished for (de Melo-Martin and Intemann 2016).  
  One possible distinction on which to distinguish acceptable values from unacceptable 
values is the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction. On this account, certain values have a 
special relationship with truth. In her critique of this distinction (2009), Douglas lists predictive 
accuracy, explanatory power, scope, and simplicity/economy as examples of epistemic 
values, a list she inherits from Kuhn (1977). Longino suggests accuracy, consistency, 
simplicity, scope and fruitfulness, in contrast to feminist values such as novelty, applicability 
and ontological heterogeneity (1996). The special relationship to truth that these values are 
taken to have holds universally, across scientific disciplines and projects. That is, for 
Longino, simplicity is always considered an epistemic (and therefore acceptable) value, 
regardless of the scientific project or field under consideration. It is not clear if this 
relationship is at root a simple pragmatist point that projects guided by these values have in 
the past had the good consequence of increasing our knowledge, or some kind of stronger, 
perhaps necessary, relationship. All other values are understood not only to not have this 
special relationship with truth, but to be socially based.60   
                                               
different in kind from those I am critiquing because I am not attempting to provide a universal for identifying 
proper roles for values for all scientific projects throughout space and time. Instead, in my proposal, appropriate 
values are indexed to the particularities of the project in question. My proposal remains different from those 
discussed in this first section.  
 
60 The additional implication is that this tie to social forces means that these values function to move us further 
from the truth. I argue elsewhere that this additional claim linking social values with an increasing distance from 
truth is not the case, but it seems to be taken as given by this account.  
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  The first argument against this distinction takes aim at the assumption implicit within 
it that there is a universal set of values which lead to truth (or more weakly, at least a more 
pragmatic epistemic success) across scientific fields and projects. This argument has its 
roots in older critiques of reductivism and the unity of science (Cartwright 1999; Hacking 
1996; Dupre 1993). For example, simplicity is a value generally considered to be epistemic, 
but it does not have this special relationship to truth universally.61 It is generally taken to be 
the case in physics and mathematics that simplicity is a value which leads to truth (or 
epistemic success).62 However, in other scientific disciplines, such as economics, simplicity 
need not be such a value. Indeed, given the complex social and psychological factors at play 
in economics, a dependence on the value of simplicity may in fact lead away from truth or 
epistemic success. It seems difficult to chalk this difference up to a deficiency, either in 
discipline maturity or rigor, of economics, as differences between social and other sciences 
sometimes are. Instead, it is just the case that the values that count as epistemic vary across 
disciplines. This example illustrates that the set of values considered epistemic is not in fact 
universal. As a result, the epistemic/nonepistemic distinction loses one of the factors that 
made it preferable to other distinctions ─its clarity and consistency. However, this argument 
does not show that the epistemic/ nonepistemic distinction cannot work, only that the 
determination of which values have this special relationship with truth must be local and not 
universal. These issues of locality and context-dependency will be taken up in section 2, my 
positive proposal for guidance for adopting values.  
  A second critique of the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction (itself a kind of legitimate 
vs illegitimate distinction) is the literature of inductive risk, recently led by Douglas, but rooted 
in older work by Hempel and Nagel (2009). This critique of the epistemic/nonepistemic 
distinction takes aim at the possibility of some values always being acceptable  
                                               
61 Exactly what the value of simplicity consists of is in some ways not settled. See Rochefort-Maranda (2016) 
for an example. 62Emphasis original  
62 See (Sober 2015) for an interesting investigation into why we might think this is the case. 
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(“cognitive” or “epistemic’) and others (“social”) always unacceptable and argues instead that 
social values have a role to play in proper scientific process.  
  Douglas’ inductive risk arises because of what Biddle would call, “transient 
underdetermination,” the idea that “some theories, hypotheses and models are 
underdetermined by logic and the currently available evidence” (Biddle 2013).62 Given this 
state of affairs, decisions will have to be made in the face of uncertainty. According to the 
Douglas account of inductive risk, it might be best to limit values’ direct influence on 
decision-making, values cannot be fully removed from decision-making because the amount 
of evidence that is required in order to accept a hypothesis or make a decision will be raised 
and lowered based on values; values regarding the possible consequences of getting the 
choice wrong.  That is, this view highlights issues of uncertainty and levels of required 
evidence for acceptance as important areas which require values in scientific projects. 
Because in some sense the “stakes” will matter in each scientific project, there will be 
uncertainty in each project, which means there will be values in each project. The important 
thing is to separate these indirect and irremovable values components from direct and 
inappropriate values components. 
  This argument has been enormously successful in challenging the value-free ideal 
and has resulted in a large amount of scholarly activity. However, I (and others) think that it 
does not go far enough or describe enough of the relevant phenomena surrounding values 
and scientific practice (de Melo-Martin and Intemann 2016; Biddle and Kukla 2016). The role 
that the inductive risk argument carves out for values is small and specialized. Values are 
thought only to come legitimately into play in the context of accepting a hypothesis or 
deciding how much evidence you need to accept a hypothesis, as opposed to throughout the 
scientific process.63 For these reasons, although discussions of inductive risk are helpful in 
critiquing the value-free ideal and the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, they do not go far 
                                               
63 It might be possible to adopt both the inductive risk account and the indirect/direct distinction as they are 
compatible, but the problems with the direct/indirect distinction still stand independently.  
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enough to characterize the roles of values in science. This point is contentious because this 
is an unusual riff on the usual tactic regarding the appropriate place of values in science; 
carving out some area where values are barred. The Douglas account remains in this 
tradition, though this account allows that values might legitimately play a role in science in a 
“new” area; not the determination of what questions we should ask, but instead the 
determination of how much and what kind of evidence we will need in order to accept a 
theory, hypothesis, or model. 
  The most recently proposed of these “legitimate vs illegitimate” distinctions is the 
indirect/direct distinction. According to this distinction it is acceptable for values to have an 
indirect role in science but not a direct role. Douglas articulates the most popular version of 
this distinction in 2009, writing,   
In the direct role, values determine our decisions in and of themselves, acting 
as stand-alone reasons to motivate our choices. They do this by placing value on 
some intended option or outcome, whether it is to valorize the choice or to condemn 
it. The value provides warrant or reason in itself, to either accept or reject the option. 
In this direct role, uncertainty is irrelevant to the importance of the value in the 
judgment. The issue is not whether the choice will somehow come out wrong in the 
end, but whether the choice, if it comes out as expected, is what we want. This role 
for values is crucial for some decisions, but we will see that it must be restricted to 
certain decisions made in science and excluded from others. The integrity of the 
scientific process cannot tolerate a direct role for values throughout the process.   
The indirect role, in contrast, can completely saturate science, without threat 
to the integrity of science. This role arises when there are decisions to be made but 
the evidence or reasons on which to make the decision are incomplete, as they so 
often are, and thus there is uncertainty regarding the decision. Then values serve a 
crucial role of helping us determine whether the available evidence is sufficient for 
the choice and that the importance of the uncertainty is, weighing the potential 
consequences of a wrong choice and helping to mitigate against this possibility by 
requiring more information when such consequences are dire…If we find new 
evidence, which reduces the uncertainties, the importance of the relevant value(s) 
diminishes. In the indirect role, more evidential reasons in support of a choice 
undercut the potency of the value consideration, as uncertainty is reduced. The value 
only serves as a reason to accept or reject the current level of uncertainty or to make 
the judgement that the evidence is sufficient in support of a choice, not as a reason 
to accept or reject the options per se. (Douglas 2009, 96-98)64    
The idea here is that while values play a role in scientific activities like project choice, 
planning, and technology regulation after discovery, it is inappropriate to use values to guide 
                                               
64 Emphasis original  
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the scientific project itself- that this kind of direct role for values is at its core nothing more 
than “wishful thinking,” the spectre that haunts many accounts of values in science. The 
worry about wishful thinking is that a scientific project which incorporates values might be a 
scientific project which finds only what a scientist wishes to find (which may be expressed in 
their values) rather than what is “really” out there.65 Douglas describes the problem of wishful 
thinking saying, “…simply because a scientist values (or would prefer) a particular outcome 
of a study does not mean the scientist’s preference should be taken as a reason in itself to 
accept the outcome. Values are not evidence; wishing does not make it so” (Douglas, 2009). 
Wishful thinking of this kind is a problem in scientific projects if the scientists on a given 
project will find results that are in line with the values they hold regardless of that is “out in 
the world.”66 The problem of wishful thinking as been especially salient in discussions about 
the possibility of feminist scientists. Here the worry was that scientists who identified as 
feminists would be more likely to come to conclusions that supported equality between men 
and women via inappropriate methods or reasoning in projects like looking for brain 
differences between men and women in neuroscience or investigating the roles of men and 
women in hunter-gather societies in archeology.   
  Douglas suggests this distinction as an improvement on the epistemic/non-epistemic 
distinction. She claims the indirect/direct distinction is an improvement over the 
epistemic/non-epistemic distinction in that it does not say that certain values are always 
acceptable and others always unacceptable, but instead indexes the acceptability of the 
values to the role they are playing in the scientific project.67 I sympathize with this type of 
                                               
65 Sometimes the problem of wishful thinking is treated as if it requires a robust commitment to a particular brand 
of realism in order to show up as a problem at all. I do not think this is the case- it seems to me we can describe 
what is wrong about wishful thinking while remaining fairly skeptical about what we can know about the world. 
Because it is not required to describe the problem of wishful thinking, this section does not include any strong 
claims about realism or anti-realism, which remains outside the scope of this work.  
66 Elliott has also been critical of the Douglas account, worrying that the direct/indirect distinction is not clear 
enough to do the work it is assigned. For more on this, see (Elliott, 2011a).  
67 In addition, while the indirect/direct distinction is put forward as a new distinction, an improvement over older 
accounts, the indirect portion of the distinction seems to be indistinguishable from the lexical priority of evidence 
distinction, an older idea which will be critiqued in this section as well.  
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critique, but want to take it still further, indexing the appropriate values not to the role they 
are playing in a scientific project, but to the content details of the scientific project itself.  
  My main concern with the indirect/direct distinction is that, in order for it to work, the 
scientific process must be divided up into discreet categories which do not seem particularly 
responsive to the messy way that science is done in practice. Douglas points to a few 
situations in which a direct role for values might be acceptable, most of which occur  
“in the early stages of a research project;” the decision of which scientific projects to 
undertake, funding decisions in science, the choice of which methodology to pursue.  
However, after this early stage has passed, “any direct role for values must be restricted to 
unusual circumstances when the scientist suddenly realizes that additional direct values 
considerations must be addressed” (Douglas 2009, 101).    
  In order for the indirect/direct distinction to be useful, there needs to be a consistent 
way of disentangling indirect situations from direct situations. Largely this has been done 
temporally, by delimiting different chronological stages in the scientific process.68 This project 
of slicing up a linear process of science into sections, some of which could be protected from 
the influx of values, was a project that paired nicely with attempts in philosophy of science to 
articulate a distinct and consistent scientific method. Douglas situates her contemporary 
work as inspired by the work of Heil (1983), but it is similar to other older accounts. For 
example, Reichenbach’s context of discovery vs. context of justification distinction is similar 
in that the early part of the scientific project in which a direct role for values is allowed by 
Douglas largely maps on to the context of discovery and the later stages of the scientific 
project in which Douglas says only indirect roles for values are permitted maps onto the 
context of justification (Reichenbach 1951, Schickore and Steinle 2006).   
                                               
68 Another option would be to designate specific activities, regardless of when they are done, as indirect or direct. 
This may, however, undo the indexing to roles that Douglas cites as a reason to prefer her account to the 
epistemic/non-epistemic distinction.  
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  This idealized, linear conception of science seems far removed from what happens in 
practice, in which tinkering and revision are not “unusual” but play large parts. It seems 
unlikely that direct roles for values can be segregated in the early stage of project planning 
(or a late stage of implementation, although Douglas does not focus on this possibility), 
leaving a “pure” middle section of the scientific process, because the activities which 
Douglas stipulates as allowing a direct role for values do not take place either before a 
project is begun or afterward during a non-scientific implementation, but occur throughout 
the process, a process which includes multiple planning and decision-making phases. My 
critical strategy here is not new. Biddle argues, “In many areas of research, such factors 
have an influence throughout the research process, including the characterization of data, 
the choice of methodologies (including the choice of a level of statistical significance), the 
choice of models and research subjects and so on” (2013). Because the indirect/direct 
distinction relies on this linear concept of science to do its segregation of acceptable from 
unacceptable roles for values (a linear conception of science which is not borne out in 
practice) this distinction cannot do the work which needs to be done to make clear which 
values should be in play in scientific projects.69  
  A final distinction which has been used to separate values which are illegitimate from 
those that are legitimate is the “lexical priority of evidence” distinction. This criterion is 
identified by Brown as underlying arguments about value inclusion which proceed from both 
inductive risk and underdeterminism (2013). The lexical priority account suggests that values 
do have a role to play in science but only in cases where the evidence is not definitive. It is in 
these cases that values “fill the gap” left by available evidence, allowing a decision to be 
made. In order to prevent an “anything goes” relativism, evidence always has “lexical 
priority.” So according to this way of thinking, values are legitimate when they enter into a 
                                               
69 If my critique of the indirect/direct distinction hangs mostly on this linear idealization of science, it is important 
to ask if this linear idealization is something foundational to the Douglas view, or something merely incidental. 
Apart from the possibility of listing certain actions, regardless of when they occur in a project, as either direct or 
indirect, which I mentioned earlier, I do not see an alternative to this linear idealisation for getting the Douglas 
distinction off the ground. 
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situation where the evidence is not settled. Values are illegitimate when they play a role in a 
situation where the evidence is settled. However, according to this distinction, values can 
only fill such a gap- they should never be the primary consideration, and should not be 
considered at all in cases in which there is sufficient evidence. That is, “values do not 
compete with evidence when the two conflict” (Brown 2013, 834).  
  For Brown, this is problematic in several ways. It implies that no value judgments are 
needed to evaluate the quality of the evidence, a possibly dangerous assumption. In 
addition, he worries that this account of values takes them to be nothing more than 
preferences, noting that, “[the lexical priority rule] denies that we can have good reasons for 
our value judgments” (Brown 2013, 836). While those who champion the lexical priority 
distinction might respond that these measures are necessary to avoid the problem of wishful 
thinking, as previously discussed, Brown argues that there are other ways to avoid this 
problem. These include clarifying separate but necessary roles for evidence and values 
(Kournay 2010) or evidence, theory, and values (Brown 2012).  
  Generally, I agree with Brown’s critique and appreciate his call for alternative 
methods of avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. However, in that his proposals remain 
universal about finding the proper roles for evidence, theory, and values in all cases in all 
scientific projects, I believe he is overstating the unity of science.  
A Proposal for Guidelines: Locality, Context-Dependency and Transparency  
  Now that I have discussed difficulties in the current options for adopting values based 
on universal concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy which rely on distinctions such as 
epistemic/non-epistemic, indirect/direct and complete evidence base/non-complete evidence 
base, I offer my positive account of a better way forward. This positive account is especially 
needed if we are concerned with the work of the last 50 years of arguments that science is 
shot through with values. My positive account does not attempt to reargue for that empirical 
claim, but takes it as given.  My account also does not attempt to provide a different 
distinction for a universal illegitimate/legitimate principle, allowing for a new characterization 
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of values as legitimate or illegitimate (although this does not entail that I think all values are 
legitimate). Indeed, this method of attacking the investigation of values seems destined to fail 
given the diversity of non-unified scientific disciplines and projects. Instead, I am interested 
in providing criteria for determining if the values in place in a scientific project fit that project. I 
offer three criteria for “values that fit;” locality, context dependency, and transparency. I will 
discuss each of these in turn.  
  The first of my proposed criteria for values that fit is locality. By this I mean that the 
values in question should be reflective of the norms and particularities of the field or fields in 
which the project is located. For example, as I argued in the previous section, simplicity is 
sometimes taken to be a paradigmatic case of a universal epistemic value in science; 
explanations and theories which capture the phenomena while remaining as simple as 
possible are to be preferred above others. This is, however, not actually reasonable in many 
social sciences, including in, for example, economics. In economics, a simple account is 
generally to be viewed with suspicion as the subject of economics is itself highly complex, 
including many social factors. Another possible example is the importance of the value of 
first-person experience in social sciences which make use of ethnography. This value would 
seem strange in a project based in physics, but fits well with a project based in sociology. 
This is not just a mistaken contingent tendency of the field, but rather a logical preference 
given the subject matter of the field.  
  An adoption of values which are not local might mistakenly attempt to adopt 
simplicity, with its “universal” status credibility, as a value for a project in economics. Such an 
adoption of value would be inappropriate given the empirical information we have about the 
subject matter of economics. Obeying a criterion of locality can help avoid this and other 
related mistakes in values adoption. For this reason, I suggest locality as one desideratum 
for values adoption.  
  A second criterion for providing guidance for applying values that fit in science is 
context dependency. This criterion is concerned with adopting values which are sensitive to 
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the history and concerns which are particular to a scientific project.70 For example, Hicks 
highlights a case study in which feminist values were instrumental in allowing archaeology to 
progress (Hicks 2014). In the 80s and 90s, feminist values in archaeology allowed for a re-
examination of dominant conceptions of the development of agriculture. Traditionally women 
were thought to be responsible for plant gathering in pre-agrarian societies, while men were 
assumed to be responsible for plant domestication among other roles. Feminist values were 
appropriate, given that a history of sexism had hidden particular possibilities for women in 
the communities under study from archeologists (Wylie 2001; 2002; 2007). Without this 
awareness of history and the adoption of values which were sensitive to this context, 
progress could not be made. Similar cases from primatology are familiar from Haraway’s 
work (1989;1991).  
  The third guideline for values adoption I propose is transparency. Values which are 
transparent are adopted values which are accessible to those in the scientific community 
who are not involved in the project. By accessible, I mean not necessarily that others in the 
scientific community will agree with these values, but that an explicit articulation of values will 
allow others in the field to understand which values are in play. This guideline allows for the 
possibility of a sort of “peer review” of values; if a scientific project is failing to live up to the 
other two criteria, this criterion of transparency allows this failure to be visible to the 
community at large for debate and correction.  
                                               
70 Of course, it is possible that, as a result of the history of a group of projects in the discipline, inclusion decisions 
made under this criterion could also be made on the basis of the locality criterion. For example, the worry about 
simplicity stems from a particular history in economics. In cases like this, guidance from the locality and the 
context dependency requirements will look the same: it does not fit to use simplicity as a value in projects in 
economics, for two reasons- a violation of the locality criterion, and a violation of the context-dependency criterion 
(which in this case, but not all, is the foundation for the existence of the locality criterion.) I include the additional 
requirement of context-dependency to account for cases in which the history of particular projects suggests 
values which are not necessarily captured by the locality requirement. For example, the history of the Human 
Genome Project, in which great interventional advances were promised but not delivered, might render “humility 
about results” an especially important value for projects in that tradition of genomics. This concern would not 
have been brought out if the requirement of locality were in place as neither medicine nor biology need have 
“humility about results” as a particularly salient value.  
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The fulfilment of this transparency guideline could take many forms, from a brief 
statement in a scientific paper, to the completion of a more complex and detailed values 
protocol, which supports and records the reflection and deliberation on values by those 
involved in a scientific project throughout the stages of the project. It has been brought to my 
attention that some scientific projects already use a form of values disclosure. For example, 
the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative, (DNDi) includes a “vision” statement in its 
research.71 Its goals are, “to improve the quality of life and the health of people suffering from 
neglected diseases by using an alternative model to develop drugs for these diseases and 
by ensuring equitable access to new and field-relevant health tools” (DNDi 2013). In future 
work, I hope to design a protocol for values consideration throughout the scientific projects 
which includes these kind of value statements in publication.  
Since many scientific bodies already require or encourage the registration of scientific 
projects before they begin, values could also be recorded at this point, as a way to compare 
and map shifts in values over the course of the project. This is an especially important 
guideline, since without it, we have no epistemic access to see if the other two guidelines are 
being followed. For this reason, even if the other two other desiderata, locality and context-
dependency, are deemed too difficult to follow, the guideline of transparency remains a 
crucial first step for beginning to understand the ways in which values are at play in scientific 
projects.   
  Though there might perhaps be other useful guidelines for the adoption of values in 
scientific projects, at the current time my proposal suggests that locality, context 
dependency, and transparency are a good start towards adopting values that fit.72  
                                               
71 Thank you to Erman Sözüdoğru for this example.  
72 The work of Kevin Elliott has suggested the importance of including criteria that are somehow responsive to the 
public (perhaps a requirement that the values adopted be “democratic” or “public”) (2011b). Additionally, Intemann 
suggests something similar, particularly in the realm of climate science (2015). I have not included such a 
component. I believe that such a component would be attempting to accomplish either one of two things-either 
work towards transparency of the kind I believe my proposal is already handling, or to hold scientific projects 
accountable to the public. While I think that it is important that science be responsive to those who will be 
impacted by its technologies, (and therefore support movements like patient-centered medicine) phenomena like 
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A Note on “Adoption”  
  Throughout my proposal on values, I have been careful to speak of “values adoption” 
in contrast to “values choice” or “values selection.” I have made this choice of words 
deliberately and with two specific goals in mind. First, “adoption” is meant to make reference 
to the minimal sense in which values are explicitly held, expressible, accessible and 
therefore changeable. Second, “adoption” is meant to express a communal and social 
process. I will expand on the importance of each of these two reasons for talk of “adoption” 
below.  
  “Adoption” serves to flag the way in which there are additional epistemic constraints 
on values, as opposed to beliefs or thoughts perhaps. Even individually, the values which we 
know we hold and can explicitly identify are just a small portion of the values which influence 
our decision-making. We know that we do not have a complete account of the values that we 
hold because of cognitive phenomena, for example, implicit bias.73 Implicit bias is the 
phenomenon whereby even those who explicitly embrace gender and racial equality and 
reject sexism, racism, and ableism retain implicit, subconscious preferences based on these 
characteristics (Saul 2013). This suggests that while an individual may explicitly hold values 
like equality and fairmindedness, other implicitly held values, inaccessible to them, may also 
play a role in how they act. Learning about the values we hold is not as simple as reflecting 
and making a list, though I might wish that it were. Given this example, it seems clear that 
even on an individual level values are layered, entangled and perhaps contradictory. Such 
values may exist in trade-off relations, meaning that a commitment to one may make others 
untenable (Khosrowi 2016). All of this should serve to undermine any attempt to take my 
proposal as a straightforward selection of values from a menu. If it is the case that at last 
                                               
the “disability paradox,” make me wary of placing too much faith in the determinations of the public on matters of 
medicine and science (Carel 2016).  
73 Thank you to Rebecca Kukla for this point.  
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some of the values that we hold are not epistemically accessible to us, we must be modest 
about our claims to explicate and modify values.  
  Philosophy has a history of locating action and decision-making in the rational 
autonomous individual agent. Recent work from a variety of disciplines (such as ethics of 
care, feminist political philosophy and social epistemology) suggests that this is perhaps 
beginning our investigation of values in the wrong place. Instead, it might be beneficial to 
take a community or society as our unit of investigation. This seems especially to be the 
case in deciding on a unit for the investigation of values in science. I believe “adoption” 
rather than “choice” or “selection” can serve as a reminder that the process I am discussing 
will always be a social process, a deliberation undertaken by a group, with all of the 
additional messiness and complications that implies. Of course, using the word “adoption” 
does not remove these problems, but it can perhaps remind us to keep these issues in mind, 
rather than covering them over. There will be nothing neat about this endeavour, which 
means guidelines of the sort I have suggested here may be the most structure that can be 
offered to the process.  
  However, this modesty about the kind of epistemic access we can have to values can 
sometimes improperly escalate into full blown scepticism about the possibility of modifying 
values at all. If such a large portion of our values are not even obvious to us, the argument 
goes, how could they possibly be explicated and modified by a group? A look at some 
historical case studies, including work in primatology and archaeology can quiet this 
scepticism (Hicks 2014; Haraway 1989;1991). Since activism has modified values in the 
past, there is some reason to suppose that it is not in principle impossible.  
Case Study: Statins for Stroke  
  To make clearer how my proposal might work in scientific practice, I will give an 
account of how values impact one future scientific project: a randomized controlled trial 
(RCT) for the use of statins in stroke patients.  
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  Suppose you are a medical researcher investigating the use of statins in stroke 
patients. While statins have been (controversially) studied and approved for the treatment of 
other cardiovascular events and conditions, the most recent Cochrane review on statin use 
reported that there was “not enough evidence” to support their use in case of stroke. They 
write, “The available evidence does not confirm any benefit or harm of statin administration 
in the acute phase of cerebrovascular ischemic event, in particular ischemic stroke” 
(Squizzato et al. 2011). What kind of values are in play in a research project to design and 
carry out a RCT for the use of statins in stroke patients?  
  To answer that question, we need to know a bit more about the proposed 
intervention. Statins are a class of drugs commonly used to lower cholesterol. They are 
some of the most commonly prescribed drugs in the United States and have a similar record 
of use in the UK and Canada (Stegenga 2016).  
  While supporters of EBM, like many at the Cochrane Collaboration, are loath to 
spend much time discussing intervention causality or mechanisms, they write in a short 
section entitled “How the intervention might work,”   
  The potential positive effects of statins during an acute cerebrovascular 
ischemic event are two-fold: a neuroprotective effect, limiting damage and improving 
recovery from the presenting event (in particular for major stroke); and an 
antithrombotic and endothelial effect, preventing early recurrence (in particular in 
TIAs [transient ischemic attack] and non-disabling stroke. Some clinical data 
apparently support these potential mechanisms. However, recent published data 
from the Fast Assessment of Stroke and TIA to prevent Early Recurrence (FASTER) 
study seem not to support the latter hypothesis...(Squizzato 2011)   
  
That is, statins intervene on stroke by preventing damage and improving recovery, or 
preventing additional strokes. Because strokes often involve similar systems and problems 
to other cardiovascular events like myocardial infarctions, events statins are approved 
interventions for, it has been suggested that statins might help improve stroke outcomes.  
  There is a history of reports of muscular problems from patients who take statins. 
These problems manifest in many different ways from myopathy (muscle aches) to 
rhabdomyolysis, a serious condition which can cause extreme pain and death (Steganga 
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2016). While there are many patient reports of these kind of effects Cochrane did not find 
many instances of these problems in their review, writing, “No cases of rhabdomyolysis (the 
breakdown of muscle fibres resulting in the release of muscle fibre contents (myoglobin) into 
the bloodstream) occurred in 274 patients enrolled in three studies” (Squizzato, 2011).  
  In the case of statins, many values are in play. For example, the choice of RCT as a 
methodology might suggest “rigor” and “generalizability” as values, at least rigor as defined 
by EBM.74 74 In tension with these values might be the value of timeliness- in order to 
achieve the required power, RCTs often take years to recruit and follow up on many 
participants. Other methodologies might be more appropriate if we have reason to think that 
timeliness or thrift are particular values of the project. In addition, it is likely that profitability is 
a value in play here, either very explicitly in that this research is carried out by a company 
hoping to have good news for their shareholders or somewhat implicitly in that any grants or 
patents that are given to a public institution for this research will impact that institution’s 
bottom line. In that the project has chosen to study statins, a drug which is already widely 
available which does not require any new complex delivery system, perhaps implementability 
is an important value. Institutional commitments might require that research be patient-
centred, making that a value under consideration. Other values that might be in play include; 
fruitfulness, simplicity, justice, scope, and equality-of-access. Since many of these values 
exist in trade-off relations and a project guided by different values can produce different 
results, some method will be needed to sort through and adopt values which are suited to 
the project; values that fit.  
  What if we were to subject this tangle of conflicting values to my proposed 
guidelines? My first requirement was that the values we adopt be local-that is, appropriate to 
                                               
74 Indeed, the choice of RCT as method may indicate that the whole group of values implicit in EBM are in play. 
74I am not making the claim here that rigor and generalizability are guaranteed by the use of an RCT. I am 





the values of the science in which the project is taking place. In this case that would be most 
broadly medicine, but perhaps also epidemiology and public health. This criterion can help 
us to reject some values as inappropriate. For example, while simplicity is an important value 
for other sciences like physics, it does not make very much sense as a value for a project in 
these scientific disciplines. Therefore, locality can rule out these value-candidates.75  
  My second criterion, context dependency, can continue to narrow the field of possible 
values for our RCT of statins for use in stroke. The guideline of context dependency asks us 
to consider the history of the discipline in which the scientific project is taking place, as well 
as the history of more specific similar projects. In this case, it is important to know the history 
of patient-centred health care; a movement undertaken by patients and clinicians to ensure 
that care and research are focused on outcomes that patients care about and which takes 
the patient perspective into account (Bechtel and Ness 2010). This movement was a 
response to the historical paternalism and authoritarianism in medicine, both in the sense of 
the egregious oversights recorded in the history of bioethics and also in the opportunity costs 
associated with research driven by academic interests or pharmaceutical company’s bottom 
lines, rather than patient needs. This information is combined with the specific information 
we do have about patient reported muscular problems. So, in the case of an RCT for statin 
use in stroke, the context dependency guideline requires that, in response to this particular 
history, a patient-centred trial which investigates these muscular problems is undertaken and 
that an appropriate value for our research is patient-centeredness.  
  The final requirement, transparency, might be satisfied many different ways. The 
simplest might be to include as a standard practice, a section of this kind, perhaps just after 
the “methods” section of the project’s write up: “In designing this study, we made decisions in 
light of particular values, including methodological rigor, patient-centeredness, and ease of 
implementation. We adopted these values based on the history of the discipline and the 
contemporary concerns of users.” However, a more thorough dedication to this guideline 
might require the use of a formal Values Discussion Protocol. In future work, I hope to 
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develop such a protocol including concepts taken from the philosophical “values in science” 
tradition as well as from the value-based practice (VBP) movement in health care. Even 
though a more rigorous process may seem excessive, it more fully satisfies the guideline of 
transparency as previously discussed and helps to avoid the “tick box” objection I will 
discuss later. For these reasons, I would, in our hypothetical statins for stroke case, 
encourage the use of such an extended protocol.  
 While this set of guidelines cannot definitively guard against the worry of wishful 
thinking when it comes to values in science, they are good first step towards adopting values 
that fit particular scientific projects without universally declaring that some values are 
acceptable and others not, as has been the trend in the values in science literature up until 
now. This set of guidelines works tightly together, in that the transparency requirement asks 
for explicit deliberation about values, without which this whole project is impossible, while the 
context-dependency and locality requirements allow us to learn from the rich histories of 
different scientific projects to prevent poorly adopted values of the past from rearing their 
heads again. Given that the alternatives to the kind of program I offer here is to insist that 
science is value free (allowing values to enter into scientific projects without judgement or 
deliberation) or to insist that some values are universally acceptable and others universally 
unacceptable (which does not respect non-reducible differences between scientific projects) 
I believe the sort of guidelines I offer here are our best option, even if they cannot promise a 
watertight avoidance of the problem of wishful thinking, or ensure that future scientific 
projects will always adopt prudent values. 
Objections and Replies  
  In this section, I consider three possible objections to my positive account of 
desiderata for values inclusion. These objections are the “entrance of politics” objection, the  
“too high a bar” objection and the “what about relativism?” objection. I will answer the first 
only briefly and the second and third at greater length.  
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  The firsts of these objections, the “entrance of politics” objection, is the most general. 
The idea here is that my suggestion that encourages the adoption of values which are local, 
context-dependent and transparent is a problem, not because of the details of the proposal, 
but because it advocates the inclusion of values in science at all. Since philosophers have 
been writing about the ways science is shot through with values for at least 50 years, it may 
seem repetitive or dated to continue to respond to this sort of critique. Nevertheless, as the 
value freedom of science remains an important assumption for the public as well as for parts 
of science itself, it is important to continue to engage with these kinds of critiques.  
  In response to this objection, I argue that far from introducing corrupting values into 
an otherwise objective, value-free science, I am instead promoting a systematic method for 
identifying and documenting appropriate adopted values. Since values are already in 
science, my proposal cannot be accused of introducing values. Values are present in each 
stage of science from the production of hypotheses to the choice of which projects to pursue 
to the collection of data to the design of experiments to the presentation of findings to the 
scientific and wider community. This has been well argued by many (Longino 1990; Biddle 
2013; many others). My proposal does not bring values into science; they were always 
already there.  
  It is of course important to note that while political values are the ones often worried 
about, the category “values” is much broader. Once we have in place some systematic 
method for documenting and suggesting values for use, we may well find that there are 
many values we would not choose to have our research guided by. These might well include 
some kinds of politically-based values.  
  In fact, once this kind of critic is convinced of the ubiquity of values in science, 
convinced that science is already “contaminated” with values, my proposal may be a 
welcome source of structure and transparency. While I do not share with these critics their 
strong worries about the damaging or dangerous effects of values, we would share the view 
that more transparency about these values and how we got to have them is better than less.   
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  A second possible objection to my proposal might be the “too high a bar” objection. 
This objection states that the reason not to adopt my proposal is that it makes improperly 
high demands on scientists. Scientists, such a view holds, have their hands full with the 
practice of science and do not have the time or resources to investigate, reflect on, and 
adopt values as well. In addition, the argument goes, even if they did have the time or the 
resources, scientists are not trained to think about values. Overall, one could use these 
reasons to suggest that my proposal simply sets the bar too high.  
  I would respond to such a critique by suggesting that while my proposal might set a 
high bar, it is a bar scientists are already routinely surpassing. Scientists in many disciplines 
are already having important debates about the values within their fields, albeit often 
implicitly and without resources or systems for recording and reporting their decisions. The 
DNDi value statement is one example of an explicit concern for values on the part of 
scientists ─there are many more (DNDi 2013). Scientists from a variety of disciplines are 
already considering value concerns. My proposal does not therefore “set the bar too high” 
but instead suggests an explicit and systematic set of desiderata for doing work scientists 
are already doing.  
  Perhaps there is the additional claim here that what makes the bar too high is my 
insistence on these particular guidelines ─that adopted values should be local, context 
dependent and transparent. If I had called instead for the inclusion of values in science but 
have asked for values which were, say, absolutely unified and held throughout all space and 
time, perhaps this would not set the bar too high. If this is what had been proposed, such a 
set of values might be provided once and for all, for all sciences, by non-involved values 
experts; perhaps philosophers. So, it is not just that the project of investigating, reflecting on 
and documenting values for the sciences is difficult, although it might be, but also that the 
specific desiderata that I have included make the project even more difficult. However, the 
problems that these kind of universal distinctions have continued to face, as detailed in 
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section one, suggest that the project of finding universal acceptable values for science, or 
even universal rules for deciding which values are illegitimate or legitimate will be unfruitful.  
  A third possible objection my proposal might face is the charge of relativism. The 
argument here is that my proposal is relativistic in that it admits of many possible values. The 
worry is that this attempt to let a hundred value-flowers bloom makes criticism of scientific 
projects impossible. When confronted with a critique, members of the project being critiqued 
can simply point to a difference of values to defuse criticism. In this way, all sorts of poorly 
done science would be allowed to proceed unrestrictedly. Rigor, long considered an 
important deliverable of science, will be lost.  
  I can respond to this critique in two ways. The first and weaker response I call the 
agnostic response; the second, which is much stronger, I call the not-even-close-to-anything-
goes (NECTAG) response.  
  A first way of responding would be to remain agnostic on the issue of relativism.  
Perhaps there is some set of scientific values which are always the right ones, allowing 
significant criticism of particular scientific projects which use values that are not part of this 
universal set. However, without implementing my proposal, we have no way of 
systematically documenting what values are going on in science at all. Might we find that 
some projects have used values that are unacceptable in some way and want to have the 
epistemic strength to criticize those projects? Yes, but this requires as a first step 
systematically documenting and discussing values, as suggested by the requirement of 
transparency, not insisting that science is value free. Relativism might be a problem but it is 
not our first problem, and its possibility does not dissolve the importance of my proposal. 
This style of answering puts lots of weight on the inclusion of “transparency” as a component 
of my proposal.    
Another possible response which does not attempt to dissolve the charges of 
relativism but instead meets it head on is ‘NECTAG.’  
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  NECTAG references the Feyerabend “anything goes” form of relativism ─the claim 
that no value is inappropriate or bared from consideration and inclusion (Feyerabend 
1975).75 My proposal has two components which make clear that it is NECTAG-locality and 
context-dependency. For those who will worry that my proposal will leave us with no way to 
critique science which uses values like, “I will believe whatever is most profitable to be true” 
or “I will prioritize outcomes which are in line with my political beliefs, regardless of my 
findings” need not worry. My proposal, far from supporting an anything goes relativism, 
actually gives us two additional criteria, locality and context dependency, with which to 
critique these kinds of issues. This critique might go as follows: values like “believe whatever 
is most profitable to be true” or “prioritize outcomes which are in line with my political beliefs, 
regardless of my findings” fail both to be respectful to the fields in which these projects occur 
(locality) and to the history of value failings in those fields (context-dependency). While I 
have said that appropriate values vary from discipline to discipline and context to context, 
this does not entail that all values are permitted. This kind of response requires a shared 
weight between the context-dependent and local criteria and the historical content of the 
various special sciences. These two arguments can do much to deflate the threat of 
relativism in my proposal. While I stand behind the stronger second response (NECTAG), I 
include the first (agnosticism) because even the most stringent critic must surely admit that 
much.  
 As a way of further explaining how these three criteria can constrain inappropriate 
values in science (without necessarily claiming that they prevent all instances of the problem 
of wishful thinking), consider an example from pharmacology, a value which is a variation on 
the above “believe whatever is most profitable to be true” value worry. In this example, a 
particular drug X is the great financial hope of pharmaceutical company A. Considerable time 
and resources have been put towards developing this drug. However, RCTs for drug X have 
come back with a p value of .10, higher than the usually accepted .05. That is, for drug X, 
                                               




assuming the drug did nothing, you would obtain the observed difference between patients 
who did and did not get drug X, or a greater difference, in 10% of studies due to random 
sampling error.  As a result, the company is considering lowering its usual p value threshold 
from the traditional .05 to .10 for this drug and publishing these results as “significant” 
without remarking on the difference in standard. What can my three criteria say about this 
possible value (something like “fit your statistical tests to your financial needs”)?  
 If my first criteria, transparency, were to be followed in this case, the researchers on 
drug X would be asked to articulate and reflect on their reasons for working on this scientific 
project in the ways in which they are. They would be asked to articulate the values in play in 
this particular case, hopefully using a systematic values finding system, perhaps similar to 
that used by the Toolbox Project in the Michigan State Philosophy department (Gonnerman 
et. al 2015).76 In the course of this systematic articulation and reflection on values, they 
would perhaps say things like, “the bottom line is just really what drives our choice of tools,” 
“the most important thing to make sure that the statistics we use show the potential of the 
product” or “it was really important to show the value of drug X this quarter in whatever way 
we could, regardless how the trials were going.” It is true that transparency itself is the 
normatively weakest of the criteria- it only makes possible the normative judgements 
preformed by the other two criteria. However, without transparency as a criterion we might 
not have access at all to the internal understanding of the values in play in a particular 
scientific project. Transparency thus provides an important first step towards rejecting the 
value “fit your statistical test to your financial needs,” as inappropriate.  
 My second criteria, locality, requires that we look into the types of values which fit 
with the goals of the science in question, which is in this case, pharmacology. In this case, 
while we can find that there is at present an interesting and important debate about the use 
and abuse of significance testing in general (American Statistical Association 2016; 
                                               
76 In future work, I would like to develop my own system for values articulation and reflection, but my work will 
owe much to the Toolbox system. The Toolbox system works as an example of the kind of activities which would 
fulfill the transparency criterion for current purposes.  
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Wasserstein and Lazar 2016), and specific motions to modify traditional p values levels (say, 
from .05 to .005) (McShane et al 2017; Benjamin et al 2018), these debates are motivated by 
differing views on statistics, and worries that both scientists and the public understand these 
concepts in a flawed manner. We will not find here any defense of modifying p values for 
purely financial reasons. My second criterion would additionally defend against the 
acceptance of the value “fit your statistical tests to your financial needs” as acceptable. 
 My third criteria, context dependency, would have us examine the history of 
pharmacology to discover the appropriateness of this proposed value, given inappropriate 
value-based failures in this science in the past. This examination would bring to light a 
history of statistical manipulation for financial gain with bad consequences in pharmacology. 
(Fries and Krishnan 2004, Biddle 2007, Goldacre 2012 for a sample). My third criterion 
would provide additional reason not to accept “fit your statistical test to your financial needs” 
as an acceptable value for a scientific project in pharmacology.   
  A final kind of objection to my proposal might be the worry that this description and 
systemization of values will actually lead to less, rather than more, reflection on values in the 
sciences. Such worries might come from imagining a not-too-distant future in which, in 
alignment with my proposal, a section labelled “values” is included in every scientific paper. 
However instead of this being the result of serious reflection and debate among the research 
group, this section is replicated verbatim from previous research. Perhaps even worse, the 
existence of this formalized paragraph discourages reflection or discussion of values since 
this paragraph means that “values are taken care of.”  
  Such calcification of the process of values adoption is not difficult to imagine, 
especially given the extent to which research ethics has been similarly simplified. While such 
calcification is surely possible, it can perhaps be avoided by the development of manuals or 
guidelines for “how to write a values section” similar to the current literature on how to write a 
methods section. And while it is true that many methods sections are formulaic, they still 
allow for differences and deliberation about best practices from project to project. While it is 
important to consider the possibility of calcification, especially given the current state of 
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research ethics, my proposal need not result in this kind of values calcification and is an 
important step forward toward explicit values adoption.  
  This program for value adoption, which acknowledges the role of values in scientific 
practices but prevents just any values at all from being adopted via three desiderata, can do 
much to help philosophers and scientists to think about the ways in which values and 
science can work together. However, in other debates about values and science, it is argued 
that values and facts are very different things; so different that their differences support a 
strong demarcation between the study of values done in projects like ethics, and the study of 
facts done in projects like science. In the following section, I argue that the split between 
facts and values is not as clean as is often claimed, meaning that calls for demarcation 
between science and ethics cannot be done via the fact/value distinction.   
  
“Fact-Based Values”: Why the Fact/Value Dichotomy Plays Too Large of a Role in Critiques of 
“Evidence-Based Ethics”  
In this section, I examine the way in which the fact/value dichotomy is utilized in the 
demarcation of normative ethics and, more specifically, the role this dichotomy plays in 
critiques of calls for “Evidence-Based Ethics.” Since the debut of Evidence-Based Medicine 
in 1992, the “evidence-based” methodology as become ubiquitous in the health professions 
and has spread to other disciplines such as education and social policy. Especially given the 
close relationship between the health professions and bioethics, it is unsurprising that  
“evidence-based” methodology and rhetoric would soon be manifest in bioethics. This 
movement has been called “Evidence-Based Ethics.”77 There have been many different 
attempts to criticize this application of “evidence-based” methodology to bioethics, and ethics 
generally. These critiques often have in common that they make use of the fact/value 
dichotomy, traditionally attributed to Hume, to suggest that while “evidence-based” methods 
might aid in producing properly vetted facts needed for decision making in fields like 
                                               
77 See (Strech 2008) for a good overview of the movement  
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medicine and education, these methods cannot assist with the content of ethics, that is, 
values. I will argue that because the fact/value dichotomy is much less unproblematic than 
we might think, it would be unwise to make too much use of this trope in attempting to 
demarcate bioethics and the science of medicine. I do this using separate arguments from 
philosophy of language and feminist philosophy of science. I agree that calls for “Evidence-
Based Ethics” deserve examination and critique. I will conclude my paper by offering a 
strategy for the critique of “Evidence-Based Ethics” that does not lean on the fact/value 
distinction for strength.  
A History of Evidence Based Ethics: Roots in Evidence Based Medicine  
Evidence-Based Ethics, part of what has come to be called the “empirical turn” in 
ethics, is part of a set of “evidence-based” disciplines, including nursing, chaplaincy, 
education, and health policy that followed in the wake of EBM. While versions of Evidence-
Based Ethics vary within the literature, generally the idea here seems to be that ethics 
should take into consideration relevant evidence, evidence that is arranged in a hierarchy 
that is more or less similar to that used by EBM, during moral investigations. One proponent 
defined Evidence based ethics this way, “As in medical decisions based on evidence-based 
medicine, ethical decisions based on Evidence-Based Ethics would involve conscientious 
and judicious use of the best evidence relevant to the care and prognosis of the patient to 
promote better informed and better justified ethical decision making” (Major-Kincade et al.  
2001), but the definition remains controversial in the literature (Strech 2008).  
This might seem problematic for a number of reasons and require careful critique. 
One sort of critique is levelled by Maya Goldenberg in her 2005 article, “Evidence-based 
ethics? On evidence-based practice and the empirical turn from normative bioethics.” Her 
project of critiquing Evidence-Based Ethics (a project I have much sympathy for) takes the 
fact/value distinction as an important component, a move I warn against. This move is also 
made in nearby debates about the possibility of moral expertise, in a similarly problematic 
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way. However, before I go too much further with this, I should say more about what the 
fact/value distinction is.  
Origins of the Fact/Value Distinction in Hume  
           The is/ought or fact/value distinction is generally attributed to Hume. He writes in A  
Treatise of Human Nature,   
  In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, 
and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when all of a sudden, I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; 
and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it. (Hume 1739/2000, 335)   
This has been taken to mean that the projects of various kinds of empirical research and the 
projects of moral investigation must be kept separate from each other. Whether this parse is 
respectful to the context in which Hume made these original comments, if this is what Hume 
had in mind in his comments, and the relation of this original meaning to the fact/value 
distinction as now commonly referenced in philosophy now are questions outside the scope 
of this work. For the time being, let it suffice to say that that previous parse is what we mean 
when we talk about the fact/value dichotomy.  
Analysis of Goldenberg’s Critique  
  This distinction appears in Goldenberg’s critique of Evidence-Based Ethics. She  
articulates her worries as follows,   
  Much like positivism threatened ethics by rendering it ‘senseless’ an 
evidence-based approach proposes to make moral deliberation redundant as it offers 
a method to resolve ethical and political questions about healthcare spending and 
practice by appeal to technical measure. The normative issues therefore get coopted 
by supposedly neutral technique. An evidence-based ethics would therefore threaten 
bioethics’ normative mandate. (Goldenberg 2005, 7)   
  
She continues, writing, “therefore along with wavering on the fact/value distinction, evidence-
based ethics threatens bioethics’ normative mandate” (Goldenberg 2005, 7). Goldenberg is 
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here engaging in a project of subject demarcation, in the hope of retaining this mandate, 
suggesting that evidence-based approaches might work fine in medicine and science, the 
realm of facts, but may threaten the sovereignty of the realm of values, ethics. It is true that 
her larger goal is the retention of a clear mandate for a strictly normative realm of thinking, 
but in order to protect that mandate, she is willing to use the fact/value distinction as a 
demarcation tool, a critical move in her larger argument. 
  None of this suggests that Goldenberg is unaware that a reliance on the fact/ value 
distinction is problematic (she suggests as much in a footnote) but only that it is not 
problematic enough to avoid as a strategy. Indeed, she is not at all alone in her use of this 
trope: the concept is mentioned in passing in much of the critical literature on Evidence-
Based Ethics.  
Two Strategies For Problematizing the Fact/Value Dichotomy  
  Now I want to problematize the Goldenberg critique of Evidence-Based Ethics by 
suggesting that the fact/value dichotomy is not as strong or clear as we might think. I do this 
in two ways. The first strategy makes use of arguments by Hillary Putnam in the philosophy 
of language. The second strategy makes use of arguments put forth by feminist philosophers 
and philosophers of science arguing against the value-free ideal in various special sciences.  
Putnam on Thick Concepts   
  The distinction between thick and thin value concepts was used by Putnam to 
illustrate a difficulty in the traditional hard distinction between facts and values. Putnam 
writes,   
  When we think of facts and values as independent, we typically think of 'facts' 
as stated in some physicalistic or bureaucratic jargon, and 'values' as being stated in 
the most abstract value terms, e.g. 'good', 'bad'. The independence of value from fact 
is harder to maintain when the facts themselves are of the order of 'inconsiderate', 
'thinks only about himself', 'would do anything for money.' (Putnam 1981, 139)   
These “thick terms' are meant to complicate what seems at first to be a clear distinction. In 
the previous quote, “thin” concepts are the “the most abstract value terms e.g. 'good', 'bad'.”  
In other works, Putnam writes that a list of “thin” value terms might include “'good', 'ought',  
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'right' and their opposites 'bad', 'must not', 'wrong' as well as 'virtue', 'vice', 'duty', 'obligation' 
and so on” (Putnam 2004, 35). What makes these terms “thin” is that they seem to only 
praise or blame without any other content.78* This is in contrast to “thick” terms. “Thick” 
terms, in addition to praising or blaming, also carry some additional description. Such terms 
might include, “'generous', 'elegant', 'skillful', 'strong', weak,' or 'vulgar'” although the list 
includes many others as well (Putnam 2004, 35). The term 'cruel' is one that Putnam spent 
significant time meditating upon. He writes,   
  The sort of entanglement I have in mind becomes obvious when we 
study words like 'cruel.' The word 'cruel' obviously – or at least it is obvious 
to most people even if it is denied by some famous defenders of the 
fact/value dichotomy – has normative and indeed ethical uses. If one asked 
me what sort of person my child's teacher is, and I say, 'He is very cruel' I 
have both criticized him as a teacher and criticized him as a man...Yet 
'cruel' can also be used purely descriptively, as when a historian writes that 
a certain monarch was exceptionally cruel... 'Cruel' simply ignores the 
supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be used 
sometimes for a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term. 
(Putnam, 2004, 35)  
So, we have established that cruel is a “thick” term, one that has both evaluative and 
descriptive meanings. Additionally, these dual meanings are intertwined. If we are 
uncomfortable with this duality, what are our options?  
  Here we seem to have two options according to Putnam's account of  
traditional non-cognitivists. They are,   
1. To simply insist that thick ethical concepts are plain factual 
concepts and not ethical or normative concepts at all. This is the 
response of R.M. Hare (in the case of 'rude') and of John Mackie (in 
the case of 'cruel').  
2. To claim that the thick ethical concepts are “factorable” into a 
purely descriptive component and an “attitudinal” component. The 
descriptive component then states the matter of fact that the predicate 
corresponds to, and the attitudinal component expresses an “attitude” 
(an emotion or volition) exactly as in noncognitivist accounts of the 
function of 'good,' 'ought,' and so on. (Putnam 2004, 35-36)  
                                               
78 I might argue that “duty” and “virtue” have more than simple “praise and blame” as content, but this is not the place 
for it.  
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  Neither of these options seem to be respectful to the value content in thick concepts. 
The first option denies that there is such a thing as value content in thick concepts. I would 
ask those who espouse such an option how they account for the fact that we use such 
concepts to praise or blame, if they are really mere descriptions of facts. For example, no 
one thinks that I have made an objective value-free description when I describe my child's 
teacher as “cruel;” it is clear in this situation that I mean to blame my child's teacher for poor 
treatment of some kind or another in a way which does not leave open the option of being a 
good teacher or a good person (Putnam 2004, 34).  
  In the second option, the thick concept is divided into two portions. The “attitudinal” 
component is described as either an emotion or volition and plays little role in the additional 
analysis of the concept. The descriptive component can then be compared to facts-in-the-
world to determine its truth. It is not clear why we should think that these concepts can be 
easily divided into these portions; why not think instead that the concept is is “shot through” 
with values? Neither of these two options for dealing with the normative/descriptive duality of 
thick concepts seems satisfactory and no other options present themselves in Putnam's 
work.  
In discussing the way in which some terms seem to “cheerfully” be both descriptive 
and normative, to be like facts and to be like values, and the ways in which attempts to wrest 
these terms apart to fit in these categories fail, I hope to have shown that depending on the 
fact/value dichotomy to demarcate ethics from sciences and thus critique Evidence Based 
Ethics is problematic. However, taking a lone argument from philosophy of language, with all 
the baggage of that field, does not seem to be enough. There is another way to critique the 
fact value distinction which comes from a group of philosophers of science with feminist 
leanings.  
Historical Case Studies in Philosophy of Science  
  As I have noted previously, for the last 50 years various arguments have been put 
forward by philosophers of science to suggest that science, the traditional realm of facts, at 
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least was not value-free, but perhaps should not be value-free. Some provided examples in 
which work in science was entangled with values. Examples of this kind of work include  
Heather Douglas’s arguments about inductive risk based on the case study of the use of 
values in reading rat liver slides in dioxin cancer studies, among others.  
Douglas Case Study  
In her 2000 article, “Inductive Risk and Values in Science,” Douglas explained her 
concept of inductive risk via a case study on the examination of images of rat livers in 
toxicology studies. She writes,   
In dioxin cancer studies, rodents (the animal group of choice because of their 
relatively short lifespan and rapid breeding cycle) are dosed for two years, close to a 
natural life-span. At the end of two years, full-body autopsies are performed on the 
animals to gather the endpoint data. Because dioxins appear to affect more than one 
organ site, all potential areas for cancerous growths are checked. In the studies 
relied upon by regulators about dioxins, tissue and organ samples have been 
mounted on slides to be evaluated by toxicologists…The female rat liver slides have 
undergone at least three evaluations by pathologists, with different results. (Douglas  
2000, 17-18)   
It might seem strange that multiple evaluations by pathologists should produce 
different results ─surely there is a clear fact-of-the-matter about whether these slides do or 
do not depict patches of cancerous growths. Douglas writes, “As evidenced by the lack of 
agreement among expert pathologists, the judgement of whether a tissue sample has a 
cancerous lesion or not has proven to be more subtle than one might initially suppose  
(Douglas 2000, 19).” Douglas attributes these differences to what she calls non-epistemic 
values; practitioners have different levels of concerns about the consequences of getting 
their judgements wrong. Douglas calls this phenomenon inductive risk and argues that it 
accounts for the different judgements in cases like the rat liver slides. In this case study, it is 
clear that what looks like an endeavour about facts has important components which are 
dependent on values consideration. These two components are, in the Douglas case study, 
and perhaps elsewhere, impossible to separate in the way which those who seek to use the 
fact/value dichotomy as a demarcation tool suggest.    
  Others have gone farther, arguing that sciences should not be value-free but require 
the use of certain values to improve the science, given particular histories. Often, the 
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prescribed values here were to be feminist values, invoked to improve sciences which are 
restricted by sexist history. Examples of this kind of work include Helen Longino’s work on 
prenatal determination of gender role behaviour and Donna Haraway’s famous work on 
primate behaviour.79 This source of rich examples goes far to suggest that far from being 
unproblematic, calling upon the fact/values distinction to carve out a sovereign role for 
bioethics, as was an important move in Goldenberg’s critique of Evidence-Based Ethics, 
treads on shaky ground indeed.  
  In conclusion, though thorough and rigorous critique of Evidence-Based Ethics is an 
important project, it is however a project which can be undertaken without depending on the 
is/ought distinction as a dubious demarcation tool to provide the boundary between ethics 
and the sciences, including medicine.   
New Developments in Values in EBM  
  There is some evidence that EBM is one scientific arena which is ripe for the kind of 
guidelines for adopting values that I have sketched in this chapter. In 2015, Michael Kelly,  
Iona Heath, Jeremy Howick and Trisha Greenhalgh, all members of the Evidence Based 
Medicine Renaissance Group (Greenhalgh et al. 2014) published “The importance of values 
in evidence-based medicine” in BMC Medical Ethics. In this article, they argue that,   
   Consideration of values can enhance every aspect of EBM, including:  
prioritizing which tests and treatments to investigate, selecting research designs and 
methods, assessing effectiveness and efficiency, supporting patient choice and 
taking account of the limited time and resources available to busy clinicians. Since 
values are integral to the practice of EBM, it follows that the highest standards of 
EBM require values to be made explicit, systematically explored, and integrated into 
decision making. (Kelly et al. 2015, 1)80   
  
An important upshot of their article is that there will be values in EBM, regardless of if we 
discuss them or not. By avoiding or downplaying a discussion of values, we do not keep 
                                               
79 Wylie’s case from archeology on the gendered attribution of early agricultural domestication, discussed in the 
section entitled, “A Proposal for Guidelines: Locality, Context-Dependency and Transparency,” would be an additional 
example of this kind of work.   
80 Emphasis mine.  
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scientific projects free from values but instead risk, “introduce[ing] new (mostly covert and 
unacknowledged) biases” (Kelly et al. 2015, 2).  
  The authors discuss fairly traditional places to point out values in a scientific project; 
determining which questions to ask and applying research findings in order to make clinical 
decisions. But importantly, they do not shy away from discussing roles for values which go 
right to the very heart of the scientific project of EBM. These include method selection 
(traditional RCT or “pragmatic” trial) and what they call “values in the broader sense,” which 
is explained in a section in which they examine the utilitarian values that underpin most of 
EBM (“value for money”), which come into conflict with the primarily deontological values of 
the clinic (physician’s duty of care to patients).    
  This article is an exciting step forward for the discussion of values in EBM. However, 
it perhaps paints too rosy a picture of what values can do. The traditional worries of 
pernicious relativism and wishful thinking, which occupy such an important place in the larger 
values in science literature, are not discussed here. This article establishes that EBM needs 
to talk about values; more work is needed to make sure this can be done without 
undermining the project of EBM. There is still a need for my guidelines, as discussed in the 
section entitled, “A Proposal for Guidelines: Locality, Context-Dependency and 
Transparency” here, though EBM seems to have made great progress in its discussion 
about values.  
  It would be too quick to say that this article itself represents a sea change in EBM on 
values. Several of these authors critique various aspects of EBM in other work, so perhaps 
they are not its most conservative supporters (Heath 2016; Kelly 2009; Greenhalgh 2015). 
Additionally, this article was published in a medical ethics journal, rather than a more 
mainstream medical journal, which perhaps indicates the authors’ awareness of where they 
were likely to find a friendly audience. Nevertheless, their interest discussing new and 
expanded roles for values suggests that EBM is one scientific project which might in the 
future be open to the previously described guidelines for purposefully adopting values. 
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In medicine, excitement about genetics has produced a new goal: personalized or 
precision medicine. This may seem to be such a different goal from Evidence-Based 
Medicine (EBM) that the issues discussed in this work will no longer be at issue. While it is 
true that personalized or precision medicine will have it’s own set of issues, I argue that 
many of the same concerns discussed by philosophers in the context of EBM would still be 
relevant in a “new paradigm” of personalized or precision medicine. These perennial 
problems include the problem of expertise, the problem of mechanisms, and the problem of 
values.   
This chapter contains four sections. First, I trace this new movement in medicine from 
the original label “personalized” to the currently accepted “precision” medicine. Next, I 
present the case that EBM will soon be replaced by genetics-based precision medicine. 
While many have promised this paradigm shift, it has not yet taken place. There are two 
possible kinds of reasons for this; reasons why precision medicine, as popularly promised, 
cannot take place in principle, and reasons why precision medicine has not yet taken place 
in practice.   
In my third and main section, I discuss three issues which have been raised in 
relation to EBM and the ways in which these issues crop up again in new forms in precision 
medicine. These include the problem of expertise, the problem of mechanisms, and the 
problem of values. The problem of expertise in EBM included worries about how important, 
and yet under-articulated and under-theorized, expertise was in this trend, which, if not 
augmented, could have serious consequences for the implementation of EBM for the clinic 
and for medical education. This issue would remain important in precision medicine. The 
problem of mechanisms was the difficulty of making clear the role of mechanisms as 
evidence in EBM, either within the evidence hierarchy or augmenting it in some way. This 
issue also includes the problem of stipulating how many and which confounders need to be 
included in an informative mechanism so that a useful picture of how the intervention worked 
was gained, without this becoming unnecessarily epistemologically burdensome. In precision 
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medicine, concern about the interaction of mechanisms and the hierarchy in producing 
evidence drops out, but worries about the possibly unmanageable scope of mechanisms 
remain. Lastly, in EBM, the problem of values was the difficulty of finding good ways to 
identify, reflect on and adopt values for use, once it became clear that EBM was not a value 
free enterprise. This challenge remains in full force in precision medicine.   
In my fourth section, I suggest that we should consider the consistency of these 
issues as a feature, rather than a flaw of philosophy of medicine. While medical movements 
might come and go, philosophy of medicine can still find footing for interaction with clinical 
practice.  
From “Personalized” to “Precision” Medicine  
The term “personalized medicine” has been tightly tied to outputs and applications of 
the Human Genome Project (Collins 2010). However, in their paper reviewing  
143 interviews with, “proponents of personalized genomic medicine—including scientists, 
translational researchers, commercial and non-profit developers, research funders, clinician 
researchers, clinicians in private practice, health professional educators, medical journal 
editors and health insurers,” Juengst et al. found that, “By 2012…powerful opinion leaders 
were abandoning ‘personalized medicine’ as a usefully descriptive name for their cause in 
favor of a new label: ‘precision medicine’” (2016). Why has this shift in terminology come to 
pass? What does it mean?  
While there are several possible origins for the term “precision medicine,” it was at 
least in use by 2008, when Clayton Christenson of Harvard Business School used it in his 
book, The Innovator's Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care to describe the 
good the molecular diagnostics could bring to medicine in removing clinical intuition 
(Christensen 2008; Katsnelson 2013).   
There were two main reasons for this shift away from “personalized” to “precision” 
medicine, according to Juengst et al.; first, decoupling the movement from patient 
empowerment efforts and second, an emphasis on lowering expectations from individually 
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tailored and unique interventions to improving interventions by learning more about smaller 
groups of patients with similar genomic disease risk associations.  
Juengst et al. argue that, “the operation of ‘precision’ equipment, large scale 
‘datamining’ activities, and the targeting of ‘smart bombs’ are the domains of professionals, 
not amateurs. In fact, with the shift to ‘precision medicine’ patient-driven decision making 
seems almost completely jettisoned as the revolution’s signature virtue” (2016, 25). This is in 
contrast to personalized medicine, which had retained connections to patient advocacy 
groups. This move is described by Juengst’s interviewees as necessary to avoid 
overburdening the patient as the “data tsunami” associated with genomic outputs continues 
to grow (2016, 25-26).  
In addition to reclaiming medicine as thoroughly the domain of the professional, on  
Juengst et al.’s account, precision medicine more honestly reflects the promise of using 
genetic and genomic information to improve interventions by emphasizing the way in which,  
“molecular information improves the precision with which patients are categorized and 
treated” (Katsnelson 2013). The unit at which interventions will be designed based on 
precision medicine, cannot quite be the individual, but can make claim to interventions 
tailored to very specific subgroups (Juengst 2016, 28). These interviewees also expressed 
hope that these groups based on DNA markers might replace problematic traditional social 
and racial categories.   
Both of these shifts were moves to moderate earlier rhetoric about the promise of 
future interventions which may have contributed to inflated hype among patients and their 
families. The words of Maynard Olsen, a genome scientist at the University of Washington, 
have been widely repeated as summing up the difficulties leading to this change; “I think  
‘personalized medicine’ was perhaps a useful rubric with which to launch this activity, but it 
sends a misleading message—actually both to ourselves and the broader community” 
(Katsnelson 2013; Juengst et al. 2016). At the same time, there has been some recent 
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philosophical work on personalized medicine, although not as much as on other trends in 
medicine such as EBM and narrative medicine. At the end of her book, Making Medical 
Knowledge, Solomon turns briefly to personalized medicine. She writes that personalized 
medicine is, “a term that has been widely used since about 2000, primarily to describe 
therapies that are tailored to individual biochemistry such as the sequence of the somatic cell 
genome (or proteome) or the cancer cell genome” (Solomon 2015, 227). She suggests that 
personalized medicine has been less readily adopted than other trends in medical 
epistemology, including EBM, translational medicine, consensus conferences and narrative 
medicine, and that when it has been adopted it was largely as a rhetorical device. This 
rhetorical appeal has allowed new biotechnologies to be presented to the public not as 
alarming but as part of individualized, tailored care. She writes, “Personalized medicine is 
rhetorically successful, bringing cutting-edge genomic science together with a rhetoric of 
individualized care, but it remains to be seen what substance lies behind the rhetoric” 
(Solomon 2015, 228).  
The move from “personalized” to “precision” when the rhetorical usefulness of 
“personalized” has worn thin is reflected in many recent initiatives. These include the 2013 
creation of the Institute for Precision Medicine, a joint venture between Weill Cornell Medical 
College and the New York Presbyterian Hospital, conferences in 2013 at the University of 
California- San Francisco and Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, and uptake by pharmaceutical 
companies in describing the virtues of certain of their products, such as the cancer drug  
Xalkori created by Pfizer (Katsnelson 2013). The popularity of the term was solidified by a 
2011 report on creating disease taxonomies based on molecular information rather than 
symptom clusters from the United States National Research Council named “Toward 
Precision Medicine” (Katsnelson 2013), and U.S. President Barack Obama’s call in 2015 for 
precision medicine (Ashley 2015; The White House 2015).   
However, that there is a strong difference between the terms is not, of course, 
universally accepted. Edward Abrahams, the president of the Personalized Medicine  
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Coalition, says, “there is not one iota of difference” between the two terms. Because of this 
lack of difference, and the public’s comfort with the term “personalized” in relation to various 
patient empowerment movements, “personalized” is to be preferred according to Abrahams 
for rhetorical reasons (Katsnelson 2013). Roden and Tyndale write, “To us, this [the use of 
the term precision medicine] seems premature at best…The term ‘precision medicine’ 
carries an expectation of perfect outcomes that not only is unrealistic but runs the risk of 
overhyping the potential of the field to patients and their families. We prefer to continue and 
expand the use of ‘personalized medicine’” (2013, 171). In contrast to the earlier expressed 
hope that precision medicine corrected for the high expectations created by “personalized 
medicine,” these authors worry that it is “precision medicine” that sets expectations too high.   
Some work uses both terms, or one as a subset of the other, without additional 
clarification (Mirnezami et al. 2012; Jameson and Longo 2015; Joyner and Paneth 2015). 
Additional concerns about precision medicine come from public health, including authors like 
Ronald Bayer and Sandro Galea, who worry that “that an unstinting focus on precision 
medicine by trusted spokespeople for health is a mistake — and a distraction from the goal 
of producing a healthier population,” in that precision medicine solidifies research and 
financial support for clinical medical interventions, when many of the improvements in health 
in the last few decades have come from improvements in various kinds of prevention and 
public health (2015). Because of the way in which it expresses that the target or the trend is 
not, in fact, individuals, but instead smaller, more precise subgroups, I will use the term 
“precision medicine” in what follows.  
 Replacing EBM with Precision Medicine: Why a Delay?  
Regardless of the encouraging rhetoric around personalized medicine and the 
clarification of the movement as precision medicine, it has yet to overtake or even challenge 





But Wait: Why Think Evidence Can Be Replaced or Have Competition?81  
  
  Why think that EBM could ever be “surpassed” in any sense? Surely no future 
movement in medicine will be able to get rid of the demand for evidence? If some movement 
were to do this, they would be in a great deal of epistemological trouble. How would such a 
field police claims about interventions to see if they were warranted if not by refence to 
evidence? Such a movement would have much more fundamental issues than those which 
are leveled at EBM in this work.  
Indeed, a medicine which “surpasses” EBM and is therefore unmoored from evidence 
would be unrecognizable as anything like medicine at all. There are a few confusions which 
together create this kind of worry. The first is just an error about what the content of EBM is. 
As detailed in the brief textual history of EBM in Chapter 1 of this work, the content of EBM 
was never just a claim that evidence was needed in order to decide on a course of 
treatment, as this worry seems to suggest. Instead, EBM included a set of much more 
specific claims about what evidence counts as good evidence, how to create and find this 
good evidence and how this good evidence might apply to individual patients in clinical 
settings. Again, these claims have changed and expanded over time in ways detailed in 
Chapter 1.   
  A second confusion that is causing the above worry is a lack of clarity about what it 
might mean for another movement to “surpass” EBM.82 For the above worry to make sense, 
a movement that surpasses EM must not share any of the claims that EBM makes. This 
would assume a very strong kind of reactionism. Or perhaps those who have this worry are 
reading too much into claims made by those in EBM or other movements that these 
                                               
81 Thank you to Nancy Cartwright for requesting this clarification. 
82 Of course, it is not the case that there can only be one trend which shapes medicine at any one time. For 
example, narrative medicine, which has not been the focus here, has been practiced largely at the same time as 
EBM though their goals and methodologies are deeply in tension (Solomon 2015). However, the narrative of 
precision medicine as someday replacing or overtaking EBM is well worn in the literature, perhaps because the 
units of measure and processes of reasoning to clinical intervention are so different in the two different trends (EBM 
as primarily population based and focusing on RCTs, precision medicine as individual based and focusing on 




movements are “new paradigms” in a strict Kuhnian sense. This would result in successive 
paradigms being “incommensurable,” which comes close to the charge being leveled in the 
above worry.   
  However, as I discuss in Chapter 1, EBM at least is not a new paradigm in the strict 
Kuhnian sense, regardless of what early proponents of this movement might have 
suggested. In addition, a similar sort of argument can be run to argue that 
personalized/precision medicine is not a new paradigm, at least not in a way that threatens 
to condemn us to Kuhnian incommensurability- either his strong earlier, or weaker later 
versions of the concept. Therefore, there is no reason to think that the surpassing of one 
movement in medicine with another in prominence requires that these two movements share 
no claims or are unable to use similar concepts to talk about goals and methods. In fact, 
although precision medicine focuses on smaller subgroups (ideally the individual) and 
methods derived from genetic testing and editing, and EBM focuses on evidence from 
populations derived from RCTs, they share in common a set of “puzzles” and goals 
regarding improving human well-being. 
So, this worry confuses the content of EBM and assumes a strict lack of overlap 
between medical movements. Yes, movements which come after and surpass the current 
movement in terms of influence or popularity (or even perhaps correctness) will likely share 
with EBM the demand for evidence to ground their claims about interventions. What will 
differ in this case is that for EBM what counts as good evidence will be obtained at a 
population level, using a particular set of techniques (randomization, blinding, and various 
statistical methods) while in a precision medicine setting good evidence is obtained on an 
individual or small subgroup level and will depend on other methods like CRISPR/Cas9, 
comparison work with the Human Genome Sequence and massive non-randomized cohort 
studies. Both agree that evidence is required to show our claims in medicine are warranted. 
However, this bare agreement is pretty empty—the reason these count as importantly 




Reasons for delay  
  
One major reason for this delay is that contrary to some popular accounts of 
genetics, there is rarely a one-to-one relationship between genotype and phenotype. That is, 
it is only in very rare cases that an intervention on a single gene can have an impact on a 
particular disease or condition, regardless of popular accounts of “genes for” everything from 
loneliness to obesity (Davis 2016; Winch 2016). These cases so far include cystic fibrosis,  
Huntington’s disease, some kinds of cancer, and early onset Alzheimer’s disease.83 Most 
other phenotypes we are interested in are either attributable to the cumulative very small 
effects of many genes or some combination of genes and some non-genetic environmental 
factors (Schaffner 2016; Barnes and Dupre 2008). Diagnostic tests to identify biomarkers 
which suggest the possibility of a particular phenotype may not take into consideration this 
cumulative effect of many genes, interaction of different genes, or the impact of a particular 
environment. Attempts to systematically study relevant environments may help to surmount 
part of this problem (Schaffner 2016).   
An additional possible reason for delay is the relative immaturity of the field. Genetics, 
even charitably, beginning with Mendel’s original work (lost to a wider scientific audience for 
many years), is only a 150-year-old endeavor. Perhaps it has just not progressed enough 
either in technique development or indeed in public trust such that it could take on a daunting 
application such as precision medicine.84    
Another reason for the delay in precision medicine is the current regulatory climate 
surrounding genetics. For example, in the United States, large public funding bodies like the 
National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug Administration, have banned research 
which involves gene editing in human embryos, although this ban may be softened or 
removed in the near future (Reardon 2015a; Reardon 2015b; Kaiser 2017). Research of this 
                                               
83 Additionally, it is not the case that precision medicine is necessarily successful in the development of interventions 
even in cases where this simpler relation holds, as Solomon reminds us using the case of cystic fibrosis (Solomon 
2014).  
84 This worry about an immaturity of practice and methods is also echoed in Solomon 2014.  
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kind has been undertaken by scientists in China, the United Kingdom and Sweden (Kaiser 
2017), but the US prohibition removes a crucial source of funding from a global perspective. 
Such research may be legally undertaken in the US using private funds, but the lack of 
public funding for this issue is one practical reason that precision medicine has yet to 
emerge as a viable trend in medicine.  
Precision medicine may not yet have surpassed EBM is because precision medicine 
is de-incentivized by both academia and industry. In academia, a shift to precision medicine 
is de-incentivized by publication practices. Very few medical journals publish case studies or 
any other type of research which features small sample sizes. Precision medicine, given the 
emphasis on therapies targeted to small subgroups, is likely to produce research in which 
the sample is small. Given the increasingly high pressure on academics to publish more, 
faster, these kinds of projects which produce findings many journals will not publish are de-
incentivized. And since neither the “publish or perish” culture of academia nor the custom of 
journals to discount small sample research looks to change in the future, these problems 
remain a practical block to the implementation of personalized medicine.  
Precision medicine might also be practically delayed because of the ways in which it 
would require industry to participate in de-incentivized activities. Currently, pharmaceutical 
companies are most interested in creating products which are of interest to large groups of 
people who can afford to buy these products for long periods of time. This explains the large 
range of drugs available for wide-spread chronic conditions which are common in the first 
world, such as depression and high blood pressure. Precision medicine intends to turn this 
model on its head, producing interventions which are tailored to very specific subgroups and 
whose effects are hoped to be permanent-that is, the intervention takes place once, and the 
phenotype is modified for the rest of the patient’s life. The current goal of pharmaceutical 
companies is to produce profits for their shareholders; precision medicine does not in any 
immediately obvious way further that goal. Thus the disincentive for industry to pursue 
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treatments of this kind might be a practical reason for the lack of adoption of precision 
medicine.85  
New Trend, Same Issues  
  
It might be tempting to think that the issues discussed in this work, issues 
surrounding the concepts of expertise, mechanisms and values, arise as interesting to 
philosophy of medicine only in the context of EBM. That is, if EBM were to fall from 
prominence, these issues would no longer be of interest to the philosophical community, and 
the kind of prescriptions offered in works such as this would be of little use.  
In the sections that follow, I argue that these particular issues, and philosophical 
recommendations and prescriptions regarding them, remain salient and rich even were there 
to be a switch in emphasis in medicine from EBM as a leading movement to precision 
medicine as a leading movement.86  
    
                                               
85 It is worth noting that some pharmaceutical companies are attempting to make the pivot to a precision mindset. 
Pfizer, creator of the aforementioned Xalkori cancer drug for patients with particular biomarkers, has committed 
resources to doing this kind of work in collaboration with Medco Health Solutions (Pfizer, 2011). It is not clear that 
this represents a feasible business model, since this collaboration is a very small part of the Pfizer operation.   
86 These three are not the only issues from EBM that are likely to carry over into precision medicine. EBM, to 
oversimplify greatly, is particularly interested in promoting randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and methodologies 
derived from them, such as systematic reviews and meta-analysis. EBM’s reliance on RCTs has been the subject 
of criticism from many sides. However, an especially important source of critique of the EBM dependence on 
RCTs is the “problem of generalizability.” The evidence that comes from a RCT is population based evidence-by 
definition, RCTs can tell us nothing about particular patients, but instead about average effects sizes in a 
particular population in a particular place and time. Problems arise however, because generally the results of 
RCTs are not taken only to apply to the group which participated in the trial itself, but also in some larger 
application population. Indeed, one of the reasons given for elevating the methodology of RCTs so high in the 
evidence hierarchy (especially given their high cost) is the assumption that they deliver “once and for all 
knowledge,” that they tell us what works, everywhere and for everyone. This is a faulty assumption and has been 
critiqued by many (Bluhm and Borgerson 2011, Cartwright 2007a; Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Fuller 2013, 
Worrall 2002; as well as many others). If these critiques are to be believed, then we have a problem; do we have 
any good reason to think that “what worked” there and then, will “work” here and now? This is the problem of 
generalizability.  
The problem of generalizability seems to be particular to EBM because of the movement’s uniquely strong claims 
about what RCTs can do.  Does this mean that the problem of generalizability is unique to EBM, and is therefore 
likely to just fall out in the event that EBM is overtaken by a different medical movement such as precision 
medicine? This is not the case. EBM has drawn particular fire for assuming it has solved the problem of 
generalizability through the use of RCTS when in fact it has not, but other methodologies have the same problem. 
We cannot know just from a cohort study that the results of a cohort study apply anywhere but in the cohort.  The 
problem of generalization would also continue to be a problem in the event that precision medicine was to replace 
EBM, but on a very different scale. Precision medicine explicitly avoids population based evidence and 
interventions and instead is supposed to operate on a much smaller scale. As a result, the problem of 
generalization too moves to a different scale; the worry here is that interventions designed to work with particular 
genes may not consistently generalize to different patients because of other confounding forces within the 
genome or within the environment. The problem of generalization would remain a concern in a precision 
medicine, but since it has not been the focus of this larger work, a more in depth consideration of this issue is not 
possible here.  
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Expertise in Precision Medicine  
In EBM, the role of expertise was and remains contested. In early EBM articles, 
expertise was part of what EBM sought to replace, the kind of authoritarian learning that was 
claimed to prevent progress in medicine (EBMWG 1992). Under later models, some role for 
expertise was added back, although the details of that role were not clear (Haynes 2002). It 
remains unclear if expertise is taken to be internal or external to evidence; that is, if expertise 
is to count as a kind of evidence itself, or perform other roles, such as the amalgamation of 
evidence and other aspects of the clinical encounter. It remains unclear if EBM takes the 
skills of expertise to be teachable, and if so how. Earlier in this work, I argued that the 
detailed theoretical account of expertise put forward by Collins and Evans could provide 
needed conceptual clarity for the EBM conception of expertise.   
The problem of how to explain, teach and make use of expertise would remain an 
issue in a new precision medicine movement, although perhaps in a slightly different 
manner. Because precision medicine does not have the same emphasis on making 
distinctions about kinds of evidence, concerns about whether expertise is internal or external 
to evidence may drop out. However, the issue about how to recognize and teach “good 
expertise” will remain. Indeed, because of the difficulties of interpreting new genomic data for 
individual patients, expertise may be an even greater issue than it was for EBM itself  
(Yatsenko et al 2015).   
Mechanisms in Precision Medicine  
EBM has been uncomfortable talking about causality and mechanisms. Despite many 
philosopher’s claims that what science (and therefore to some extent medicine) is interested 
in is making causal claims in order to understand and manipulate the world, (Cartwright 
2007b; Russo-Williamson 2007; Illari 2011) EBM has largely avoided or marginalized talk of 
causes or mechanisms. They are placed at a very low position on EBM hierarchies, when 
they are included at all. At best, EBM manuals suggest that mechanisms can help us to 
select promising hypothesis for research, decide between two interventions when the other 
188  
  
evidence is “of low quality” or non-existent, reconstruct what went wrong when a intervention 
expected to be effective is ineffective, or possibly apply evidence about populations to 
specific patients; at worst, they are considered better avoided all together (EBMWG 1992; 
Greenhalgh 2010; Sackett 2000).  
The usual reason given for this avoidance has been a historical and ethical one; that 
throughout history, the use of reasoning from mechanisms or talk about causality has 
resulted in bad consequences for patients. For example, for some time antiarrhythmic drugs 
including encainide and flecainide were prescribed to treat arrhythmia with the intention of 
preventing myocardial infarctions (Howick 2011b). There was a proposed mechanism for 
how this intervention was supposed to have a good effect; since the arrhythmias often 
preceded myocardial infarctions, it was thought that stopping the arrhythmia might stop the 
myocardial infarctions. Drugs like encainide and flecainide were thought to stop the 
arrhythmias, so it was thought that they would have the downstream effect of preventing the 
myocardial infarctions. This was not the correct account of the mechanism as became clear 
during the 1986 Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial (CAST). This randomized control trial 
of anti-arrhythmia drugs had to be stopped early because the differences between the trial 
arms were so large. Patients taking anti-arrythmia drugs were having myocardial infarctions, 
sometimes followed by death, at a much higher rate than those who were not. These drugs 
were taken off the market and are now rarely prescribed (Pratt and Moyé 1995; Moore 1995) 
This kind of story can be told many times throughout the history of medicine about many 
interventions that were eventually shown to be non-efficacious or indeed, even very harmful. 
These include bloodletting, stomach sleeping for infants for the avoidance of SIDS, and 
hormone use for menopausal women (Howick 2011b).  
It could be argued that in these cases the source of the problem is not the use of 
reasoning from mechanisms at all, but getting the mechanism wrong, or failing to recognize 
the entire range of mechanisms an intervention triggers. A new, revised account of the 
mechanism or mechanisms in question might well prove important for future research, at the 
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very least for activities such as hypothesis generation. It is these sorts of revisions to 
mechanisms which motivate many philosophers to argue that in contrast to EBM’s hesitancy 
to make use of mechanisms, mechanisms have the potential to be very useful for health 
research.  
However, this rehabilitation of mechanisms remains contentious in EBM. I have 
argued previously in this work that this is in part because of a lack of clarity about the size of 
mechanism-how much do we have to know before we can say that we know enough to take 
action based on a mechanism? Some philosophers and EBM activists, above and beyond 
these historical concerns, worry that we must know an incredible amount before we can say 
that we understand a mechanism, because we must know, according to them, all the 
possible confounders for a particular intervention (Howick 2011a; Howick 2011b).87 This is 
the case even for very foundational processes, such as the metabolization of drugs; even 
here there remains a remarkable amount of uncertainty. Howick writes, “The partial 
ignorance about the metabolic mechanism means that we cannot be sure what mechanisms 
are eventually activated by any drug (or its metabolites) that have been swallowed. More 
generally, the complexity of the human body makes it difficult to identify all relevant 
mechanisms activated by an intervention” (Howick 2011a).  
Others have slightly less high or less clear standards, but still worry that any gaps in 
our understanding mean that our mechanistic knowledge is flawed such that it is unusable.  
Other philosophers suggest not just that reasoning from mechanisms is a viable option in  
EBM, but that it is required, alongside the kind of evidence EBM usually champions,  
                                               
87 This “all possible confounders” standard of knowledge for mechanisms may have been chosen by these critics 
because of a mistaken idea that RCTs “control for all confounders, known and unknown” (Howick 2011b; Suresh 
2011, many others). Since some have thought that RCT’s have this power of control, a rival strategy must do just 
as well or better in order to be adopted. Many authors have argued that in reality, RCTs themselves do not have 
this power so mechanisms need not meet this criteria in order to be as good or better evidence for the use of a 
particular intervention. In addition, since RCTs do not have any particularly privileged position in personalized 
medicine, given that movements preferences for very large non-randomized cohort studies and individual gene-




“probabilistic evidence,” in order for an intervention to be put into practice with good 
evidential support (Clarke et. al. 2014; Illari 2011; Russo-Williamson 2007). Until there is 
some clear way of determining the scope of a particular mechanism, it seems unlikely that 
the two groups will come to any kind of consensus.  
What of these problems would remain after a shift from EBM to precision medicine?  
Given precision medicine’s lack of interest in universal or absolute evidence hierarchies, 
concerns about if mechanisms, or evidence which comes from them, belong on a hierarchy 
and if so, where, do fall away. However, the ongoing ontological and epistemic debate about 
what exactly is included in a mechanism and the follow-up concern about how much we 
need to know in order to say that we understand and can reliably make use of a mechanism 
will continue (Darden 2008). Given that genetics and precision medicine seem to exhibit the 
same kind of hesitancy about causation that often marks EBM (Schaffner 2016), it will 
continue to be unclear exactly what the proper role of mechanisms is, regardless of their 
size. In addition, since association studies, an important component of genetics, require a 
particular kind of mechanism-motivated hypothesis generation, the selection of a “candidate 
gene,” precision medicine will no doubt at least make use of mechanisms to this end  
(Schaffner 2016).88  
Values in Precision Medicine  
Especially in its earliest forms, EBM subscribed to the value-free ideal. Part of the 
movement was a reaction against authoritarian forms of medical school pedagogy, in which 
students were instructed to do as their instructor or attending clinician said without much 
recourse to independent investigation (Sackett 1996). Given this history, implicitly 
subscribing to the value-free ideal was a way of more closely allying medicine with other 
                                               
88 It might be tempting to worry about the claim that mechanisms or causal reasoning will be used in a methodology 
called association studies, given the popularity of catchphrases like “association is not causation.” However, within 
the literature, these are the kinds of studies used to eventually produce “proof of concept” for precision medicine 
interventions. In this context, the tension that philosophers might assume exists between association and 
causation is not present (Lewis and Knight 2012).  
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sciences, in order to access science’s prized status as objective and truth-seeking and help 
patients by improving knowledge.  
Over time, however, values began to creep into an explicit place in EBM. An early 
example of the discussion of values in EBM comes in the Sackett and Haynes models of the 
functioning of EBM (Sackett 1996, Haynes 2002). In these early Venn diagram style models,  
EBM is to take into account additional concerns alongside “best evidence.” In both models, 
one of these additional concerns is “patient values and preferences.” In these cases, the 
values of patients were the only values said to be taken into consideration; health care 
professionals remained objective, impartial, “value-free.” This was to change with the debut  
of Bill Fulford’s Values-Based Practice (VBP). According to Fulford,   
Just as we need evidence-based medicine because of the increasing complexity of 
the evidence underpinning medical decision-making, so, increasingly, do we need 
values-based medicine because of the increasing complexity of the values 
underpinning medical decision-making. Thus, we can think of values based 
medicine as being to values what evidence-based medicine is to evidence. Just as 
evidence-based medicine offers a process for working more effectively with 
complex and conflicting evidence in medicine, so values-based medicine offers a 
process, albeit a different process, for working more effectively with complex and 
conflicting values in medicine. (Fulford 2008)  
In this system, which Fulford explicitly claims to work alongside, and not in conflict with, 
EBM, the values of a much larger range of participants in the clinical encounter are to be 
taken into account. These participants with values worth taking into consideration in VBP 
include patients, health care workers, family and friends of the patient, social workers and 
other support workers. Fulford is perhaps a bit too optimistic that circumstances in the 
clinical setting will not make a difference to the ability of all these participants to have their 
values heard and too confident that any conflicts between the values aired by these 
participants can be navigated with goodwill and without explicit moral principles. (Fernandez 
and Wieten 2015; Thornton 2011) However, his VBP guidelines and workbooks represent 
some of the most important attempts to integrate values into an EBM-friendly framework.  
However, the problem of values for EBM that I am pointing to in this chapter is not 
the issue of how to take patient and other stakeholder’s values into account in the clinical 
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encounter. Instead, the issue is how to adopt values which appropriately guide EBM as a 
scientific project, given that the value-free ideal is neither feasible, nor to be desired (de 
Mello-Martin and Intemann 2016, Hicks 2014, Biddle 2013).  The goal here is to make clear 
that adopting goals need not result in a science of wishful thinking. Allowing a place for 
values does not mean an end to objectivity. Earlier in this work I have argued that three 
important guiding ideas can help to narrow the field of values for specific scientific projects; 
locality, context-dependency, and transparency. In EBM, the use of these guidelines might 
result in the adoption of the values like rigor, replicability, and waste-avoidance. However, 
given that many in EBM are still invested in the value-free ideal and that the value-adoption 
procedure I suggest should be replicated on a regular basis, values in EBM remain an issue.  
  Will this problem of values be replicated in precision medicine, should it succeed  
EBM as the next “new paradigm?” Like all other scientific projects (and indeed, like many 
other kind of endeavors) precision medicine will be guided by values. The value-free ideal is 
not a viable option. The only options are denial about the values in play (allowing them to go 
unexamined and unchanged) or awareness of the roles of possible values and beginning the 
hard work of examining, adopting and living up to values which fit the project. Given the long 
history of denying this guiding role of values, it is unlikely that precision medicine will escape 
the problem of values which has played a role in EBM. Precision medicine has different 
goals and priorities from EBM and so will require different values; differences in the “shape” 
of the project will mean that different values “fit” the project. But precision medicine will deal 
with the same “problem of values” which has plagued EBM.  
Implications of Problem Consistency for Philosophy of Medicine  
  
The third section of this chapter suggested that many of the problems faced by EBM 
would also be faced by precision medicine, should it be the next big medical trend; the 
problems of expertise, mechanisms and values. It might be tempting to see this consistency 
as reason for concern. The worry could be that the trends in medicine are consistently 
problematic (and not even in new or different ways!), or that philosophy of medicine makes 
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so little progress with these problems of expertise, mechanisms and values which continue 
to be relevant, even if EBM were to end tomorrow and be replaced by precision medicine.   
  However, there are other options. Both of these concerns can be explained in part by 
the serious disconnect between medicine and philosophy of medicine. Philosophers might 
like to think that new medical trends must be put in place with an awareness of the kind of 
problems that have been discussed by philosophers and historians in the past. However, in 
reality, there are different factors which contribute to the rise of particular trends in medicine. 
If the problem here is one of communication between philosophy of medicine and medicine, 
rather than one of a lack of progress in philosophy of medicine, or a lack of imagination in 
medicine, than the consistency in theoretical issues this chapter has demonstrated across 
medical trends can be a feature, not a flaw, because what we learn about these problems of 














































Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter 1  
In chapter 1, I provided an outline of the overall work, and a short textual history of 
Evidence Based Medicine, as a way of grounding the reader in some of the important 
components of the movement I examined. This does not, of course, include all the relevant 
texts of EBM, but rather a representative sampling. I discuss what I have called the “original 
texts,” including the “debut” article of EBM in 1992, the 1996 Sackett et al. article which 
provides the most often used definition of EBM, and the 2002 Haynes et al. article that 
marked a move to a more holistic style for EBM. This discussion of texts also provided an 
opportunity to discuss EBM as a possible paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense, and an 
exploration of the make up of the Evidenced-Based Medicine Working Group, a largely 
McMaster-based consortium of physicians with interests in epidemiology and biostatistics, 
the authors of the 1992 article.  
After the “original texts” I discussed a group of works which did much to shape the 
dissemination of EBM; clinical manuals. I looked specifically at the Users’ Guide to the 
Medical Literature, which was compiled from a group of articles in JAMA published by 
members of the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group. This manual advocates for 
individual clinical assessment of the evidence at bedside. That is, it asks that health 
professionals have a working knowledge of research methodology and statistics such that 
they can evaluate the quality of the evidence and amalgamate the findings of different 
related studies when making clinical decisions. While this requirement was once taken to be 
a very important feature of EBM, I traced the way in which this requirement has been 
loosened, and EBM advocates now provide pre-assessed evidence to practitioners, reverting 
to a divided system of epistemic labour.  
Next, I focused on the responses, by philosophers and others, to the claims made in 
these original texts and manuals. My analysis of this critical response identified three 
especially common critiques. First, that randomization is in some way different or less 
powerful than EBM takes it to be. Second, that mechanisms, largely set aside in EBM, are 
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crucial for the practice of medicine in various ways. Third that medicine requires an 
expanded role for clinical expertise, in a way in which EBM cannot or has not allowed for.  
Finally, I examined recent work in the EBM movement, which has coalesced around 
the themes of adaptation and renaissance. These works have asked if EBM is currently in 
crisis due to the involvement of monied interests and a failure to respond to critiques, 
attempted to persuade readers to accept a traditional view of EBM progress, proposed the 
addition of new theoretical resources, even farther then philosopher critics have called for, 
and attempted to produce a new Manifesto (to be discussed at this year’s Evidence Live 
conference at the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine) with significant online input 
from a variety of concerned parties.  
Chapter 2 
 Chapter 2 focused on expertise. I explained that EBM had articulated the relationship 
between expertise and evidence in three different influential models; The Pyramid Model, the 
Tripartite Model and the Amalgamation Model. These three models signaled very different 
things about the role of expertise in EBM. It remained unclear if expertise should be taken to 
be a kind of evidence, or a way to bring evidence together. As a way of improving our 
vocabulary around this problem, I suggested a new distinction; is expertise internal or 
external to evidence? It was also unclear if EBM is meant to make use of all three models of 
expertise, or if each previous model was to be dropped as a new one was proposed. Given 
these problems, I claimed that EBM is in need of augmentation from other fields on the topic 
of expertise. I additionally examined a few arguments which might be given to suggest that 
no more needs to be said about expertise in EBM and found these arguments wanting. 
I then examined several different accounts of expertise from fields such as sociology, 
philosophy, computer science, and science and technology studies. These included accounts 
by the Dreyfus brothers, Stephen Turner, J. D. Trout and Michael A. Bishop, and Harry 
Collins and Robert Evans. Each account was evaluated as to how well it was able to deal 
with some of the problems faced by the current clouded account of expertise in EBM. These 
included not conflicting with other important EBM claims, taking a stand on question of if 
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expertise was internal or external to evidence, explaining what makes for useful expertise, 
rather than authoritarian expertise, and an account of how this useful expertise might best be 
taught. On these grounds, I rejected the Dreyfus brothers’ account, which is the most 
commonly suggested account of expertise for EBM (which had found particular uptake in the 
nursing literature) and instead thought that the Collins and Evans account would be most 
helpful for EBM. This assistance from the Collins and Evans account will, however, only be 
made useful by clarifications from EBM itself on questions of expertise raised in the earlier 
part of the chapter. 
Chapter 3 
In my third chapter, I discussed an important debate in the EBM literature: the place 
of mechanisms in medicine. One group, proponents of the Russo-Williamson thesis, claim 
that both mechanisms and “probabilistic relationships,” the kind of evidence you can get from 
an RCT, are required in order to justify the use of an intervention. This is because of the 
methodological frailties of each which can be adjudicated by the other. EBM proponents, 
including Howick, have argued that RCTs do not have the methodological frailties identified, 
and that mechanisms have additional frailties that justify their diminished status in EBM. 
These frailties are articulated with reference to a standard set of historical examples where 
reasoning from mechanisms led to poor, sometimes devastating, outcomes.  
I suggested that at the root of this debate are two issues. The first is relatively 
straightforward; neither group is particularly clear about what exactly they think a mechanism 
is, and both state that they do not think this has much bearing on the debate. I suggested 
that additional clarity about what mechanisms are might improve the quality of the debate. 
Second, given the kinds of worries articulated by Howick, and dismissed by defenders of the 
Russo-Williamson thesis, I claimed that the underlying issue is the perceived “size” of 
mechanisms; how much about the world, about the conditions that allow or disallow a 
mechanism to do what it does, do you need to know before you can say that you have a 
mechanism that you can use to make decisions? The Russo-Wiliamson thesis assumes this 
is not a problem, while the Howick position is very focused on this issue. I suggested that we 
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could make use of a Strevens account of ceteris paribus laws in order to suggest that 
mechanisms can be useful without including all possible confounders.  
I then discussed an important reason for the lack of consensus about mechanisms in 
medicine; a disagreement about medicine’s goals and status as a science. Those who 
claimed that mechanisms have a clear role in medicine claim this in part because they see 
knowledge gathering as a primary goal of medicine, while those who deny the role of 
mechanisms see knowledge gathering not as primary, but only useful insofar as it serves 
what they take to be the main goal of medicine- the caring for and curing of patients. While I 
was sympathetic with the first group on the topic of the usefulness of mechanisms, I claimed 
that the second group can claim a better grasp of the, in some ways “unscientific,” nature of 
medicine. 
Chapter 4 
 Chapter 4 focused on values. As mentioned in chapter 2, values were taken to have a 
role in EBM in later models of the movement, but the values in question were always 
stipulated to be patient values. In response to this, Bill Fulford created his Values Based 
Practice workshops, workbooks, and other texts. Fulford wanted to take into account the 
values of all players in a clinical encounter, not just the values of the patient, and was careful 
to state that he created Values Based Practice as a compatible partner, rather than 
competitor, with EBM. After articulating his account and examining a case study, I critiqued 
his account of values as assuming values are static, which is a particularly problematic 
assumption in the health, and especially mental health, fields. 
But all of this had said little about the values at play in EBM, rather than how 
individual patient, or other actor, values are to be treated by EBM. I claimed that while EBM 
says little about its values explicitly, we have some resources to learn about EBM’s values 
implicitly. One of these is the Good Old Boy’s Sat Around a Table (GOBSAT) joke, a story 
often referenced as an explanation of what was humorously problematic about clinical 
decision-making before EBM. I suggested that these kinds of rhetorical tropes can help us to 
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see what values EBM holds; in this case the values of empirical research (instead of 
armchair rationalism) and a diversity of perspectives (rather than authoritarian exclusion).  
 However, perhaps these are not the values EBM would have upon reflection or are 
somehow inappropriate values. This concern brings us to a larger debate in the values in 
science literature. In the last 50 years, scholars have argued quite persuasively for the 
existence of values in science. Now the problem is, how can we distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate values in science? After critiquing the various options for legitimate 
and illegitimate distinctions currently on offer, I offered my own three guidelines for beginning 
to constrain values in scientific projects: locality, context-dependency and transparency. 
 I then articulated some concerns about a possible value-related cousin to EBM: 
Evidence Based Ethics. Some critiques of Evidence Based Ethics have placed considerable 
weight on the fact/value distinction to motivate their critique. While I agreed that there are 
reasons to be critical of this trend, I do not think that the fact/value distinction is the way to go 
about this critique. I pointed to two separate kinds of concern here; an argument by Putnam 
in the philosophy of language which suggests that some kinds of “thick” concepts do not split 
neatly into fact and value components and an example from the recent philosophy of science 
which suggests that the creation of our facts is shot through with values. 
 I concluded this chapter with a discussion of some new work on values from within 
EBM which suggests that the movement may look favorably on the recommendations I gave 
in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 
In chapter 5, I looked to future possible trends in medicine, namely, precision or 
personalized medicine. I discussed the difference (if any) between precision and 
personalized medicine, and what it would mean for precision medicine to “overtake” EBM as 
the dominant movement in medicine. These preliminaries handled, I claimed that the issues I 
have raised in EBM, issues of the roles of expertise, mechanisms, and values, would remain 
controversial even in a newly dominant precision medicine.  
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In precision medicine, the problem of expertise would remain largely the same. It is 
true that since precision medicine need not use the models used in EBM, the question of 
say, whether expertise is internal or external to evidence may lose some of its motivation. 
However, more general questions regarding what expertise is, how you can tell someone has 
it, if it is relational or not, and if it is possible to teach, will remain important. Indeed, given the 
way in which genomic data will be interpreted by clinicians for individual patients, it may well 
be an even more pressing issue in precision medicine.  
It is likely that if precision medicine, rather than EBM, were the order of the day, 
concerns about where mechanisms are included (if they are included at all) on the hierarchy 
of evidence would likely not be of greatest importance, given that precision medicine may not 
operate with these traditional models. However, the continuing debate about the ontological 
and epistemic qualities of mechanisms, as well as general concerns about the proper role of 
mechanistic reasoning in the clinic, will remain important, should this shift take place. 
It seems most clear that the problem of values will continue to be important for 
medicine, even if the medical world shifts its attention from EBM to precision medicine. 
These will however be different values, given that some of the priorities and methods of 
precision medicine differ from the priorities and methods of EBM. But in this scientific project, 
just as in many other kinds of scientific projects, values will continue to play a role. This 
means the problem of attempting to determine which of these values are legitimate and for 
the best, and which are illegitimate and problematic, will continue to be relevant. 
Finally, I examined what this consistency of problems across very different 
movements might mean for the philosophy of medicine. It might be the case, for instance, 
that this consistency of the issues of expertise, mechanisms, and values, which have been, 
in varying forms, the subject of many philosophers of medicine over time, indicates that our 
field is failing to make a difference, that our critiques and suggestions are not being heard, 
and (perhaps) should therefore be abandoned. I, however, claim instead that this just 
indicates both the broader relevance of the issues at hand and the difficulty of 
interdisciplinary work and communication. I urged philosophers of medicine not to see this 
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consistency as an indication of the impossibility of our task, but instead of the enduring 
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Appendix A  
Model Visualizations89  
  








                                               
89 These model depictions come from a variety of sources. These images, with their emphasis on the place of 
expertise, were created by the author. Pyramid Model  is based on written information in EBMWG, 1992. 
Model 2 is based on written information in Sackett et al., 1996. Model 3 is based on written information in 
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